Opinion
No. 1522 C.D. 2012
04-09-2013
Rodney L. Yentzer, Carol M. Yentzer, Jeffrey A. Yentzer and Rodney L. Yentzer II, t/d/b/a/ Doublin Gap Motocross, Inc., Appellants v. Hopewell Township, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Rodney L. Yentzer, Carol M. Yentzer, Jeffrey A. Yentzer, and Rodney L. Yentzer II (together, the Yentzers) doing business as Doublin Gap Motocross, Inc., appeal from the July 24, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County (trial court) declaring Hopewell Township's (Township) Ordinance 79-2 (Ordinance), as amended, valid and enforceable. We affirm.
The Yentzers have conducted motocross events for thirty years on two parcels of land in the Township. Fans of the events often camp on-site for the weekend. Residents of the Township have complained that the events increase traffic and create noise and air pollution.
Motocross is a form of motorcycle racing held on enclosed, off-road circuits.
The Ordinance, originally enacted in 1979, applied to public gatherings of 750 or more individuals. The Ordinance limits the hours of outdoor gatherings, requires permits and adequate sanitation facilities, and restricts alcohol consumption, public drunkenness, fighting, and indecent conduct. The Township amended the Ordinance in 2007, making it applicable to any public gathering of 450 or more individuals. The Ordinance includes an exception for gatherings consisting entirely of related individuals. The Ordinance also includes a severance clause, preserving the remainder of the Ordinance if a portion is declared invalid.
The Ordinance states in relevant part:
AN ORDINANCE REGULATING PUBLIC GATHERINGS, PROVIDING FOR PUBLIC GATHERING PERMITS AND REQUIRING ADEQUATE FACILITIES THEREFORE(Ordinance at 1.)
* * *
Section 4. It shall be unlawful for any person to be in an intoxicated condition in or on any street, highway, or public place within the Township.
Section 5. It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly start a fight, or to fight, or to commit any assault or battery in any public place within the Township.
Section 6. Any public gathering or event not held in a building shall be terminated not later than midnight, and it shall be unlawful for any person to remain on the premises between the hours of 1:00 and 6:00 am; provided that employees of the holders, managers or conductors of such gathering or event whose duties necessitate it, may remain on the premises for the performance of such duties.
Section 7. No such gathering, entertainment, or party shall be held or presented in any premises, unless such premises have been examined by the building inspector of the Township not more than three days in advance of the date of such gathering and found free of any fire hazard and found to be suitable for the purpose.
Section 14 of the Ordinance states: "This Ordinance is not intended to apply to any public gathering within the Township where all persons in attendance are related by blood or marriage." (Ordinance at 2.)
Section 16 of the Ordinance states: "If any sentence, clause, paragraph, section or portion of this Ordinance is declared by any Court of competent jurisdiction to be illegal, invalid or unconstitutional, such declaration shall not affect the remaining provisions of this Ordinance." (Ordinance at 2-3.)
On June 21, 2007, the Yentzers filed an action for declaratory judgment against the Township, asking that the Ordinance be declared null and void. On May 13, 2008, the trial court denied the Yentzers' motion for judgment on the pleadings. After a non-jury trial, the trial court issued an order on July 24, 2012, declaring the Ordinance to be valid and enforceable. The Yentzers appealed to this court.
"Our standard of review in a declaratory judgment action is limited to determining whether the trial court's findings are supported by substantial evidence, whether an error of law was committed or whether the trial court abused its discretion." City Council of the City of Reading v. Eppihimer, 835 A.2d 883, 886 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003).
The Yentzers first argue that the trial court erred in finding that the Township has authority to enact a public gathering ordinance because the Ordinance regulates a business that is not expressly subject to regulation in The Second Class Township Code (Code), Act of May 1, 1933, P.L. 103, as amended, 53 P.S. §§65101-68701. We disagree.
Townships of the Commonwealth "possess only such powers as have been granted to them by the legislature, either in express terms or which arise by necessary and fair implication or are incident to powers expressly granted or are essential to the declared objects and purposes of the townships." Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517, 521, 198 A.2d 514, 515 (1964). The Township argues that it enacted the Ordinance to preserve the health and welfare of its citizens.
Section 1506 of the Code provides:
[t]he board of supervisors may make and adopt any ordinances, bylaws, rules and regulations not inconsistent with or restrained by the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth necessary for the proper management, care and control of the township and its finances and the maintenance of peace, good government, health and welfare of the township and its citizens, trade, commerce and manufacturers.53 P.S. §66506 (emphasis added). Section 1527 of the Code states:
[t]he board of supervisors may adopt ordinances to secure the safety of persons or property within the township and to define disturbing the peace within the limits of the township.53 P.S. §66527 (emphasis added).
Thus, we must examine whether the Ordinance aims to protect the health and welfare of the Township. The Ordinance curtails drunkenness at large public gatherings, prevents people from staying on the premises between the hours of 1:00 a.m. and 6:00 a.m., subjects the site to inspection by the Township for safety issues, and requires adequate sanitary facilities. When large groups of people gather and drink alcohol, they can present a danger to themselves and to the persons and property of the community. Preventing such a gathering from occurring late at night mitigates this danger while reducing noise pollution. Requiring adequate sanitation prevents the spread of disease and noxious odors, and subjecting a gathering to inspection and permitting processes is necessary for enforcement. Thus, because the Ordinance addresses valid health and welfare concerns, the Township has the authority to enact the Ordinance.
The Yentzers next argue that the trial court should have found the Ordinance to be an invalid zoning ordinance. We disagree.
A zoning ordinance is subject to the provisions of the Pennsylvania Municipalities Planning Code (MPC), Act of July 31, 1968, P.L. 805, as amended, 53 P.S. §§10101-11202. A zoning ordinance that fails to follow the procedures included in the MPC is invalid on its face. See Board of Supervisors of Franklin Township v. Meals, 426 A.2d 1200, 1202 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1981) ("[W]e hereby hold that an ordinance which regulates a zoning principle, but does not contain the procedural safeguards mandated by the MPC is invalid on its face.").
The Ordinance does not prohibit motocross. The Ordinance does not involve zones, lot sizes, set-backs, accessory uses, special exceptions, variances, or other concepts typical of zoning ordinances. Because the Ordinance aims to regulate public gatherings in order to protect the public health and welfare, and the terms of the Ordinance do not exceed the scope of that goal, we conclude that the Ordinance is not a zoning ordinance. Therefore, the MPC requirements do not apply.
The Yentzers next argue that the trial court erred by finding that the Township can impose an arbitrary threshold on the number of people that can gather together. We disagree.
In support of their position, the Yentzers cite Simco Sales Service of Pennsylvania, Inc. v. Township of Lower Merion Board of Commissioners, 394 A.2d 642, 642-43 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1978), where a township enacted an ordinance banning the sale of ice cream on its streets. A corporation that operated ice cream trucks for fifty years challenged the regulation. Id. at 643. This court noted that an exercise of the police power must not be unreasonable, unduly oppressive, or patently beyond the necessities of the case. Id. at 644. This court found the ordinance to be an unreasonable and impermissible exercise of the township's police power. Id.
Unlike the ordinance in Simco, the Ordinance here does not completely ban any activity. Simco, 394 A.2d at 644. Instead, the Ordinance merely requires permits, limits hours of operation, and curtails dangerous behaviors. The Ordinance does not specifically regulate motocross.
Moreover, the court in Simco found the ordinance to be an arbitrary interference with private business because ice cream trucks posed no safety issues. Here, air pollution, noise pollution, property damage, fire hazards, and injury risks arising from large, public gatherings create legitimate health and safety concerns. The Ordinance's requirements are rationally related to protecting these health-related, governmental interests. Thus, we find the Ordinance to be a reasonable exercise of the Township's power.
Finally, the Yentzers argue that the trial court erred by finding that the Ordinance unconstitutionally distinguishes between related and unrelated persons. We disagree.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. "'The equal protection provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution are analyzed by this Court under the same standards used by the United States Supreme Court when reviewing equal protection claims under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.'" McCusker v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Board (Rushton Mining Company), 536 Pa. 380, 384, 639 A.2d 776, 777 (1994) (citation omitted).
"The appropriate standard of review under an equal protection analysis depends upon the type of interest affected by the statutory classification." Id. at 385, 639 A.2d at 778. A classification implicating neither suspect classes nor fundamental rights will be sustained if it passes a "rational basis" test. Id. In order to sustain constitutional attack under the rational basis test, a classification "'need only be directed at the accomplishment of a legitimate governmental interest, and to do so in a manner which is not arbitrary or unreasonable.'" Id. at 391, 639 A.2d at 781 (citation omitted).
Arguably, family gatherings are less likely to be rowdy or dangerous to community persons or property than gatherings of non-related persons or gatherings sponsored by businesses. Thus, we find that the exemption is rationally related to a legitimate government interest in protecting the health and welfare of the community.
We do note that it appears unlikely that the family exemption would ever actually apply, given the unlikelihood that a gathering of 450 individuals could occur without including a single individual unrelated by blood or marriage.
Moreover, even if we found the exemption unconstitutional, the remainder of the Ordinance would still be valid because the Ordinance includes a severance clause, and the Yentzers would remain unentitled to the declaratory judgment they seek. --------
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 9th day of April, 2013, we hereby affirm the July 24, 2012, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge