Opinion
2020–01764 Index No. 151226/18
03-16-2022
Elvisa YENINAS, appellant, v. Gogba KAH, et al., respondents.
Krentsel Guzman Herbert, LLP, New York, NY (Marcia K. Raicus of counsel), for appellant.
Krentsel Guzman Herbert, LLP, New York, NY (Marcia K. Raicus of counsel), for appellant.
ANGELA G. IANNACCI, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, ROBERT J. MILLER, JOSEPH J. MALTESE, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Charles M. Troia, J.), dated February 4, 2020. The order granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the subject accident.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs.
The plaintiff commenced this action to recover damages for personal injuries that she allegedly sustained in a motor vehicle accident that occurred on February 24, 2018. Thereafter, the defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident. The Supreme Court granted the defendants' motion, and the plaintiff appeals.
The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the accident (see Toure v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 98 N.Y.2d 345, 746 N.Y.S.2d 865, 774 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gaddy v. Eyler, 79 N.Y.2d 955, 956–957, 582 N.Y.S.2d 990, 591 N.E.2d 1176 ). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injuries to the plaintiff's left shoulder and left knee did not constitute serious injuries under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see Staff v. Yshua, 59 A.D.3d 614, 874 N.Y.S.2d 180 ). The defendants also demonstrated, prima facie, that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury under the 90/180–day category of Insurance Law § 5102(d) (see John v. Linden, 124 A.D.3d 598, 599, 1 N.Y.S.3d 274 ; Marin v. Ieni, 108 A.D.3d 656, 657, 969 N.Y.S.2d 165 ; Richards v. Tyson, 64 A.D.3d 760, 761, 883 N.Y.S.2d 575 ). In opposition, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Il Chung Lim v. Chrabaszcz, 95 A.D.3d 950, 951, 944 N.Y.S.2d 236 ; McLoud v. Reyes, 82 A.D.3d 848, 849, 919 N.Y.S.2d 32 ).
Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.
IANNACCI, J.P., RIVERA, MILLER and MALTESE, JJ., concur.