Opinion
No. CV 07 4006978
December 7, 2007
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
As permitted by General Statutes § 31-249b, the plaintiff, Yellow Cab Garage Company, Inc., has filed a timely appeal from the decision of the board of review (board) of the employment security appeals division that awarded unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant, Carolyn Johnson, a former employee. The defendant is the administrator of the unemployment compensation act (administrator).
General Statutes § 31-249b provides in relevant part: "At any time before the board's decision has become final, any party . . . may appeal to the superior court . . . for the judicial district wherein the appellant resides . . ."
While the claimant and the board are technically defendants in this matter, throughout this memorandum the term "the defendant" will refer to the administrator, the term "the claimant" will refer Carolyn Johnson and the term "the board" will refer to the board of review of the employment security appeals division.
The certified record filed by the board sets forth the following: On July 23, 2006, the administrator ruled that the claimant was eligible for unemployment benefits and notified the plaintiff of its chargeability on August 11, 2006. On August 22, 2006, the plaintiff appealed the administrator's decision, which was reversed by an appeals referee (the referee) on September 20, 2006, based on the referee's determination that the claimant "voluntarily left suitable work without good cause attributable to the employer." On September 25, 2006, the claimant appealed to the board, which reviewed the record, including the tape recording of the hearing before the referee. The board reversed the referee's decision on December 8, 2006, concluding that pursuant to General Statutes § 31-236(a)(2)(A), "[t]he claimant is not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits . . ."
The referee found the following facts, which were adopted by the board: (1) The plaintiff employed the claimant as a part-time bookkeeper earning $17.50 per hour, from March 3, 2003, to June 23, 2006; (2) The claimant quit her job on June 23, 2006, telling the defendant that she had found a job that was a better fit for her needs; (3) On September 12, 2005, the plaintiff notified the claimant that it was changing its health insurance. This change required the claimant to pay a $2,000 deductible before all other medical expenses were paid and also removed a $500 co-pay for outpatient surgery and all hospitalization deductibles. The plaintiff provides health insurance as a company benefit without costs to the claimant; (4) The claimant did not like the new deductible that the insurance required and she complained to Kern Bruno, a supervisor. Bruno told the claimant that this was the only health insurance plan that the employer would be utilizing. The claimant never discussed her dissatisfaction with the plaintiff's health insurance again; and (5) The claimant found another job that paid four dollars an hour less, but had better health insurance coverage, which the claimant needed because she was getting older. The referee concluded that "the claimant acquiesced to the change in health insurance instituted by the employer by working for nine months, well beyond the usual recognized three month trial period. She therefore has waived the right to claim that the change in the employer's health insurance plan rendered the job unsuitable."
In its review, the board found that "the claimant had sufficient financial justification for remaining in the job until she secured other full-time employment. The Claimant determined that the job had become unsuitable because she was unable to afford the first $2,000 of her annual health care expenses out of pocket. It would have made little sense for the claimant to quit before she had another job, which would have left her unable to pay any of her basic living expenses. Quitting immediately would also have deprived the claimant of an opportunity to assess how the new health plan would affect her. [The plaintiff's] witnesses indicated that once the deductible was met, the benefits were better than the previous plan and `until you use the plan, you don't know how it will work.' The claimant also unsuccessfully pursued alternatives to leaving by seeking a raise to offset the cost of the deductible. We conclude that the change in health benefits provided the claimant with good cause, attributable to the employer, for leaving the job. In so ruling, we adopt the referee's finding of fact as our own, except that we add the following to the referee's finding of fact [numbers three and four]: 3. The change went into effect on October 1, 2005 . . . [and] 4. In November or December of 2005, the claimant asked for an increase in her hourly wage. The employer denied her request."
The plaintiff purports to bring its appeal pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA), General Statutes § 4-166 et seq. As the defendant correctly points out, however, "[u]nemployment compensation act appeals are exempt from the [UAPA] pursuant to General Statutes § 4-186, which provides in relevant part: `(a) Appeals . . . from decisions of the Employment Security Board of Review to the courts, as is provided in [chapter 567] . . . are excepted from the provisions of this chapter.' " Fullerton v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 280 Conn. 745, 755 n. 7, 911 A.2d 736 (2006).
"Ordinarily, administrative appeals are subject to the pleading and filing requirements specified in Practice Book § 14-7(a). Notably, Practice Book § 14-7(b) excepts unemployment compensation appeals from those requirements, providing that [a]ppeals from the employment security board of review shall follow the procedure set forth in [Practice Book] chapter 22 . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Law Offices of Neil Johnson v Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 101 Conn.App. 782, 790, 924 A.2d 859 (2007). Practice Book § 22-9 sets forth this required procedure for unemployment compensation appeals.
Practice Book § 22-9 provides: "(a) Such appeals are heard by the court upon the certified copy of the record filed by the board. The court does not retry the facts or hear evidence. It considers no evidence other than that certified to it by the board, and then for the limited purpose of determining whether the finding should be corrected, or whether there was any evidence to support in law the conclusions reached. It cannot review the conclusions of the board when these depend upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of witnesses . . ."
The Superior Court's scope of review of "an administrative appeal, pursuant to General Statutes § 31-249b, [as to findings of] fact, [is that the] court is limited to a review of the record certified and filed by the board of review. The court must not retry facts nor hear evidence . . . If, however, the issue is one of law, the court has the broader responsibility of determining whether the administrative action resulted from an incorrect application of the law to the facts found or could not reasonably or logically have followed from such facts. Although the court may not substitute its own conclusions for those of the administrative board, it retains the ultimate obligation to determine whether the administrative action was unreasonable, arbitrary, illegal, or an abuse of discretion." (Citations omitted.) United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 209 Conn. 381, 385-86, 551 A.2d 724 (1988).
The plaintiff seeks to have the court consider an uncertified transcript which it simply appended to the plaintiff's memorandum in support of its appeal. The plaintiff did not seek to add this to the record by filing a motion to correct the board's factual findings, as required by Practice Book § 22-4. The absence of such a motion forecloses this court from considering any facts that are not in the certified record. See JSF Promotions, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 265 Conn. 413, 422-23, 828 A.2d 609 (2003) ("[The plaintiff's] failure to file a timely motion for correction of the board's findings in accordance with [Practice Book] § 22-4 prevents further review of those facts found by the board"). The plaintiff's contention that the board's initial treatment of its appeal as a motion for reconsideration somehow affected its ability to file a motion to correct is mistaken. The time limit for filing such a motion does not begin to run until "after the record has been filed with the superior court . . ." Practice Book § 22-4. Therefore, the uncertified transcript that is appended to the plaintiff's memorandum in support cannot be considered by this court.
Practice Book § 22-4 provides: "if the appellant desires to have the finding of the board corrected he or she must, within two weeks after the record has been filed with the superior court, unless the time is extended for cause by the board, file with the board a motion for the correction of the finding and with it such portions of the evidence as she or she deems relevant and material to the corrections asked for . . ."
In addition, "[a] reviewing court must accept the findings made by the Board as to witness credibility and must defer to the agency's conclusions to be drawn from the evidence. Howell v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 174 Conn. 529, [ 391 A.2d 165] (1978); Briggs v. State Employees' Retirement Commission, 210 Conn. 214, 217, [ 554 A.2d 292,] (1989)." Cooper v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of New London at Norwich, Docket No. CV 98 115055 (February 24, 2000, Corradino, J.).
Further, "[a]s a general rule, [t]he application of statutory criteria to determine a claimant's eligibility for unemployment compensation . . . involves mixed questions of fact and law in which the expertise of the administrative agency is highly relevant." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United Parcel Services, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, supra, 209 Conn. 386. "Moreover, the construction placed upon a statute or regulation by the agency responsible for its enforcement and administration is entitled to great deference. See Griffin Hospital v. Commission on Hospitals Health Care, 200 Conn. 489, 496, 512 A.2d 199, appeal dismissed, 479 U.S. 1023, 107 S.Ct. 781, 93 L.Ed.2d 819 (1986)." Strawberry Hill Animal Hospital, LLC v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of Stamford-Norwalk at Stamford, Docket No. CV 05 4007548 (August 8, 2006, Lewis, J.T.R.). Therefore, the court may only consider whether the record contains evidence to support the board's conclusions.
This appeal is governed by General Statutes § 31-236, which provides in relevant part: "(a) An individual shall be ineligible for benefits . . . (2)(A) If, in the opinion of the administrator, the individual has left suitable work voluntarily and without good cause attributable to the employer, until such individual has earned at least ten times such individual's benefit rate . . . provided . . . no individual shall be ineligible for benefits if the individual leaves suitable work (i) for good cause attributable to the employer, including leaving as a result of changes in conditions created by the individual's employer . . ."
Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-236-17 provides in relevant part: "(a) Except as provided in section 31-236-58, an individual shall be ineligible for benefits until he has earned at least ten times his benefit rate if the Administrator finds that he has left suitable work voluntarily, as defined in section 31-236-18, and without good cause attributable to the employer, as defined in section 31-236-19. (b) No individual shall be ineligible for benefits as a result of a voluntary leaving of work under any of the following circumstances: (1) where he leaves suitable work for good cause attributable to the employer, including leaving as a result of changes in conditions created by his employer Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-236-19 provides in relevant part: "In determining whether an individual's reason for leaving suitable work is for good cause attributable to the employer, the Administrator must find that the reason relates to wages, hours or working conditions which comprise the employment that the individual voluntarily left."
"Valid [state] agency regulations have the force of statutes and constitute law." Acro Technology, Inc. v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 25 Conn.App. 130, 135, 593 A.2d 154 (1991).
On appeal, the plaintiff argues that the board's decision awarding unemployment compensation benefits to the claimant was not supported by the substantial evidence in the record. The board concluded that the claimant left work for good cause attributable to the employer because of the change in health insurance. Health insurance may qualify as wages See Bermudez v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford at New Britain, Docket No. CV 89 0370447 (September 4, 1991, Koletsky, J.) (6 C.S.C.R. 891, 893) [4 Conn. L. Rptr. 811], where the court held that the board "could reasonably have found that the medical insurance in question [were] wages under General Statutes § 31-222." The change in wages, according to the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies § 31-236-19, constitutes good cause for the claimant to voluntarily quit her employment. Further, the change in the condition was attributable to the employer because it changed the only health insurance plan it provided to employees.
The plaintiff makes other arguments in support of sustaining its appeal; e.g., that the claimant acquiesced to the changed employment conditions; but as stated above, the trial court is limited in its review of unemployment compensation act appeals. The court may only review the record before it to determine if the board's conclusion is supported by that record. The court, therefore, does not reach these arguments.
General Statutes § 31-222 sets forth definitions for General Statutes chapter 567, unemployment compensation.
The board further found that the claimant was in a difficult situation because she could not quit her job, lest she be unable to financially support herself. The only practical alternative she had was to continue her employment under the new health insurance plan, which she eventually determined she could not afford. The board additionally found that if the claimant had immediately ceased her employment, she would not have had an opportunity to assess the impact of the new health insurance plan on her financial circumstances. The claimant, as noted by the board, also tried to offset the change in health insurance by attempting to obtain a raise. This attempt, however, was ultimately unsuccessful.
Given the limited review a trial court exercises over unemployment compensation act appeals and the board's application of the facts to the governing provisions of law, the court finds that the board had sufficient evidence before it when it concluded that the claimant was not disqualified from receiving unemployment compensation benefits. Based on this finding, the court cannot disturb the board's conclusion. The assessment of the credibility, weight and inferences drawn from the evidence are in the province of the board, not the court.
For all the foregoing reasons, the plaintiff's appeal is hereby dismissed.