Yellot v. Poritzky

6 Citing cases

  1. Dubbs v. Stribling Associates

    274 A.D.2d 32 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 13 times
    In Dubbs v Stribling Assocs., 274 AD2d 32, 37 (1st Dept 2000), the court's finding that the principal-broker relationship terminated by reason of the accomplishment of the transaction for which the defendant-brokers were hired was based on its factual finding that the broker was hired to find a purchaser for the plaintiffs' apartment.

    The answer to this question is pivotal since, in the absence of a continuing principal/broker relationship, defendants had no duty to disclose information they learned after contracting to purchase plaintiffs' apartment regarding the availability of the Kelly apartment (see, Midcourt Builders Corp. v. Eagan, 36 A.D.2d 90, affd 31 N.Y.2d 728; see also, Olson v. Brickles, 203 Va. 447). The courts of our State do not appear to have definitively addressed the issue of whether a fiduciary relationship survives the execution of a contract between a broker and her principal (see, Yellot v. Poritzky, 170 A.D.2d 676; Falle v. Metalios, 132 A.D.2d 518;Geisler v. Department of State, 73 A.D.2d 392; Midcourt Builders Corp. v. Eagan, supra). However, other jurisdictions considering the issue have concluded that a broker's fiduciary duty terminates when a legally binding contract to purchase the client's property is executed (see e.g., Sylvestor v. Beck, 406 Pa. 607 [Sup Ct, Pa];Hardy v. Davis, 223 Md. 229 [Ct of App, Maryland]; Jones v. Allen, 294 S.W.2d 259 [Ct of Civ App, Texas]; Edna Mae Development, Co. v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 79 Ill. App.2d 251 [App Ct, Ill];Clinkenbeard v. Central Southwest Oil Corp., 526 F.2d 649 [Ct of App, 5th Cir]; Irby v. Lee, 512 P.2d 253 [Ct of App, Ok]; First Trust Co. of Montana v. McKenna, 614 P.2d 1027 [Sup Ct, Montana]).

  2. Edwards v. Walsh

    169 A.D.3d 865 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 19 times

    This evidence was sufficient to demonstrate, prima facie, that Maureen and Walsh Properties breached their fiduciary duty to the plaintiff (cf.Dubbs v. Stribling & Assoc., 96 N.Y.2d at 341, 728 N.Y.S.2d 413, 752 N.E.2d 850 ). Additionally, this evidence established, inter alia, that Maureen made material omissions of fact upon which the plaintiff relied to his detriment (cf.Yellot v. Poritzky, 170 A.D.2d 676, 567 N.Y.S.2d 91 ; cf. alsoMatter of Imperato, 149 A.D.3d 1072, 1073, 53 N.Y.S.3d 661 ). In opposition, the Walsh defendants failed to raise a triable issue of fact.

  3. Greenberg v. Joffee

    34 A.D.3d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)   Cited 23 times

    In opposition, the plaintiff submitted the affidavit of his daughter, who stated that Porter failed to disclose that the respondent Neil Joffee was a licensed real estate broker interested in buying the property for investment purposes, and that Porter had known Joffee prior to the sale. This was insufficient to raise a triable issue of fact as to whether Porter and Resort breached a fiduciary duty and that their conduct was the direct and proximate cause of a loss ( see Yellot v Poritzky, 170 AD2d 676, 677; see generally Zuckerman v City of New York, 49 NY2d 557, 562; cf. Baii Banking Corp. v Northville Indus. Corp., 232 AD2d 349, 350; TPL Assoc, v Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 146 AD2d 468). In addition, the Supreme Court properly granted that branch of Joffee's motion which was for summary judgment on his counterclaim for specific performance of the contract for the sale of the estate's real property.

  4. Reiser Inc. v. Roberts Real Estate

    292 A.D.2d 726 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 22 times

    Accepting these allegations, as we must, in the light most favorable to plaintiff (see, Foresite Props. v. Halsdorf, 172 A.D.2d 929, 930), we nevertheless find that they are insufficient to create a material issue of fact precluding summary judgment on the issue of whether defendant breached its fiduciary duty. "In New York, it is well settled that a real estate broker is a fiduciary with a duty of loyalty and an obligation to act in the best interests of the principal * * *" (Dubbs v. Stribling Assocs., 96 N.Y.2d 337, 340 [citations omitted]; see, Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate v. Berner, 202 A.D.2d 949, 951; Douglas Holly Inc. v. Rice, 161 A.D.2d 560, 561, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 709). This duty, however, is not unlimited (see, Sonnenschein v. Douglas Elliman-Gibbons Ives, 96 N.Y.2d 369, 375-376 [holding that a broker had no duty to refrain from showing other properties to a purchaser who is in the process of negotiating to purchase the principal's property]; Yellot v. Poritzky, 170 A.D.2d 676, 677 [no duty to disclose to principal the broker's purchase of a parcel contiguous to the parcel broker purchased from principal]). Indeed, in our view, the duty is not so broad as to render a broker responsible for protecting its principal's interests with respect to a property that has not been listed with that broker.

  5. Rallis v. Brannigan

    2008 N.Y. Slip Op. 30164 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)   Cited 1 times

    A selling broker does not breach her fiduciary obligation by purchasing her principal's property at a fair and reasonable price after disclosing her intention to purchase the principal's property. Yellot v. Poritzky, 170 AD2d 676, 677 (2d Dep't 1991). Indeed, there is no prohibition against a broker purchasing the property of her principal provided the broker's position is clearly made known to the principal.

  6. Shovak v. Long Island Commercial Bank

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 32760 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)   Cited 1 times

    However, the Court is faced with allegations only by the Bank versus the plaintiff's allegations that he experienced a financial shock based on the ultimate mortgage payments. Clearly, the record does not reflect what evidence could or would be adduced after discovery or at trial see Yellot v Poritzky, 170 AD2d 676 (2nd Dept 1991). Now, plaintiff has presented viable allegations of a fiduciary relationship.