Id. Otherwise, leaving open a contract's term of place of performance at the time of execution of the contract allows the appellant, as the holder, at some future time to determine venue at its own will and pleasure. Id.; Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238, 239 (Tex.Civ.App. — Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd). Accordingly, we conclude that such a unilateral designation by appellant does not establish prima facie proof that venue was proper in Harris County under section 15.035(a).

See Donald v. Agricultural Livestock Finance Corporation, 495 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1973, no writ); and Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd). The question to be decided is whether a motion to set aside a default judgment which does not act as a general appearance for the purpose of a plea of privilege would so act for the purpose of a challenge to the jurisdiction. This rule in reference to the plea of privilege has been held applicable even where the plea of privilege is filed subsequent to the motion to set aside.

Neither does such a motion serve as a waiver of a plea of privilege. Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd). McDonald supports the proposition that a defendant may urge a motion to set aside a default judgment without waiving a subsequent hearing on a plea of privilege, reasoning that such motion does not invoke action by the trial court on the merits of the case.

McManus v. Texas Development Bureau, 73 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1934, no writ). Here, as in Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd), the place of payment of the note is left open for determination at a later date at the will and pleasure of the appellee or some subsequent holder of the note. Subdivision 5 of Article 1995 does not permit such a deviation from the basic right of a person to be sued in the county of his residence.

There are a number of Texas cases involving this type of provision. A case directly in point is Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1951, writ dism'd). The suit there was on a promissory note that was payable "to the order of the General Distributing Company, 2814 Main Street, Dallas, Texas, or at such other place as the holder thereof may from time to time in writing appoint."

Specifically, Loomis argues that because the Association could determine to change the location of its principal place of business, the designation in the note for place of payment is inherently uncertain, citing Dowd v. Dowd,359 S.W.2d 287 (Tex.Civ.App. Texarkana 1962, writ dism.); Yell v. Prock,238 S.W.2d 238 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1951, writ dism.); and McManus v. Texas Development Bureau, 73 S.W.2d 655 (Tex.Civ.App. Dallas 1934, no writ). In Dowd, the note sued upon was payable "at the office of the holder hereof as may be designated from time to time"; in Yell, the note was payable "to the order of the General Distributing Company, 2814 Main Street, Dallas, Texas, or at such other place as the holder hereof may from time to time in writing appoint"; and in McManus, the note was payable "at the office of the Texas Development Bureau, or bank, at Dallas, Texas, or at the place of residence of the owner, legal holder or assignee of note, at his option."

This court has already held against this character of contention. Yell v. Prock, 238 S.W.2d 238 (Fort Worth Civ.App., 1951, writ dism.). See also Turner v. Ephraim, 28 S.W.2d 608 (El Paso Civ.App., 1930, no writ hist.).

Appellees cite Dowd v. Dowd, Tex.Civ.App., 359 S.W.2d 287, writ dism., where the court held that venue lay in the residence of the promissor where the note recited that it was payable at "State Line Discount Houst at office of holder hereof as may be designated from time to time." The Court held that the place of payment was uncertain and cited Yell v. Prock, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 238, writ dism. In this latter case the note was payable "to the order of the General Distributing Company, 2814 Main Street, Dallas, Texas, or at such other place as the holder hereof may from time to time in writing appoint."

However, if we could reach it, it would have to be sustained under the doctrine announced in Wolf v. Sahm, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 564, 120 S.W. 1114, point p. 1117 (1909); same case, 55 Tex. Civ. App. 564, 121 S.W. 561, (w. ref.,). See Spinnler v. Armstrong, Tex.Civ.App., 63 S.W.2d 1071 (n. w. h.), pt. p. 1075; Turner v. Ephraim, Tex.Civ.App., 28 S.W.2d 608 (n. w. h.); Yell v. Prock, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 238 (w. dis.,). The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

* * *" The instrument is a negotiable instrument and could be transferred to a holder or holders whose offices might not be in Bowie County, Texas, but might be in various other counties, and "as designated from time to time" as provided in the instrument. We think this case is more closely akin to the case of Yell v. Prock, Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 238, wr. dism., and authorities cited therein, than to the Brown, Harrison and Coffield cases. In Yell v. Prock, supra, a plea of privilege case, the suit was on a note payable "to the order of the General Distributing Company, 2814 Main Street, Dallas, Texas, or at such other place as the holder hereof may from time to time in writing appoint."