We have previously recognized that a property owner has a right of access to abutting highways and streets. E.g., Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422, 424 (N.D. 1980). Section 24-01-01.

The use of the lane must be consistent with the purpose of the original easement for highway purposes. SeeYegen v. City of Bismarck , 291 N.W.2d 422, 425–26 (N.D. 1980) (citing Donovan v. Allert , 11 N.D. 289, 91 N.W. 441, 443 (N.D. 1902) ) ("The ultimate issue to be determined was whether or not the use of the street for telephone posts and wires was within the purposes of the original dedication to the public. More specifically, ‘to what public purposes were the streets originally dedicated?’ "); Cosgriff v. Tri–State Telephone & Telegraph Co. , 15 N.D. 210, 107 N.W. 525, 526 (N.D. 1906) ("The proposed use must be within the purpose of the original dedication."). If the use is inconsistent with the purpose of the original easement the abutting landowner is entitled to compensation.

It therefore should bring no surprise to find that in the takings cases a question whether regulatory action substantially advances a legitimate public aim has more often than not been treated by the federal courts as a legal issue. See, e. g., New Port Largo, Inc. v. Monroe County, 95 F. 3d 1084, 1092 (CA11 1996) (whether regulatory taking occurred is an issue for the court); Mid Gulf, Inc. v. Bishop, 792 F. Supp. 1205, 1213-1214, 1215 (Kan. 1992) (whether city's regulations unreasonable and a taking a question of law for the court); Gissel v. Kenmare Township, 512 N. W. 2d 470, 474 (N. D. 1994) (necessity for proposed taking a question for the court); Yegen v. Bismarck, 291 N. W. 2d 422, 424 (N. D. 1980) (taking vel non of private property for public use a question of law). But see Gray v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways, 427 S. E. 2d 899 (S. C. App. 1992) (whether no taking because closing of intersection was needed to prevent serious public harm is jury issue).

. . . Much should be left to the city's discretion."); Gillam v. Landrieu, 455 F.Supp. 1030 (E.D. La.1978) ("A vehicle owner who . . . parks overtime at a meter is not effectuating a constitutionally protected right."); Dep't of Highways v. Capone, 298 So. 2d 94, 97 (La. Ct. App. 1974) ("We believe it elementary that no person, be he property owner or not, has the absolute, inalienable and unqualified right to utilize a public street for parking purposes. To the contrary, parking on public thoroughfares is a privilege enjoyed by the public at large, subject, of course, to reasonable regulation under proper exercise of the police power."); Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422, 425 (N.D. 1980) ("No person has the absolute, unqualified right to utilize a public street for parking purposes. Parking on public thoroughfares is not a right, but a privilege to be enjoyed by the public at large subject to reasonable regulations under the police power."); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Or. 321, 162 P.2d 371, 375 ("Parking is not a right, but a privilege, and, as such, is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power."); Hickey v. Riley, 177 Or. 321, 332-33, 162 P.2d 371, 375-76 (1945) ("The use of parking meters has been generally approved by the courts. . . . The imposition of a parking fee for regulatory purposes has likewise been approved generally."); Galvis v. State, Dept. of Transp., 140 Wash. App. 693, 706-07, 167 P.3d 584, 590 (2007) (noting the "well-established authority that parking on the public right of way is a privilege, revocable by the State at any time"); Sandona v. City of Cle Elum, 37 Wash.2d 831, 840, 226 P.2d 889 (1951) (parking on the street is a privilege,

[¶14] This Court has interpreted Donovan to mean that the proposed use need only be "consistent" with the purpose of the original dedication for street or highway purposes. See, e.g. , Ceynar v. Tesoro Logistics LP , 2017 ND 112, ¶¶ 14-16, 894 N.W.2d 374 ; Yegen v. City of Bismarck , 291 N.W.2d 422, 425-26 (N.D. 1980) ; Cityof Fargo v. Fahrlander , 199 N.W.2d 30, 34 (N.D. 1972) ; Cosgriff v. Tri-State Tel. & Tel. Co. , 15 N.D. 210, 214-17, 107 N.W. 525, 526-27 (1906). Thus, in Fahrlander and Cosgriff this Court held construction of a city mall project and of telegraph and telephone lines, respectively, were not consistent with the purpose of streets and highways for travel or transportation.

"[A] property owner has a right of access to abutting highways and streets." Cady at 469; Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980). Cady ruled that the right of access is "a private right which entitles the abutting land owner [to] just compensation if that right is impaired or destroyed." 472 N.W.2d at 469.

Cases and authorities that may be applicable to this determination are cited in the comprehensive analysis made by Justice Vande Walle in Eck v. City of Bismarck, 283 N.W.2d 193 (N.D. 1979) ( Eck I). See also Rippley v. City of Lincoln, 330 N.W.2d 505 (N.D. 1983), and Eck v. City of Bismarck, 302 N.W.2d 739 (N.D. 1981) ( Eck II). Eck I, Eck II, and Rippley were zoning cases. Compare Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422, 424 (N.D. 1980) with syllabus 5 of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Morton County, 131 N.W.2d 557, 559 (N.D. 1964). General rules are especially made inapplicable by specific statutes and, in some cases, by the procedures adopted by the parties.

As mentioned earlier, this appeal is before us following a summary judgment entered in favor of the plaintiff corporations. The purpose of the summary judgment, under Rule 56, N.D.R.Civ.P., is to promote the expeditious resolution of a legal conflict on its merits, without a trial, where there exists no dispute as to material facts and where only a question of law must be determined. Pioneer State Bank v. Johnsrud, 284 N.W.2d 292 (N.D. 1979). It is the party moving for summary judgment who must clearly demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980). A summary judgment may be based upon the pleadings, depositions, admissions, affidavits, interrogatories, and the inferences that may be drawn therefrom.

It is well settled that summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, North Dakota Rules of Civil Procedure, is available for a prompt and expeditious disposition of a controversy without a trial if there is no dispute as to a material fact and if there is no dispute regarding the inferences that may be drawn from the facts, or if only a question of law is involved. E. g., Zuraff v. Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 252 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1977); Farmers Elevator Co. v. David, 234 N.W.2d 26 (N.D. 1975). It is equally well settled that a party moving for a summary judgment must clearly demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. E. g., Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980). We must also consider the relevant facts to determine if they are adequate for the issuance of a writ of mandamus.

Richard v. Credit Suisse, 242 N.Y. 346, 152 N.E. 110, 111 (1926). The party moving for a summary judgment must clearly demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Yegen v. City of Bismarck, 291 N.W.2d 422 (N.D. 1980). Thus, we have said that: