Opinion
No. 99 Civ. 4923 (JFK).
December 26, 2000.
MEMORANDUM OPINION and ORDER
Before the Court are the Defendant's motion in limine to preclude the introduction of evidence regarding two withdrawn claims, Plaintiff's cross-motion to amend her complaint, and various other evidentiary disputes raised by the parties. For the reasons outlined below, the Defendant's motion in limine is granted and the Plaintiff's motion is denied. The evidentiary disputes will be discussed in more detail below.
Plaintiff Augustina Yeboah brought this action against the Government on July 7, 1999, under The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (b) et sec., ("FTCA"), claiming she suffered permanent injuries when she fell a year earlier on the steps of the Grand Concourse Post Office in the Bronx. At that time Plaintiff's husband, Moses Yeboah, also asserted a claim against the Government for loss of his wife's services. See Complaint at ¶ 17-19, 23. Ms. Yeboah had filed a claim with the Post Office on October 29, 1999 alleging that she sustained injuries to her head, neck and back when she fell, but there were no allegations in that claim regarding injuries to her knee, nor were any claims asserted by Mr. Yeboah in that administrative claim. See Gaudett Decl. Ex. 1.
According to the Government, as of November 17, 2000 Plaintiffs had still not filed administrative claims for those alleged injuries, see Gaudet Declaration at ¶ 3-4, claims which are now time-barred. See 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) ("A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues."). Plaintiff's counsel responds that the Plaintiffs did file relevant administrative claims after "recent" requests for additional forms,see Goldman Affirmation ¶ 16-17, but does not indicate when the claim was filed, nor is it possible to ascertain when, if ever, this claim was filed since the copy of the claim form submitted is not dated.See Goldman Affirmation, Exh. F (mistakenly referred to in ¶ 17 of the Affirmation as Exhibit G).
Under the statute, any claim against the Government arising from this accident had to be filed as of July 7, 2000.
The Government maintains that Plaintiff didn't mail this claim to the Post Office until December 8, 2000. See Def.'s Reply Memo. at 3; see also Def.'s Reply Memo Ex. A.
Because Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative claims regarding the alleged knee injury or Mr. Yeboah's loss of the services of his wife, the Government duly objected to the inclusion of these claims in the instant action; on March 3, 2000 the parties entered into a stipulation that Plaintiff would withdraw claims without prejudice. See Def.'s Memo Ex. A. The Government now seeks to preclude the admission of any evidence regarding alleged injuries to Ms. Yeboah's knee, or regarding Mr. Yeboah's claim for loss of services, since Plaintiffs did not exhaust administrative remedies with respect to either of these claims and are now barred from doing so. See Def.'s Memo. at 1. Plaintiffs counter with a request for leave to amend the Complaint to include Ms. Yeboah's claim for injuries to her knee and Mr. Yeboah's claim for loss of services.See Goldman Affirmation at ¶ 3.
The issue is not, as the Plaintiff argues, whether the Government had notice of these claims, was able to defend against them or will be prejudiced by their inclusion; the question before the Court is strictly jurisdictional. If the Plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies with respect to these claims then the Court cannot assert jurisdiction over them. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides that negligence claims against the government cannot be brought "unless the claimant shall have first presented the claim to the appropriate Federal agency and his claim shall have been finally denied by the agency in writing." 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (a). Counsel's assertion that it is a "foregone conclusion" that the Postal Service will deny the disputed claims is irrelevant since the Plaintiff cannot bypass the administrative dispute process and proceed directly to District Court no matter what the likelihood of success at the administrative level. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); James v. United States, No. 99 Civ. 4238, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11246, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2000) ("The Court has no subject matter jurisdiction over a tort claim unless the claimant has first . . . exhausted his administrative remedies.")
By submitting an undated claim form, Plaintiff has not rebutted Defendant's contention that she had, failed to even file the appropriate administrative claims before the statute of limitations had run. Therefore this Court has no choice but to deny Plaintiffs' request to amend the Complaint.
Furthermore, since Ms. Yeboah's claim regarding injuries to her knee and Mr. Yeboah's claim for loss of services are not properly before the Court, this Court must grant the Government's motion in limine precluding the admission of evidence regarding these claims since such evidence would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The proposed evidence would not have "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence . . . more probable or less probable . . .," Fed.R.Evid. 401, and therefore would not be relevant to the remaining claims and so should not be admitted. See Fed.R.Evid. 402 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."). Even if it could be argued that the proposed evidence was relevant, Federal Rule of Evidence 403 would preclude its admission since its "probative value would be outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Fed.R.Evid. 403. Consequently, Plaintiff Augustina Yeboah is precluded from introducing during trial any evidence regarding alleged injuries to her knee or her husband's claim for loss of her services.
The parties have raised several other evidentiary disputes which the Court will consider in turn. First of all, in its Order dated November 1, this Court mandated that the Plaintiff identify, by November 20, 2000, the proposed witnesses referred to as "Other Postal Personnel" in her Pre-Trial Order. The Government has informed the Court, in a letter dated December 1, 2000, that the Plaintiff failed to comply with this order. Plaintiff's counsel doesn't dispute this; he simply and cavalierly states in a letter dated December 4, 2000 that "[t]he names of these individuals have been provided in our pine-trial order and the discovery phase of this case." Since Plaintiff has disregarded the direct Order of this Court by failing to identify the proposed witnesses by the stated deadline, Plaintiff is hereby precluded from calling any witnesses from the Post Office who were not identified, by name, in her Pre-Trial Order.
The November 20 Order also mandated that the parties confer and provide the Court with stipulations regarding the use of those witnesses identified only by broad categories in Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Order. In its December 1, 2000 letter the Government informed the Court that the parties had agreed not to object, on authenticity-grounds, to the admissibility of any of plaintiff's medical records, thereby dispensing with the need for testimony by medical records custodians. Nevertheless, the Government has expressed concern that Plaintiff's Pre-Trial Order lists generic categories of medical records that were neither specifically identified nor attached to the Pre-Trial Order, and requests for more specific information have been ignored. See Government's letter dated December 1, 2000. The Court directs the Plaintiff to identify, with sufficient detail, any and all medical records which will be introduced at trial by the close of business on January 12, 2001. Plaintiff will be precluded from introducing any documents not clearly identified by that date.
The Court also directs that Plaintiff must provide the Government with the identity of the proposed witness from the Moshulu Nursing Home by the close of business on January 12, 2001, or such testimony will be precluded.
Furthermore, the Court agrees with Government objections to Plaintiff's intention to offer testimony from six medical doctors during the trial on the grounds that this testimony would be both excessive and, to the extent that it related to Plaintiff's alleged knee injuries, irrelevant. Testimony from two medical doctors should be more than sufficient, so the Court directs Plaintiff to identify, by the close of business January 12, 2001, two doctors who will present testimony, limiting their testimony to the alleged injuries to Plaintiff's head, back and neck.
Finally, Plaintiff objects to the Government's request to amend its exhibit list to include employment related documents concerning Plaintiff's lost wage claim, cynically claiming that these documents "were obtained well past the completion date of discovery." Plaintiff's December 4, 2000 letter at 2. The Court shouldn't need to remind Plaintiff of Magistrate Judge Katz' determination that the Plaintiff, by failing "to comply with defendant's legitimate discovery requests and . . . provid[ing] misleading information and hollow excuses," see Magistrate Judge Katz's October 20, 2000 Order at 8, had thwarted the Government's earnest attempts to secure employment-related information before the close of discovery. Judge Katz imposed sanctions against Plaintiff's attorney for this behavior, see id. at 12, and this Court will not reward Plaintiff's intransigence by precluding the admission of that evidence. The Government's request to amend its exhibit list is granted.
The parties are reminded that a firm trial date of February 5, 2001 has been set in this matter.
SO OPDERED.