Opinion
No. COA12–1379.
2013-07-2
Carol [C.] YEAGER, Plaintiff v. [George D.] YEAGER, Defendant.
Aylward Family Law, by Dr. Ilonka Aylward, for Plaintiff. Leonard G. Kornberg, for Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 4 May 2012 by Judge Christy T. Mann in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 27 March 2013. Aylward Family Law, by Dr. Ilonka Aylward, for Plaintiff. Leonard G. Kornberg, for Defendant.
ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiff Carol C. Yeager appeals from an order awarding $4,605.00 in attorney's fees to Defendant George D. Yeager as a sanction against Plaintiff for her seeking the issuance of a mandamus petition by this Court. On appeal, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred in calculating the amount of attorney's fees that should be awarded to Defendant, by requiring that payment be made directly to Defendant's counsel rather than to Defendant, and by requiring that payment be made prior to the date upon which the trial court entered a formal written order directing the making of that payment. In addition to the issues raised in Plaintiff's brief, the parties have filed numerous motions and other documents with this Court in which each party, generally speaking, challenges filings made by his or her opponent and seeks the imposition of sanctions or other relief. After careful consideration of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's order in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that the trial court's order should be affirmed and that the motions and other requests for relief that the parties have filed with this Court during the pendency of this appeal should be denied or dismissed as moot.
I. Factual Background
The parties were married on 17 June 1972 and separated on or about 19 March 2007. On 6 May 2008, Plaintiff filed a complaint seeking, among other things, postseparation support, alimony, and equitable distribution. On 12 June 2008, Defendant filed an answer in which he denied certain of the material allegations contained in Plaintiff's complaint, asserted various affirmative defenses, and asked to be awarded more than half of the parties' marital and divisible property during the course of the equitable distribution proceeding. After the completion of the pleadings, the parties engaged in discovery and litigated the issues that had arisen between them.
On 27 January 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting the trial court to enter “an order commanding [Defendant's] counsel to refrain from directing derogatory remarks at [Plaintiff's] counsel.” On 1 February 2012, Plaintiff sent an email to the trial court “seeking resolution” of her motion. However, Plaintiff “received no response” to this request. On 24 February 2012, the trial court conducted a Final Pretrial Conference at which Plaintiff “again sought ... an order commanding [Defendant's] counsel to refrain from directing derogatory remarks at [Plaintiff's] counsel.” During the course of this pretrial conference, the parties provided the trial court with information concerning various interactions between counsel for Plaintiff and Defendant. At the conclusion of that discussion, the trial court indicated that it did not intend to enter an order admonishing counsel for Defendant as requested by counsel for Plaintiff.
On 9 March 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition with this Court seeking the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the trial court “to immediately enter” an order in response to Plaintiff's “request to admonish [Defendant's] counsel and forbid his use of derogatory personal attacks against [Plaintiff's] counsel.” At the time that he responded to Plaintiff's petition, Defendant requested the imposition of sanctions upon Plaintiff's counsel for filing the mandamus petition. On 16 March 2012, this Court entered an order denying Plaintiff's mandamus petition. On 29 March 2012, we entered an order granting Defendant's sanctions motion in which we stated that:
The motion filed in this cause on the 14th of March 2012 and designated “Motion for Sanctions under Rule 34” is allowed. Plaintiff Carol Yeager shall pay costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by defendant George D. Yeager in the filing of this motion and response to plaintiff's petition. This matter is remanded to the trial court for a hearing to determine those amounts.
The trial court conducted a hearing on 19 April 2012 for the purpose of determining “the amount of the Sanction that should be ordered pursuant to the Court of Appeals Order Sanctioning the Plaintiff.” On 4 May 2012, the trial court entered an order sanctioning Plaintiff by requiring Plaintiff to pay Defendant $4,605 in attorney's fees. On 9 May 2012, Plaintiff noted an appeal from the trial court's order. On 21 May 2012, Plaintiff filed a petition with the Supreme Court seeking the issuance of a writ of certiorari for the purpose of reviewing this Court's decision to deny her mandamus petition and grant Defendant's sanctions motion. On 1 June 2012, Defendant responded to Plaintiff's certiorari petition and requested the imposition of sanctions. The Supreme Court rejected both parties' requests on 23 August 2012.
On 4 June 2012, after noting her appeal from the trial court's sanctions order to this Court and while her certiorari petition was pending before the Supreme Court, Plaintiff filed a motion with the trial court in which she sought relief from the sanctions order pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60. On 5 June 2012, Plaintiff filed a motion with this Court asking that this case be remanded to the trial court for the limited purpose of obtaining an indication as to how the trial court would be inclined to rule on Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 in the event that Plaintiff had not noted an appeal from the sanctions order. On 20 June 2012, this Court entered an order directing that this case be “remanded to the trial court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the ... motion [pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60] pending before it,” “reduce its findings of fact and conclusions of law to writing,” “indicate what action it would be inclined to take were an appeal not pending before this Court,” and “forward its findings of fact and conclusions of law to this Court.”
A hearing was held before the trial court for the purpose of considering Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 on 17 August 2012. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court orally indicated that Plaintiff's motion should be denied. On 31 August 2012, Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's ruling. On 28 March 2013, the trial court entered a written order indicating that Plaintiff's motion should be denied. On 14 May 2013, Plaintiff withdrew her appeal from the trial court's determination with respect to her motion pursuant to N .C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60. As a result, the only issues that remain before us are those that Plaintiff has raised in connection with her appeal from the trial court's sanctions order.
II. Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
“The applicable standard of review on appeal where, as here, the trial court sits without a jury, is ‘whether there is competent evidence to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.’ ‘Findings of fact by the trial court in a non-jury trial have the force and effect of a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal if there is evidence to support those findings. A trial court's conclusions of law, however, are reviewable de novo.’ “ Belk v. Belk, –––N.C. App ––––, ––––, 728 S.E.2d 356, 358 (2012) (quoting In re Estate of Archibald (Edwards), 183 N.C.App. 274, 276, 644 S.E.2d 264, 266 (2007) (internal citations omitted), and Shear v. Stevens Building Co., 107 N.C.App. 154, 160, 418 S.E.2d 841, 845 (1992) (internal citation omitted)).
A “trial court, in making an award of attorneys' fees, must explain why the particular award is appropriate and how the court arrived at the particular amount. Specifically, ‘an award of attorney's fees usually requires that the trial court enter findings of fact as to the time and labor expended, skill required, customary fee for like work, and experience or ability of the attorney based on competent evidence.’ “ Dunn v. Canoy, 180 N.C.App. 30, 49, 636 S.E.2d 243, 255 (2006) (citing Davis v. Wrenn, 121 N.C.App. 156, 160, 464 S.E.2d 708, 711 (1995), cert. denied, 343 N.C. 305, 471 S.E.2d 69 (1996), overruled in part on other grounds, Forbis v. Neal, 361 N.C. 519, 524, 649 S.E.2d 382, 386 (2007), and quoting Couch v. Private Diagnostic Clinic, 146 N.C.App. 658, 672, 554 S.E.2d 356, 366 (2001), disc. review denied, 355 N.C. 348, 563 S.E.2d 562 (2002)), disc. review denied,361 N.C. 351, 645 S.E.2d 766 (2007). “However, the trial court is not required to make detailed findings of fact for each factor.” Furmick v. Miner, 154 N.C.App. 460, 462–63, 573 S.E.2d 172, 175 (2002) (citations omitted). In making the required findings, the trial court may properly rely on sources such as counsel's statements concerning the amount of time that he or she spent working on the issue or case in question and the trial court's own observations about the attorney's skills:
[T]he court properly relied on the statement of the caveators' attorney as to the amount of time he devoted to the case. The attorney was an officer of the court. The court observed the attorney during the trial and could determine his skill in trying the case as well as the difficulty of the problems faced by the attorney. We assume the court took these factors into account in setting the attorney's fee.
Dyer v. State, 331 N.C. 374, 378, 416 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1992). We will now proceed to utilize this standard of review and these basic legal principles in evaluating the validity of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's sanctions order.
B. Attorney's Fee Award
In accordance with a prior order of this Court requiring the payment of attorney's fees, the trial court conducted a hearing “to [d]etermine the amount of the Sanction that should be ordered pursuant to the Court of Appeals Order Sanctioning the Plaintiff.” At the remand hearing, Defendant's counsel testified about the amount of attorney's fees that Defendant allegedly incurred in responding to Plaintiff's mandamus petition. According to Defendant's trial counsel, the work that he performed in responding to Plaintiff's petition included a review of that document, which consisted of a “filing [that] was 50 or 60 pages” and “included emails [and] other documents[.]” Moreover, Defendant's counsel testified that he reviewed the cases and other authority cited by Plaintiff, conducted legal research concerning the issues raised by Plaintiff's mandamus petition, and consulted with Defendant concerning the appropriate manner in which to respond to the mandamus petition. After engaging in these activities, Defendant's counsel prepared a response to Plaintiff's mandamus petition and submitted it to this Court. Following the filing of Plaintiff's reply to his response, Defendant's counsel reviewed that document for the purpose of determining whether any further filings should be made. According to Defendant's counsel, the estimated amount of attorney's fees presented in his testimony did not include the time that he spent reviewing the file the night before the remand hearing or the time that he actually spent appearing at the remand hearing.
In response to questions posed by the trial court concerning his background, Defendant's counsel testified that he had graduated from law school magna cum laude, had been ranked fifth in his class, and had been the associate editor of the law review. Defendant's counsel had been practicing law for fourteen years and had handled family law cases throughout that period of time. As of the date of the remand hearing, about seventy per cent of his practice involved handling family law matters, most of which involved litigation in the trial courts. Defendant's counsel charged $300.00 an hour for appellate work, which he admittedly did not like doing. Although Defendant's counsel had initially agreed to represent Defendant on a flat fee basis, he testified that, for “anything with the Court of Appeals, anything in Superior Court, and anything regarding a lot of these extraneous motions,” Defendant “[was] paying [counsel] on an hourly basis” given that Defendant and Defendant's counsel had “jointly determined that that was outside the scope of what was initially contemplated by [their] arrangement.”
On cross-examination, Defendant's counsel testified that, in the event that he was not awarded the attorney's fees described in his testimony, he would bill Defendant for the full amount incurred in defending against Plaintiff's petition for a writ of mandamus and stated that Defendant was “going to pay [counsel] every cent he owes[.]” As of the time of the hearing, Defendant had paid $10,000 to $15,000, including expenses, to his counsel. The calculation of the number of hours that Defendant's counsel had spent working on responding to the mandamus petition had been prepared the night before the remand hearing.
In its sanctions order, the trial court found, in pertinent part, that:
1. On March 29, 2012 the Court of Appeals entered an order, awarding attorneys fees and costs as a sanction for the Plaintiff' [s] filing of a [petition seeking the issuance of] a Writ of Mandamus against [the trial court.] The sole issue that the Court of Appeals required this Court to determine was the dollar amount that was appropriate for Attorneys fees and costs that the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay under Rule 34 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure for the Filing of the [petition seeking a] Writ [of Mandamus].
....
3. Counsel for the Defendant testified regarding the hours he spent responding to Plaintiff's [petition for the issuance of a] Writ of Mandamus. The Court finds the following hours spent in this matter were reasonable given the unique nature of the [petition for the issuance of a] Writ [of Mandamus].
a. Review [of the petition seeking issuance of a] Writ [of Mandamus] and attachments (approx. 50 pages), 1.5 Hours[.]
b. Consultation with client regarding options-l hour[, w]hich the Court reduces ... down to .5 hours.
c. Pull cases[ ] and other legal references and review [-] 3.5 hours[.]
d. Review Transcript from the hearing in front of Judge Mann [-] 1.5 hours[.]
e. Case law research—see if any exist[s], including other jurisdictions–2.5 hours[.]
f. Prepare brief, review [-] 3.85 hours[.]
g. Review response filed by [Plaintiff -] 1 hour[.]
h. Hearing on sanction motion[-] 40 minutes[.]
[i]. [T] ime the Court allots for completing the order [-] 1 hour[.]
4. The total amount of time, which the court finds is reasonable, for having to handle the defense of the [petition for issuance of a] Writ [of Mandamus] was 15.35 hours.
5. The Defendant's counsel's rate for Appellate Court work is $300 per hour. He has been practicing in North Carolina since 1997 within Mecklenburg County and surrounding Courts. He also does some appellate work. Approximately 70% of his practice is handling domestic relations matters in these various courts.
6. He graduated Magna Cum Laude from law school and was an Associate Editor of his Law Review. His expertise in the courtroom, is at least[ ] consistent with the $300 rate that he charges. In this Court's experience the rate [ ] which he charges is well within [the] standard charged by other family court practitioners who practice in front of this Court with similar experience.
7. Given the unique nature of the [petition for the issuance of a] Writ [of Mandamus], the amount of time spent determining whether there was any relevant authority for Plaintiff's actions was reasonable.
8. The Court finds that the total amount that is reasonable [for] attorneys fees and costs in this matter was 15.35 hours, times the reasonable hourly rate of $300 per hour. Consequently, [the] total dollar amount this Court finds is reasonable as a sanction is $4605.
We conclude that the testimony offered at the hearing supports the trial court's findings of fact and that the trial court's findings adequately address the factors that must be considered in determining the appropriate amount of attorney's fees to be awarded in this case, including “the time and labor expended, skill required, customary fee for like work, and experience or ability of the attorney.” Dunn, 180 N.C. at 49, 636 S.E.2d at 255. In addition, we further conclude that the trial court's findings support its conclusion that Defendant's counsel was entitled to a reasonable attorney's fee of $4,605.00. As a result, we are unable to conclude that the trial court committed any error of law in establishing the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded to Defendant's counsel in accordance with our earlier order.
In seeking to persuade us to reach a contrary conclusion, Plaintiff argues that the trial court ignored the mandate of this Court by failing to base its attorney's fee award on the amount of fees that were “actually incurred” by Defendant. Plaintiff notes that, in Patronelli v. Patronelli, 360 N.C. 628, 629, 636 S.E.2d 559, 561 (2006), the Supreme Court affirmed our holding that an award of attorney's fees was not available to a party who was “represented on a pro bono basis by her counsel through the Volunteer Lawyers Program.” As we understand Plaintiff's argument, which focuses on the Supreme Court's use of the word “incurred,” she contends that the trial court did not find and that the record would not support a finding that Defendant would ever be charged for the services provided by his counsel in resisting the mandamus petition and that, in the absence of such a showing and such findings, the trial court erred by ordering the payment of attorney's fees. Plaintiff's argument lacks merit.
In her brief, Plaintiff acknowledges that the trial court made findings regarding “the reasonableness of the hours [that Defendant's counsel]” devoted to this matter, “the reasonableness of the rate” that Defendant's counsel charged for appellate work, and Defendant's counsel's educational and experiential background. However, Plaintiff appears to contend that the trial court was also required to make additional findings to the effect that, in accordance with the agreement between Defendant and his counsel, Defendant's counsel had actually billed or would bill Defendant for the hours spent in resisting Plaintiff's mandamus petition in this matter before that amount could be awarded pursuant to our earlier order. As an initial matter, Plaintiff has cited no authority indicating that such specific findings are necessary, and we know of none. Moreover, as we have already indicated, Defendant's counsel testified that he charged $300 an hour for appellate work, that Defendant had already paid him between $10,000 and $15,000 for his services in this case, and that he intended to bill Defendant “every cent [that] he owe[d.]” Thus, the record amply establishes that Defendant owes the fees in question. Finally, we note that the record is completely devoid of any evidence tending to suggest that Defendant's counsel was representing Defendant on a pro bono basis. As a result, we conclude that the trial court was not required to make the additional findings that Plaintiff appears to believe to be required and that the record clearly establishes that Defendant is, in fact, obligated to pay Defendant's counsel for the work that he performed in resisting Plaintiff's mandamus petition.
Similarly, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by finding that $300 an hour was a “reasonable” rate at which to compensate Defendant's counsel. As Plaintiff concedes, the trial court made findings concerning the hourly rate charged by Defendant's counsel and the nature and extent of his background and experience and determined that, given the “unique” nature of the proceedings in question, the amount of time spent on this matter was reasonable and that the rate charged by Defendant's counsel was “well within [the] standard charged by other family court practitioners who practice in front of this Court with similar experience.” Plaintiff asserts, however, that the trial court was required to make findings addressing certain additional issues, including findings comparing the rate charged by Defendant's counsel with that charged by other attorneys with similar experience for performing appellate work as compared to trial work. In addition, Plaintiff argues that the record does not contain any evidence tending to show the hourly rates charged by lawyers with similar experience for performing appellate work. However, contrary to Plaintiff's argument, the trial court's findings encompass the reasonableness of rates for legal services in general rather than the reasonableness of the rates charged for work in the trial courts. In addition, we are unable to see anything in the decisions of this Court or the Supreme Court which requires the finely tuned analysis that Plaintiff suggests to be appropriate, and Plaintiff has not cited anything indicating that such findings were a necessary prerequisite for an attorney's fee award in a situation like this one. Furthermore, members of the trial judiciary are entitled, in addressing attorney's fee issues, to take judicial notice of “the customary hourly rates of local attorneys performing the same services and having the same experience.” Simpson v. Simpson, 209 N.C.App. 320, 328, 703 S.E.2d 890, 895 (2011). We see no reason to believe, as Plaintiff appears to suggest, that a trial court may rely upon its general knowledge concerning prevailing rates for legal services among competent attorneys providing trial, but not appellate, representation, or that the court is required to draw a sharp distinction between the two types of practice in determining whether a particular hourly rate charged for representing a litigant in an appellate matter is a reasonable one. As a result, Plaintiff's attacks upon the trial court's “hourly rate” determination are not persuasive.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that the filings made by Defendant's counsel were not of high quality. In support of this contention, Plaintiff discusses errors in spelling, grammar, syntax, and legal analysis which she contends to be present in the filings made before this Court by Defendant's counsel. However, the nature and quality of the work performed by Defendant's counsel was the subject of considerable discussion before the trial court, which clearly did not accept Plaintiff's contentions and reached a contrary conclusion, which is reflected in its findings. Moreover, the trial court's determination with respect to the quality of the representation provided by Defendant's counsel in resisting Plaintiff's mandamus petition has adequate record support. As a result, we fail to find Plaintiff's final challenge to the trial court's findings and conclusions persuasive and conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to relief based on her arguments challenging the amount of attorney's fees awarded to defense counsel .
In addition to the arguments discussed in the text, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by making the award of attorney's fees payable to Defendant's counsel instead of Defendant. However, Plaintiff did not object before the trial court when Defendant's counsel requested that the attorney's fees at issue here be paid directly to him. As a result, we decline to address this issue on appeal. N.C.R.App. P. 10(a)(1) (stating that, “[i]n order to preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion, stating the specific grounds for the ruling the party desired the court to make if the specific grounds were not apparent from the context” and “to obtain a ruling upon the party's request, objection or motion”).
C. Timing of Court's Order
In addition to her specific challenges to the trial court's findings and conclusions, Plaintiff argues that the trial court erred by requiring that payment be made prior to the date upon which the order was formally entered. In support of this contention, Plaintiff notes that the trial court's written order was entered on 4 May 2012 and provides that payment had to be made on or before 29 April 2012, which was five days earlier. As Plaintiff concedes, however, any error that the trial court may have committed in this respect “has become harmless with the passage of time.” Thus, Plaintiff is not entitled to relief from the trial court's order based upon this argument.
D. Appellate Motions
While this appeal has been pending before this Court, the parties have filed numerous motions and other requests for relief, most of which pertain to issues surrounding Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N .C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60. As we have already discussed, on 14 May 2013, Plaintiff formally withdrew her request for appellate review of the trial court's determination that her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A1, Rule 60 should and would be denied in the event that the trial court had jurisdiction to act in that fashion. In light of Plaintiff's action, we resolve the issues raised by the parties' additional appellate motions and other filings in the following manner:
1. 21 March 2013 motion by Defendant to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal concerning her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60: dismissed as moot.
2. 21 March 2013 motion by Defendant for the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff stemming from her attempt to obtain appellate review of the trial court's decision with respect to her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 appeal: denied.
3. 25 March 2013 response by Plaintiff in opposition to Defendant's 21 March 2013 motions for dismissal of her request for appellate review of the trial court's decision with respect to her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 and request for the entry of sanctions against Plaintiff stemming from her attempts to litigate that issue: dismissed as moot and denied.
4. 21 March 2013 motion by Plaintiff seeking to have the costs of this appeal and “any other sanctions it deems appropriate” imposed against Defendant for alleged violations of the relevant provisions of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure: denied.
5. 21 March 2013 petition by Plaintiff seeking the issuance of a writ “compel [ling]” the trial court to reduce its ruling concerning whether it would be inclined to grant or deny her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 were an appeal from the trial court's sanctions order not pending before this Court: dismissed by this Court on 8 April 2013.
6. 25 March 2013 motion by Defendant requesting this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's petition for the issuance of the writ described in the preceding paragraph and “any appeal related to Appellant's [request for] Rule 60 relief”: dismissed as moot.
7. 25 March 2013 motion by Defendant for the imposition of an award of attorney's fees against Plaintiff relating to Plaintiff's attempt to obtain appellate review of the trial court's determination concerning her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60: denied.
8. 26 March 2013 response by Plaintiff to Defendant's 25 March 2013 motions seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's appeal from the trial court's determination with respect to her motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 and the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff: dismissed as moot.
9. 26 March 2013 motion by Defendant to strike Plaintiff's response to Defendant's 25 March 2013 motions for dismissal of Plaintiff's request for appellate review of the trial court's determination with respect to Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60 and for the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff: denied.
10. 13 May 2013 motion by Defendant seeking the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff for failing to file a brief addressing the errors that the trial court allegedly committed in the course of resolving the issues raised by Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60: denied.
11. 22 May 2013 Plaintiff's response in opposition to Defendant's motion of 13 May 2013 seeking the imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff for failing to file a brief addressing issues relating to the trial court's handling of Plaintiff's motion pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 1A–1, Rule 60: dismissed as moot.
Moreover, we deny the request, set out in Defendant's brief, that Plaintiff be sanctioned for prosecuting the present appeal.
As should be apparent from the unusual length of the list of motions and other requests for relief that the parties have asserted before this Court during the pendency of the present appeal, the parties have expended considerable time and effort complaining about each other's conduct and seeking redress from the Court for allegedly unprofessional or legally unsupported actions on the part of their opponents. Although the various remedies available under the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure exist for a reason and although members of the bar do have an obligation to provide their clients with zealous representation, we take the liberty of pointing out that “scorched earth” litigation tactics, while sometimes emotionally satisfying to attorneys or their clients, are often counterproductive, particularly in family law matters; have the potential to substantially increase the complexity and cost of the litigation process; and increase the burdens placed upon both the trial and appellate judiciary. For that reason, we urge counsel to seriously consider the merits and potential demerits of the manner in which this case has been litigated to this point as they attempt to resolve any matters which remain at issue between the parties.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that none of Plaintiff's challenges to the trial court's sanctions order have merit and that the various motions and other filings that the parties have presented for the Court's consideration should be either denied or dismissed as moot. As a result, the trial court's order should be, and hereby is, affirmed.
AFFIRMED. Judges CALABRIA and DILLON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).