Opinion
No. 04-05-00002-CV
Delivered and Filed: August 17, 2005.
Appeal from the 198th Judicial District Court, Mason County, Texas, Trial Court No. 44770, Honorable Emil Karl Prohl, Judge Presiding.
Affirmed.
Sitting: Catherine STONE, Justice, Sarah B. DUNCAN, Justice, Rebecca SIMMONS, Justice.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Cynthia Yeager appeals the summary judgment granted in favor of State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State Farm") with regard to a declaratory judgment action. Yeager argues summary judgment was improperly granted because: (1) a justiciable controversy exists between the parties, (2) State Farm was properly joined as a real party in interest, and (3) a declaratory judgment action is proper to interpret state and local statutes to determine whether cattle or other livestock were "running at large" and whether a right of way document is an easement or deed. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Background
On July 27, 2003, Dorris Feller, who is insured by State Farm, struck a calf owned by Yeager while traveling in her automobile on FM 152 in Mason County, Texas. As a result of the accident, Feller's automobile was "totaled" and the calf was injured. Yeager made a claim against Feller under Feller's automobile liability insurance policy for injuries to the calf. State Farm denied the liability claim, informing Yeager that "[b]ased on section 143.024 of the Texas Agriculture Code, you had a duty to keep your cattle off of Ranch Road 152, therefore we do not believe Ms. Feller is legally responsible to you for damages."
Throughout the record, this road is interchangeably referred to as either FM 152 or Ranch Road 152.
Yeager brought a declaratory judgment action against State Farm and the Mason County Attorney, seeking the declaratory rulings that: (1) cattle or other livestock present on the pavement or right of way of FM 152 in Mason County are not "running at large"; (2) the owner(s) of cattle or other livestock present on the pavement or right of way of FM 152 in Mason County are not in violation of Agriculture Code Sections 142.074 or 143.082; and (3) the 1955 "Right of Way Deed" for FM 152 is an easement.
State Farm sought traditional summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Yeager's action as a matter of law based on the following theories: (1) Yeager was barred from bringing a third party lawsuit directly against State Farm as Feller's automobile liability insurer; (2) Yeager can not litigate the validity of an affirmative defense in a declaratory judgment action; (3) there was no justiciable controversy between Yeager and State Farm; (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the proper parties were not joined in the suit; and (5) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to determine the validity of the Mason County 1934 Stock Election because the petition was not filed within the time period required by Texas Election Code Section 233.006. The trial court granted State Farm's motion for summary judgment without describing the ground(s) on which summary judgment was granted.
On November 6, 1934, an election was held to determine whether certain livestock would be permitted to run at large in Mason County. The stock election determined that it would be unlawful for livestock, including horses, mules, jacks, jennets, and cattle, to run at large in Mason County.
Standard of Review
The trial court properly granted the traditional motion for summary judgment only if State Farm established that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). In reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in Yeager's favor. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 549.
Because the trial court entered a summary judgment order that does not specify the particular grounds on which it is based, Yeager must show that each independent argument alleged in State Farm's motion for summary judgment is insufficient to support the trial court's order, Star Telegram, Inc. v. Doe, 915 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. 1995), and we affirm if any of the summary judgment theories advanced are meritorious. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
Availability of Declaratory Judgment: Justiciable Controversy
A declaratory judgment is appropriate only if a justiciable controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy will be resolved by the declaration sought. See Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (citing Texas Ass'n of Bus. v. Texas Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex. 1993)). A justiciable controversy is one in which a real and substantial controversy exists involving a genuine conflict of tangible interest and not merely a theoretical dispute. Id. A declaratory judgment depends on a finding that the issues are not hypothetical or contingent, and the questions presented must resolve an actual controversy. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Moody, 584 S.W.2d 855, 858 (Tex. 1979).
In its motion for summary judgment, State Farm argued that a justiciable controversy does not exist between Yeager and State Farm because all rights and obligations State Farm may have are with its insured, Feller, not with Yeager. Citing Orange Indep. Sch. Dist. v. West Orange Indep. Sch. Dist., 390 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), Yeager contends that because State Farm alleged a violation of the agricultural code and the 1934 Mason County stock election when it denied Yeager's claim against Feller's insurance policy, a justiciable controversy exists. See Id. at 89.
Yeager's attempt to draw the instant case under the umbrella of "justiciable controversy" through the vehicle of a declaratory judgment ignores the primary elements required for such to occur: a justiciable controversy must exist as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy must be resolved by the declaration sought. See Bonham, 907 S.W.2d at 467. State Farm's obligations are to Feller as her automobile liability insurer, therefore the rights at stake are Feller's against State Farm. See Angus Chem. Co. v. IMC Fertilizer, Inc., 939 S.W.2d 138, 138 (Tex. 1997) (reiterating that an injured third party cannot sue the tortfeasor's liability insurance company directly until the tortfeasor's liability has been finally determined by agreement or judgment). Despite State Farm's reasoning in its denial of Yeager's claim against Feller's policy, no controversy exists between State Farm and Yeager. Any controversy that may exist as a result of the July 2003 accident exists between Yeager and Feller, or between Feller and State Farm. Even had the trial court made the declarations sought, those declarations would not settle a controversy between Yeager and State Farm.
Accordingly, the summary judgment in favor of State Farm could have been properly granted on this ground, and we therefore need not address the other four bases for summary judgment. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.