Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:22-CV-671-KHJ-MTP
2023-09-08
Douglas L. YATES, Plaintiff v. UNIVERSITY OF MISSISSIPPI MEDICAL CENTER - JACKSON, et al., Defendants
Carlos E. Moore, The Cochran Firm, Grenada, MS, for Plaintiff. Malissa Wilson, Amanda (Mandie) B. Robinson, Forman Watkins & Krutz, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants.
Carlos E. Moore, The Cochran Firm, Grenada, MS, for Plaintiff. Malissa Wilson, Amanda (Mandie) B. Robinson, Forman Watkins & Krutz, LLP, Jackson, MS, for Defendants. ORDER Kristi H. Johnson, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Before the Court is Defendants' [26] Motion to Dismiss. The Court grants the motion for the following reasons.
I. Background
This case arises from an employment dispute. See Am. Compl. [25]. In 2015, Plaintiff Douglas L. Yates started working as a police sergeant at Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). Id. ¶ 10. He worked at UMMC's Holmes County location. Id.
In January 2022, Yates emailed and met with Defendant Chief Deputy Joshua Bromen. Id. ¶ 12. Bromen allegedly told Yates to "falsify incidents in order to boost his daily reporting" and "start showing more action," or else Yates would face reassignment to UMMC's Jackson campus. Id. Yates refused. Id.
Yates then filed a formal complaint with UMMC's Human Resources Department, alleging that "Bromen had harassed him" and "undermined his authority, creating a hostile work environment." Id. ¶ 13. A couple of days later, Yates alleges, Bromen and Defendant Chief Mary Paradis "caused [Yates] to experience a hostile and disrespectful work environment" through "belittling comments" in a "loud and professional tone." Id. ¶ 14.
Tensions came to a head while Yates was on family medical leave. See id. ¶ 16. Paradis gave Yates notice of reassignment to the Jackson campus. Id. Paradis then called Yates "asking where he lived so that she could get the AR-15 rifle and patrol car" that Yates took home. Id. Paradis sent Defendants Captain Nicholas Kehoe and Officer Jeffrey Walker to retrieve the semi-automatic rifle and patrol car. Id. ¶ 18. Yates, however, "did not agree to this arrangement." Id. Yates alleges that the disagreement led to Walker physically assaulting him, and Kehoe unholstering his gun and releasing the safety. Id. ¶ 19-20. Yates called 911. Id. ¶ 20. He then filed criminal charges against Kehoe (a police captain) and Walker. Id. ¶ 21.
UMMC placed Yates on paid administrative leave while it investigated the incident. Id. ¶ 23. Though the Amended Complaint does not allege Yates' race, it states that Kehoe and Walker—both white—did not receive disciplinary action. Id. ¶ 24. Yates filed an EEOC charge relating to the incident and to "aforementioned unjust disciplinary actions." Id. ¶ 25.
In March 2022, Yates and UMMC communicated about whether and when Yates could return to work. Id. ¶ 26. UMMC's Director of Employee Relations told Yates it was "unclear" whether Yates could return, given Yates' "health care provider's recommendation of psychiatric consultation." Id. The next day, Yates' Licensed Professional Counselor notified UMMC that Yates was diagnosed with PTSD and that "determination of his return to work status should be decided based on the reports of his medical doctor." Id. ¶ 27. That June, UMMC wrote to Yates, accepting his " 'voluntary and immediate resignation' " due to "failure to adhere to job-related medical examination." Id.
Yates sued under Title VII and Section 1981. Namely, he sued his former employer, UMMC. Id. at 1. He also sued four UMMC employees: Paradis, Bromen, Kehoe, and Walker (the Individual Defendants). Id. Yates amended his complaint to clarify that he was suing the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities. See id.; Mot. to Amend [22] at 1. Defendants then moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim or, in the alternative, for qualified immunity. [26].
II. Standard
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Ghedi v. Mayorkas, 16 F.4th 456, 463 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)). A claim is facially plausible when its factual matter allows the Court to draw a "reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937). But speculative inferences and conclusory allegations are not enough. Id. At bottom, determining facial plausibility is "context-specific" and requires the Court to draw on its "judicial experience and common sense." Id. (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937).
Yates argues that the Court "must construe the pleadings of pro se litigants liberally." [30] at 7 (quoting Andrade v. Gonzales, 459 F.3d 538, 543 (5th Cir. 2006)). That is true but irrelevant here. Yates filed his Amended Complaint "by counsel." [25] at 1.
III. Analysis
Yates raised five claims. Each claim did not specify whether Yates was suing UMMC, the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities, the Individual Defendants in their official capacities, or some combination thereof. See [25] ¶¶ 34-56. For the sake of completeness, the Court assumes that Yates sued all Defendants—in both their individual and official capacities—on each claim. The Court addresses each claim in turn.
1. Title VII—Race Discrimination
Yates' first claim is for race discrimination under Title VII. [25] ¶¶ 34-39. That claim has two defects.
Count I is ambiguous. For one, Count I alleges that Yates was "subjected to actions creating a hostile working environment . . . because of his race," but Yates separately raised a hostile-work-environment claim in Count V. See [25] ¶¶ 35, 53-56. Count I also alleges that Yates suffered a violation of Section 2000e-3, but Yates separately raised a Section 2000e-3 retaliation claim in Count II. See id. ¶¶ 36, 40-44. The Court construes Count I, favorably to Yates, as a claim for intentional race discrimination under Section 2000e-2.
First, the Individual Defendants are not proper defendants under Title VII. "Individuals are not liable under Title VII in either their individual or official capacities." Ackel v. Nat'l Commc'ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 381 n.1 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Smith v. Amedisys Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448-49 (5th Cir. 2002)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (limiting liability to "employer"). Defendants made this point, and Yates did not respond. See Mem. Supp. Mot. [27] at 7; Mem. Supp. Resp. [30] at 7-16. The Court dismisses Count I with prejudice as to the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Second, while UMMC is a proper defendant, Yates has failed to state a claim against it. "To plead a disparate-treatment claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must allege facts plausibly showing (1) an adverse employment action, (2) taken against a plaintiff because of her protected status." Hamilton v. Dall. Cnty., 79 F.4th 494, 502 (5th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted).
The Court need not address the first prong, which the Fifth Circuit modified in Hamilton. See id. at 501-02. Defendants have acknowledged that, after Hamilton, reassignment "could possibly" qualify as an adverse employment decision. Notice Suppl. Authority [32] at 2. The parties did not address whether paid administrative leave is an adverse employment action under Hamilton. See id. at 1-2; [27] at 11 (citing pre-Hamilton precedent for the proposition that paid administrative leave is not an adverse employment action). What's more, the Amended Complaint is ambiguous as to whether Yates " 'voluntar[ily] . . . resign[ed]' " or UMMC "terminat[ed]" his employment. Compare [25] ¶ 29, with id. ¶ 41. Given all of that, the Court declines to address the first prong, which is not outcome-determinative.
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, — U.S. —, 143 S.Ct. 2686, — L.Ed.2d — (2023), which presents the question: "Does Title VII prohibit discrimination in transfer decisions absent a separate court determination that the transfer decision caused a significant disadvantage?"
As to the second prong, Yates has not plausibly alleged that UMMC took any adverse employment action "because of" Yates' race. Hamilton, 79 F.4th 494 at 501. The Amended Complaint's sole reference to race is that Yates received disciplinary action while Kehoe and Walker, who are both white, did not. [25] ¶¶ 18, 24. In fact, the Amended Complaint does not even allege Yates' race. See id. ¶¶ 1-59. At the same time, the Amended Complaint does allege that:
Yates identified his race only in his memorandum. See [30] at 2, 9.
• Yates took home "work equipment"—a semi-automatic rifle and patrol car—while he was on medical leave;Id. ¶¶ 16, 18, 20-21. Given Yates' scant factual allegations about race—and numerous allegations supporting an "obvious alternative explanation" for disciplinary action—discrimination is not a plausible conclusion. Pickett v. Tex. Tech Univ. Health Scis. Ctr., 37 F.4th 1013, 1019 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682, 129 S.Ct. 1937). The Court thus dismisses Count I without prejudice as to UMMC.
• the chief of police called Yates asking where he lived so that she could retrieve the rifle and patrol car;
• the chief of police then sent a captain and another officer to retrieve the rifle and patrol car, but Yates "did not agree to this arrangement";
• during an ensuing altercation, Yates called 911 on the captain and other officer; and
• Yates then filed criminal charges against the captain and other officer.
2. Title VII—Retaliation
Yates' second claim alleges retaliation under Title VII. [25] ¶¶ 40-44. Specifically, Yates alleged retaliation "after he made reports of discrimination to the Human Resources Department." Id. ¶ 41. In that report, Yates complained that "Bromen had harassed him" and "undermined his authority, creating a hostile work environment." Id. ¶ 13. Yates filed that report after the following alleged incident with Bromen:
Bromen sent an email to Plaintiff requesting that the daily end of shift reports for UMMC-Holmes County be submitted in the same format as the shift reports for the main Jackson campus. On the same date, Plaintiff met with Deputy Chief Bromen and was told that "they" were not doing enough work to justify having four officers and a supervisor at the UMMC-Holmes County campus. Deputy Chief Bromen further stated that if Plaintiff did not start showing more action, he would be reassigned to the Jackson campus, and instructed Plaintiff to falsify incidents in order to boost his daily reporting. Plaintiff refused to falsify any documents.Id. ¶ 12. Yates' second claim likewise has two defects.
First, as above, the Individual Defendants are not proper defendants under Title VII. See Ackel, 339 F.3d at 381 n.1; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (limiting liability to "employer"). The Court thus dismisses Count II with prejudice as to the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Second, while UMMC is a proper defendant, Yates has failed to state a claim against it. A plaintiff must "plausibly . . . allege facts going to the ultimate elements of the claim." Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cicalese v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 768 (5th Cir. 2019)). A retaliation claim has three such elements: (1) protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between them. Id. (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996)).
Yates' claim fails at the first prong: Yates has not plausibly alleged that he engaged in protected activity. A plaintiff "reporting employment discrimination need not show that the discrimination rose to the level of a Title VII violation, but must at least show a reasonable belief that it did." EEOC v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 237 (5th Cir. 2016). The Amended Complaint indicates that Yates complained not of race discrimination, but of Bromen's alleged directive to "falsify incidents" and "start showing more action." [25] ¶ 12. To be sure, the Amended Complaint later alleges that Yates made "reports of discrimination to the Human Resources Department." Id. ¶ 41 (emphasis added); see also ¶ 51 ("reports of intentional discrimination to the Human Resources Department"). But the Amended Complaint offers no factual support for those conclusory allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. The Court dismisses Count II without prejudice as to UMMC.
Because Yates' claim fails at the first prong, the Court need not address the second or third prongs. As discussed above, doing so would require the Court to address the scope of Hamilton and ambiguities about the circumstances of Yates' departure from UMMC.
3. Section 1981—Race Discrimination
Yates' third claim is for intentional race discrimination under Section 1981. [25] ¶¶ 45-48. That claim has at least two defects.
First, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against UMMC and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. Absent an exception, "[t]he Eleventh Amendment bars federal 'suits against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity.' " Corn v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 954 F.3d 268, 274 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bryant v. Tex. Dep't of Aging & Disability Servs., 781 F.3d 764, 769 (5th Cir. 2015)). UMMC is a state agency. McGarry v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 355 F. App'x 853, 856 (5th Cir. 2009).
While there are exceptions to sovereign immunity—waiver, abrogation, and Ex parte Young—none apply here. "Section 1981 does not waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity." Moore v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr., 719 F. App'x 381, 388 (5th Cir. 2018) (citing Sessions v. Rusk State Hosp., 648 F.2d 1066, 1069 (5th Cir. 1981)). Section 1981 likewise "does not abrogate state sovereign immunity." Ukpong v. Int'l Leadership of Tex., No. 21-11111, 2022 WL 6935140, at *3 (5th Cir. Oct. 12, 2022) (citing Sessions, 648 F.2d at 1069). And Ex parte Young is inapplicable against UMMC because UMMC is not a "state official in his official capacity." Williams ex rel. J.E. v. Reeves, 954 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2020). Nor is Ex parte Young available against the Individual Defendants in their official capacities: Yates is not seeking "prospective relief to redress an ongoing violation of federal law." Id.; see also [25] ¶ 59 (seeking only declaratory relief that Defendants "have engaged" in unlawful conduct). Defendants raised these points, and Yates did not respond. See [27] at 7-10; [30] at 8 (Yates responding only that Eleventh Amendment "does not bar suits against governmental officials in their individual capacities") (cleaned up; emphasis added). The Court dismisses Count III with prejudice as to UMMC and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities.
Count III's second defect is that Yates asserted the wrong cause of action against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. "[P]laintiffs must assert a cause of action against state actors under § 1983 to remedy violations of civil rights under § 1981." Oden v. Oktibbeha Cnty., 246 F.3d 458, 463-65 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 731, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989)). Yates did not assert a cause of action under Section 1983. [25] ¶¶ 45-48. Defendants raised this point, and Yates did not respond. See [27] at 10; [30] at 7-16. The Court thus dismisses Count III without prejudice as to the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities.
The Fifth Circuit has not "decide[d] the outer boundaries of § 1981 liability as it applies to individual non-employer defendants." Foley v. Univ. of Hous. Sys., 355 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 2003). The parties did not address that issue, and the Court need not reach it. That is especially so given the absence of factual allegations about race, and the absence of allegations as to whether and how each Individual Defendant interfered with Yates' right to "make and enforce contracts." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a).
4. Section 1981—Retaliatory Discharge
Yates' fourth claim is for retaliatory discharge under Section 1981. [25] ¶¶ 49-52. That claim, too, has at least two defects.
First, as stated above, the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against UMMC and the Individual Defendants in their official capacities. See, e.g., Corn, 954 F.3d at 274; McGarry, 355 F. App'x at 856. The Court dismisses Count IV with prejudice as to those Defendants.
Second, as discussed, Yates asserted the wrong cause of action against the Individual Defendants in their individual capacities. See Oden, 246 F.3d at 463-65. The Court thus dismisses Count IV without prejudice as to those Defendants.
Here again, the Court need not "decide the outer boundaries of § 1981 liability as it applies to individual non-employer defendants." Foley, 355 F.3d at 338.
5. Title VII—Hostile Work Environment
Yates' fifth and final claim alleges a hostile work environment under Title VII. [25] ¶¶ 53-56. That claim has two defects.
First, as discussed above, the Individual Defendants are not proper defendants under Title VII. See Ackel, 339 F.3d at 381 n.1; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Court thus dismisses Count V with prejudice as to the Individual Defendants in their individual and official capacities.
Second, although UMMC is a proper defendant, Yates has failed to state a claim against it. "To state a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, the plaintiff must show that: (1) the victim belongs to a protected group; (2) the victim was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on a protected characteristic; (4) the harassment affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the victim's employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action." EEOC v. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 399 (5th Cir. 2007).
The Court starts—and ends—with the third prong. Yates alleged that Bromen "harassed him" and "undermined his authority, creating a hostile work environment"; and that Yates "endured belittling comments, with a loud and professional tone from Chief Paradis." [25] ¶¶ 13-14. Absent from Yates' allegations, though, are any facts indicating that Yates experienced harassment because of his race. In fact, the Amended Complaint does not so much as allege Yates' race. See id. ¶¶ 1-59. And it indicates that any harassment was because of Yates' alleged refusal to "falsify incidents" and "start showing more action." See id. ¶ 12. Yates has not plausibly alleged that he endured harassment "based on" his race. WC&M Enters., Inc., 496 F.3d at 399. The Court need not reach the other four prongs. The Court dismisses Count V without prejudice as to UMMC.
The Court assumes that Yates meant to allege that Paradis spoke in an unprofessional tone. Still, the Amended Complaint does not specify what "belittling comments" Yates endured, or even describe their general subject matter. See [25] ¶ 14.
IV. Conclusion
The Court has considered all arguments. Those not addressed would not have changed the outcome. For the stated reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendants' [26] Motion to Dismiss.
The Court DISMISSES without prejudice Counts I, II, and V as to Defendant University of Mississippi Medical Center; and DISMISSES without prejudice Counts III and IV as to Defendants Chief Mary Paradis, Chief Deputy Joshua Bromen, Captain Nicholas Kehoe, and Officer Jeffrey Walker in their individual capacities. The Court DISMISSES with prejudice all other claims. The Court will enter a separate Final Judgment consistent with this Order.
SO ORDERED, this 8th day of September, 2023.