Opinion
Civil Action No: 02-0516
November 20, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the undersigned is the motion of the defendant, Rodney J. Strain, Jr., Sheriff of St. Tammany Parish ("Sheriff Strain"), to dismiss the claims of David Yates ("Yates") pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1)(4)(5) and (6). Rec. doc. 10. For the reasons discussed below, Yates' claims against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are dismissed with prejudice.
The parties consented to the trial of this matter before a magistrate judge. Rec. doc. 5.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 2002, an order and reasons were issued and Yates' claims against unidentified parties and Sheriff Strain in his individual capacity were dismissed with prejudice. Rec. doc. 16. Yates was given until October 30, 2002 to amend his complaint to state a claim against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity. Rec. docs. 16 and 18. Yates filed a further amendment captioned as "Fourth Supplemental and Amended Petition" (actually the third amendment to the complaint). Rec. doc. 19. Sheriff Strain's motion to dismiss was reset for hearing and he was granted an opportunity to submit a further memorandum in support of his motion to dismiss. Id. Sheriff Strain did not file a further memorandum and none is required. Yates' most recent amendment fails to state a claim for relief against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
YATES' ALLEGATIONS
Yates alleges that on June 4, 2001, while he was incarcerated: (1) police officers physically assaulted, battered and abused him by striking, beating and kicking him; (2) these officers also sprayed him with mace; and (3) this was done for no justifiable reason and without provocation. Yates alleges that Sheriff Strain: (1) as a matter of unwritten custom, policy and deliberate indifference, condoned and/or ignored the continued abusive conduct of St. Tammany Parish police officers; (2) failed to take appropriate measures to prevent the continuing abusive conduct of the officers that assaulted Yates; and (3) failed to officially train St. Tammany Parish police officers on the performance of their duties.
Yates alleges that the conduct of the officers: (1) shocked the conscience; (2) deprived him of his rights under the U.S. and Louisiana Constitutions and laws; (3) was motivated by their intent to harm him and not in furtherance of any legitimate government interest; and (4) caused him bodily injury and pain such that he is disabled and unable to conduct his business. Yates alleges that Sheriff Strain is liable to him pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that the conduct of the officers was an assault and battery on him in violation of Louisiana law. Sheriff Strain is alleged to be liable for the acts of the officers pursuant to the doctrine of respondeat superior. Yates' most recent amendment only contains the following with respect to Sheriff Strain:
Sheriff Strain was aware of the abusive conduct in question and condoned same, just as he has condoned and permitted the abusive conduct of his deputies in other instances, for which he is being sued for, e.g., Civil Rights Complaint by Charles Faulkner, a Mississippi man who was convicted in 1983, but recently freed by the Court because Sheriff Strain's deputies knowingly withheld exculpatory evidence from the defendant and provided false information at his trial. Because of this conduct the Court reversed Faulkner's conviction. Faulkner's Civil Rights Complaint followed claiming cruel and unusual punishment and denial of a fair trial due to the conduct of Sheriffs detectives, William McCormick and E. L. Herman.
Rec. doc. 19.
STANDARD FOR MOTION TO DISMISS
"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a disfavored means of disposing of a case." Kennedy v. Tangipahoa Parish Library Board of Control, 224 F.3d 359, 365 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). "A motion to dismiss an action for failure to state a claim `admits the facts alleged in the complaint, but challenges plaintiffs right to relief based upon those facts.'" Crowe v. Henry, 43 F.3d 198, 203 (5th Cir. 1995) (quoting Ward v. Hudnell, 366 F.2d 247, 249 (5th Cir. 1966)). "The district court may not dismiss a complaint under rule 12(b)(6) `unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.'" Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 224 F.3d 496, 498 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 78 S.Ct. 99, 102 (1957). In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim, however, a plaintiff must plead specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations.Kaiser Aluminum Chemical Sales v. Avondale Shipyards, 677 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1982). That being said, it is well established that courts do not have to accept every allegation in the complaint as true in considering its sufficiency. 5A Wright Miller, Federal Practice Procedure § 1357 (2d ed. 1990) at 311. Courts do not have to accept legal conclusions, unsupported conclusions, unwarranted references, or sweeping legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. Causey v. The Parish of Tangipahoa, 167 F. Supp.2d 898, 903 (E.D.La. 2001).
YATES' OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIM AGAINST SHERIFF STRAIN
In Turner v. Houma Municipal Fire and Police Civil Service Bd., 229 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 2000), the Fifth Circuit said that, "[t]he performance of official duties creates two potential liabilities, individual-capacity liability for the person and official-capacity liability for the municipality." Id. at 484. Yates' only remaining claim is against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity.
Official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent. Accordingly, a § 1983 suit naming defendants only in their official capacity does not involve personal liability to the individual defendant.229 F.3d at 483 (Citations and quotation marks omitted). In Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence and Coordination Unit, 113 S.Ct. 1160 (1993), the Supreme Court held that since municipalities do not enjoy either absolute or qualified immunity from suit, plaintiffs need not satisfy a heightened pleading standard when suing such entities. Applying the Court's reasoning in Leatherman, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that defendants sued in their official capacities do not get the added protection of heightened pleading standards. Anderson v. Pasadena Independent School Dist., 184 F.3d 439 (5th Cir. 1999). Therefore, the undersigned must analyze the claim against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity under the liberal pleading requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Yates alleges that his constitutional rights were violated when a beating was administered by three officers. While a municipality may be held liable under section 1983, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 98 S.Ct. 2018, 2035 (1978), it cannot be held liable under section 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 2035. Rather, a plaintiff must identify a municipal "policy" or "custom" that caused his or her injury. Id. at 2027. In Board of the County Commissioners of Bryan County v. Brown, 117 S.Ct. 1382 (1997), the test set out in Monell was significantly narrowed when the Supreme Court stated:
[I]t is not enough for a § 1983 plaintiff to identify conduct properly attributable to the municipality. The plaintiff must also demonstrate that, through its deliberate conduct, the municipality was the "moving force" behind the injury alleged. That is, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal rights.Brown, 117 S.Ct. at 1388.
Under section 1983, the "requisite degree of culpability" is that the municipality acted with at least "deliberate indifference" to the consequences of its actions. Yates must show not only that the deputies violated his constitutional rights, but that the Sheriffs policies were the "moving force" behind his injury. To show an unconstitutional policy or custom, Yates must identify the policy or custom, connect the policy or custom with the government entity itself, and show that the particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy. Bennett v. City of Slidell, 728 F.2d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). If Yates fails to allege an official policy or custom, then his claim is subject to dismissal. See Meadowbriar Home for Children, Inc. v. Gunn, 81 F.3d 521, 532-33 (5th Cir. 1996).
Yates alleges that there was an unwritten custom or policy to condone and ignore beatings by St. Tammany Parish deputies.
[T]he [Supreme] Court has long recognized that a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written law or express municipal policy, is "so permanent and well settled as to constitute a `custom or usage' with the force of law."City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S.Ct. 915, 926 (1988) (Citations omitted). In Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1986), the Fifth Circuit held that a dozen racial incidents over a two and a half year period were too few to constitute a persistent, widespread practice so common and well-settled as to constitute a custom. Id. at 443. Yates has now alleged just one incident that predates the alleged June 4, 2001 beating, and the alleged incident does not appear to involve a beating. Under Hamilton, one incident is insufficient to constitute a custom. Id.
In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 1292 (1986), the Supreme Court held that under appropriate circumstances municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policy makers. It cited as an example Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S.Ct. 1398 (1980), where a city council passed a resolution firing a plaintiff without a pre-termination hearing. In Hamilton, 791 F.2d at 443 at n. 1, the Fifth Circuit held that appropriate circumstances existed only when the decision constituted an act of official government policy. Thus a decision by a high-ranking official responsible for setting final government policy was needed as the basis for the claim. Id. Although Sheriff Strain is a high-ranking official, Yates does not allege that he ordered the alleged beating on June 4, 2001.
Yates also fails to allege the necessary causation requirement. SeeSpiller v. City of Texas City, Police Department, 130 F.3d 162, 167 (5th Cir. 1997) (allegation that policies "led to" the unconstitutional acts is insufficient to allege causation). Yates alleges no direct casual link between his alleged beating and either the alleged policy of condoning such beatings or the failure of Sheriff Strain to train his officers.
CONCLUSION
Yates' only remaining claim is his § 1983 claim against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity. For the reasons described above, Yates' petition as amended fails to state such a claim. Although a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted is a disfavored means of disposing of a case, Yates was notified of the deficiencies in his claim and granted leave to amend. Rec. docs. 16 and 18. Yates' most recent amended complaint falls well short of what is required to state a claim for relief against Sheriff Strain in his official capacity pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
IT IS ORDERED that Sheriff Strain's motion to dismiss (Rec. doc. 10) is GRANTED.