Opinion
02-09-2024
In the MATTER OF ZACKERY S. and Danyal S. Yates County Department of Social Services, Petitioner-Respondent; v. Christa P., Respondent-Appellant.
D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (REBECCA L. KONST OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT. RUTH A. CHAFFEE, PENN YAN, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT. SUSAN E. GRAY, CANANDAIGUA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN.
Appeal from an order of the Family Court, Yates County (Joseph G. Nesser, A.J.), entered July 12, 2022, in a proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b. The order, inter alia, terminated the parental rights of respondent with respect to the subject children.
D.J. & J.A. CIRANDO, PLLC, SYRACUSE (REBECCA L. KONST OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
RUTH A. CHAFFEE, PENN YAN, FOR PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.
SUSAN E. GRAY, CANANDAIGUA, ATTORNEY FOR THE CHILDREN.
PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., BANNISTER, NOWAK, DELCONTE, AND KEANE, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.
Memorandum: In tills proceeding pursuant to Social Services Law § 384-b, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, revoked a suspended judgment entered upon her admission that she had permanently neglected the subject children and terminated her parental rights. We affirm.
[1, 2] It is well settled that, "[w]here petitioner establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been non-compliance with any of the terms of the suspended judgment, the court may revoke the suspended judgment and terminate parental rights" (Matter of Ramel H. [Tenese T.], 134 A.D.3d 1590, 1592, 23 N.Y.S.3d 782 [4th Dept. 2015] [internal quotation marks omitted & emphasis added]; see Family Ct Act § 633 [f]; Matter of Ronald O., 43 A.D.3d 1351, 1352, 842 N.Y.S.2d 801 [4th Dept. 2007]). Contrary to the mother’s con- tention, the record establishes that she violated the terms of the suspended judgment by failing to arrange for the children’s transportation to the New Year’s Day home visit in 2022, failing to confirm every scheduled visit 24 hours in advance when required to do so, and missing scheduled appointments or home visits with the caseworker.
[3] Finally, a preponderance of the evidence supports that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate the mother’s parental rights (see Matter of Jenna D. [Paula, D.], 165 A.D.3d 1617, 1619, 85 N.Y.S.3d 318 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 912, 2019 WL 150570 [2019]; Matter of Mikel B. [Carlos B.], 115 A.D.3d 1348, 1849, 984 N.Y.S.2d 253 [4th Dept. 2014]). "Although [the mother’s] breach of the express conditions of the suspended judgment does not compel termination of [her] parental lights, [it] is strong evidence that termination is, in fact, in the best interests of the child[ren]" (Matter of Jerimiah H. [Kiarra M.], 213 A.D.3d 1298, 1299, 188 N.Y.S.3d 654 [4th Dept. 2023], lv denied 39 N.Y.3d 913, 2023 WL 3513087 [2023] [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, we conclude that "any progress that [the mother] made was not sufficient to warrant any further prolongation of the child[ren]’s unsettled familial status" (Matter of Brendan S., 39 A.D.3d 1189, 1190, 834 N.Y.S.2d 602 [4th Dept. 2007] [internal quotation marks omitted]).