"If reasonably practicable and there is no positive repugnancy, a rational and workable effect must be given to both statutes, to the end that there may be a harmonious and consistent body of legislation." Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newbury port, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 589 (1980), quoting Smith v. Director of Civil Serv., 324 Mass. 455, 458 (1949). Here, the open meeting law expressly directs the school committee to convene in open session to discuss the professional competence of an individual.

Eugene McQuillan, The Law of Municipal Corporations, § 25.263 (3d. ed. 1999). The text draws support for the general proposition from cases decided in Wisconsin ( State ex rel. Cities Service Oil Co. v. Board of Appeals, 21 Wis. 2d 516, 124 N.W.2d 809 (Wis. 1963)), Missouri (Greater Garden Avenue Area Ass'n v. Webster Groves, 655 S.W.2d 760 (Mo. App. 1983)), New Jersey (Whispering Woods at Bamm Hollow, Inc. v. Middletown Planning Bd., 220 N.J. Super. 161, 531 A.2d 770 (N.J. Super. 1987), and Hudanich v. Borough Council of Avalon, 183 N.J. Super. 244, 443 A.2d 777 (N.J. Super. 1981)), New York ( Concerned Citizens Against Crossgates v. Guilderland Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 91 A.D.2d 763, 458 N.Y.S.2d 13, (N.Y. App.Div. 1978)), Addesso v. Sharpe, 44 N.Y.2d 925, 408 N.Y.S.2d 8, 379 N.E.2d 1138 (1978), and Orange County Publications v. Council of Newburgh, 60 A.D.2d 409, 401 N.Y.S.2d 84 (N.Y. App.Div.), aff'd, 45 N.Y.2d 947, 411 N.Y.S.2d 564, 383 N.E.2d 1157 (1978)), Massachusetts (Yaro v. Board of Appeals, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 410 N.E.2d 725 (Ma. App. 1980)), and Washington ( State ex rel. Carpenter v. Everett Bd. of Adjustment, 7 Wn. App. 930, 503 P.2d 1141 (Wash. App. 1972)). Citing in support cases decided by the appellate courts of Maryland ( Sullivan v. Northwest Garage & Storage Co., 223 Md. 544, 165 A.2d 881 (Md. 1960)), Massachusetts ( Elmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 343 Mass. 24, 176 N.E.2d 16 (Mass. 1961)), and New York ( Eckerman v. Murdock, 276 A.D. 927, 94 N.Y.S.2d 557 (N.Y. App. Div. 1950))

See, e.g., Pearson v. Board of Health of Chicopee, 402 Mass. 797 (1988) (town board of health); District Attorney for the Plymouth Dist. v. Selectmen of Middleborough, 395 Mass. 629 (1985) (town board of selectmen); Attorney Gen. v. School Comm. of Northampton, 375 Mass. 127 (1978) (town school committee); Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587 (1980) (town zoning board of appeals); Cole v. Brookline Hous. Auth., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 705 (1976) (town housing authority).

In several cases §§ 23A-23C have been applied to certain entities without discussion of the meaning of "[g]overnmental body." See Ghiglione v. School Comm. of Southbridge, 376 Mass. 70, 71-73 (1978) (school committee); District Attorney for the Northwestern Dist. v. Selectmen of Sunderland, 11 Mass. App. Ct. 663, 665 (1981) (municipal board of selectmen); Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 587-588 (1980) (town zoning board of appeals); Nantucket Land Council, Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Nantucket, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 206, 213 (1977) (town planning board); Cole v. Brookline Hous. Auth., 4 Mass. App. Ct. 705, 709 (1976) (municipal housing authority).

The zoning board of appeals must act timely on an application for a comprehensive permit, and it must do so at a duly noticed public meeting. Cf. Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 591 (1980). If the applicant is displeased with the board's decision, it may appeal to the HAC.

On that date, Woglom's status as a member of the board is unquestioned. In Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 590 (1980), we interpreted the open meeting law as requiring a zoning board to deliberate and arrive at its decision under public observation. After such a decision occurs, the filing of the decision is a necessary but ministerial act, simply memorializing the action taken at the meeting.

Robinson v. Planning Bd. of Hingham, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 836 (1978). Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 592 (1980). Tebo v. Board of Appeals of Shrewsbury, 22 Mass. App. Ct. 618, 623 (1986).

Robinson v. Planning Bd. of Hingham, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 835, 836 (1978). Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 592 (1980). There was no abuse of that discretion.

As additional support for its arguments, the council points to cases which call for statutes to be construed harmoniously, if at all possible. See Boston v. Chelsea, 343 Mass. 499, 501 (1962); Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 589 (1980). Despite the fact that Agawam calls itself a "town," the parties have stipulated that its charter establishes a city form of government which may be subject to the provisions of G.L.c. 39, a statute relating to the functions of "city" government.

A court must see that this purpose is enforced, see Commonwealth v. Gove, 366 Mass. 351, 354 (1974); Moynihan v. Arlington, 6 Mass. App. Ct. 960, 961 (1978), and not frustrated by approval of an anomaly, see Board of Appeals of Hanover v. Housing Appeals Comm., 363 Mass. 339, 355 (1973), such as might result from an interpretation which would permit a committee to hold a closed hearing for the taking of evidence, but would require it under G.L.c. 39, § 23B, to open its deliberative discussions of that same evidence to the public. We conclude that an inconsistency rising to the level of "positive repugnancy," see Yaro v. Board of Appeals of Newburyport, 10 Mass. App. Ct. 587, 589 (1980), exists between the open meeting law, which declares in G.L.c. 39, § 23B, that "[a]ll meetings . . . shall be open," and G.L.c. 71, § 42, which confers on school committees the right, in the exercise of discretion, to conduct dismissal hearings in public or private. The specific terms of the latter override the former, general provision.