Yarbrough v. State

22 Citing cases

  1. Butler v. State

    871 S.E.2d 902 (Ga. Ct. App. 2022)   Cited 4 times

    This evidence was sufficient for the jury to infer that Butler drove her car while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for her to do so. See Brent v. State , 270 Ga. 160, 161 (1), 510 S.E.2d 14 (1998) (evidence that the defendant "had alcohol on his breath, registered positive on [a portable breath test], failed all six parts of the HGN test, had substandard performances on [other] tests, and, in the expert opinion of [a law enforcement officer], was less safe to drive," was sufficient to support his conviction for DUI less safe, even absent evidence that he committed an unsafe act while driving); see also generally State v. Young , 334 Ga. App. 161, 165, 778 S.E.2d 402 (2015) (circumstantial evidence may be sufficient for the State to establish that "the defendant was operating or in physical control of a moving vehicle while under the influence of alcohol to the extent that it was less safe for [her] to drive"); Yarbrough v. State , 241 Ga. App. 777, 781-782 (4) (b), 527 S.E.2d 628 (2000) (causing a traffic accident, along with other evidence of intoxication, may be sufficient to establish the offense of DUI less safe). (b) Butler further maintains that the evidence was insufficient to support her DUI per se conviction because: (i) her blood was not tested within three hours of the accident; and (ii) there was no evidence as to when she last consumed alcohol.

  2. Sauls v. State

    293 Ga. 165 (Ga. 2013)   Cited 6 times
    In Sauls v. State, 293 Ga. 165, 744 S.E.2d 735 (2013), the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of this Court in State v. Sauls, 315 Ga.App. 98, 728 S.E.2d 241 (2012).

    Certainly, not every omission or misstatement in the implied consent notice given to the driver is of such potential significance so that the notice cannot be found to be substantively accurate. See and compare Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga.App. 777, 778(1), 527 S.E.2d 628 (2000); State v. Garnett, 241 Ga.App. 315, 527 S.E.2d 21 (1999); Maurer v. State, 240 Ga.App. 145, 146–147(2), 525 S.E.2d 104 (1999). However, the General Assembly has determined that drivers should be made aware of the potentially most serious consequence of refusal of testing, i.e., that such evidence can be used against the driver at a subsequent criminal prosecution in which the driver's liberty may be at stake.

  3. Dixson v. State

    313 Ga. App. 379 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011)   Cited 8 times

    (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga.App. 777, 780–781(4), 527 S.E.2d 628 (2000). 1. Dixson contends that the only evidence the items were stolen was Patterson's uncorroborated testimony, which was insufficient because Patterson was an accomplice.

  4. Dixson v. State

    A11A1329 (Ga. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2011)

    (Citation, punctuation and footnote omitted.) Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 780-781 (4) ( 527 SE2d 628) (2000). 1. Dixson contends that the only evidence the items were stolen was Patterson's uncorroborated testimony, which was insufficient because Patterson was an accomplice.

  5. Reese v. State

    296 Ga. App. 186 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009)   Cited 4 times

    The neighbor's testimony that the accident occurred at dusk, the friend's testimony that Reese did not consume any alcohol between the accident and the appearance of police, and the officer's testimony that Reese's blood alcohol level would have decreased from the time of the accident to the time of testing authorized the jury to find that Reese's blood alcohol level was 0.08 or more at the time he drove his van into the ditch. See Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 782 (4) ( 527 SE2d 628) (2000) (evidence of the time elapsed between accident and test and that defendant did not consume additional alcohol during the two events was sufficient to sustain a conviction for per se DUI). 2.

  6. Peterson v. State

    668 S.E.2d 544 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008)   Cited 9 times

    We have reviewed the record and find that the trial court acted well within its discretion when it limited these portions of Peterson's cross-examination as irrelevant or probative of matters best left to the jury. See Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 782 (5) ( 527 SE2d 628) (2000) (no abuse of discretion in limiting cross-examination concerning matter of DUI defendant's possession of keys to truck; "[t]he question posed was for the jury to decide after considering all of the evidence"). 4. Peterson also asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective when he failed to object or move for a mistrial concerning the allegedly sleeping juror.

  7. Norton v. State

    640 S.E.2d 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 5 times

    See id. at n. 6. See Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 781 (4) (a) ( 527 SE2d 628) (2000). See Moon v. State, 211 Ga. App. 559, 560 (2) ( 439 SE2d 714) (1993).

  8. Moore v. State

    258 Ga. App. 293 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that, in a prosecution for driving under the influence and vehicular homicide, an accident charge was required based on some evidence that the defendant could not have avoided hitting a truck in front of him, which caused his passenger's death, because the truck decelerated so rapidly

    This evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that, even if the test was not performed until three hours and five minutes after the collision, Moore had a blood alcohol concentration of .10 grams percent or more during the three hour period after he ceased driving or exercising physical control of the vehicle. Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 782(4)(c) ( 527 S.E.2d 628) (2000). Judgment reversed and case remanded.

  9. Williams v. State

    257 Ga. App. 54 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 5 times
    Concluding that evidence of force and lack of consent supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant could not reasonably have believed that the victims willingly had sex with him

    Davis v. State, 235 Ga. App. 362, 363(1) ( 509 S.E.2d 655) (1998). See, e.g., Hicks v. State, 255 Ga. 503 (1) ( 340 S.E.2d 604) (1986); Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 779(2) ( 527 S.E.2d 628) (2000). In this case, Williams testified that on two separate occasions in 1998, G. J. and A. W. agreed to have sex with him in exchange for money or drugs. Two other witnesses also testified that they had seen G. J. and A. W. have sex with other men in exchange for drugs or money.

  10. State v. Allen

    570 S.E.2d 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)   Cited 7 times
    Refusing to consider alternate reasons defendant urged to affirm grant of motion to suppress because these alternate grounds were not made in defendant's written motion to suppress

    As we have held, "[i]t need be established only that [the defendant's] alcohol concentration [exceeded the legal limit] during the three hour period after he ceased driving or exercising actual physical control of the vehicle." Yarbrough v. State, 241 Ga. App. 777, 782 (4) (c) ( 527 S.E.2d 628) (2000). This is because it is possible, through the use of expert testimony, to establish a defendant's alcohol concentration for the relevant time period even though the test was administered more than three hours later.