Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. c. Co.

163 Citing cases

  1. Tapley v. Collins

    41 F. Supp. 2d 1366 (S.D. Ga. 1999)   Cited 9 times

    In Yarbray v. Southern Bell, 261 Ga. 703, 704, 409 S.E.2d 835 (1991), our Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he 'unreasonable intrusion' aspect of the invasion of privacy involves a prying or intrusion, which would be offensive or objectionable to a reasonable person, into a person's private concerns." (Citations omitted.)

  2. Gray v. Tri-County Elec. Membership Corp.

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 5:14-CV-225 (MTT) (M.D. Ga. Mar. 25, 2016)   Cited 1 times

    1. Extreme and outrageous conductGray relies on Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 838 (1991), for her assertion that an act of deliberate retaliation is sufficient for the extreme and outrageous conduct element. (Doc. 30 at 20).

  3. Couick v. Morgan

    4:10-cv-153 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 14, 2010)   Cited 5 times
    Noting lighter burden at pleading stage, and allowing claims of negligent supervision to proceed based upon underlying tort claim for IIED asserted against fellow employee

    "Whether a claim rises to the requisite level of outrageousness and egregiousness to sustain a claim for [IIED] is a question of law." Yarbray v. So. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706 (1991)). This element requires Plaintiff to plead facts that would lead an average member of the community to exclaim "Outrageous!

  4. Rowan v. Stone Mountain Chrysler Jeep, Inc.

    Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-3568-JOF-CCH (N.D. Ga. Jun. 29, 2006)

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  5. Smith v. Akstein

    408 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2005)   Cited 11 times
    Examining the Georgia Court of Appeals' understanding of the standard of outrageousness required in an employment context to establish the conduct is "extreme and outrageous" and noting that "approximately ten threats against [the plaintiff's] future employment and retirement benefits, as well as his life . . . did not rise to a sufficient level of outrageousness"

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  6. Kimsey v. Akstein

    408 F. Supp. 2d 1281 (N.D. Ga. 2005)   Cited 5 times
    Finding that the alleged harasser was the CEO and President of the company, thus the employer could not avail itself of the Faragher/Ellerth defense

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  7. Spivey v. Akstein

    Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-1003-WSD-CCH (N.D. Ga. Dec. 2, 2005)

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  8. Smith v. Akstein

    Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-1002-WSD-CCH (N.D. Ga. Oct. 24, 2005)

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  9. Kimsey v. Akstein

    Civil Action No. 1:04-CV-1001-WSD-CCH (N.D. Ga. Oct. 18, 2005)

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. Southern Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.

  10. Hackett v. Fulton County School District

    238 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2002)   Cited 26 times
    Holding that a defendant school district "is immune from suit on plaintiff's state law claims" because the plaintiff "failed to identify any legislative act" by the state of Georgia "that specifically states that sovereign immunity is waived"

    One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.Yarbray v. S. Bell Tel. Tel. Co., 261 Ga. 703, 706, 409 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1991) (quoting The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)); see also Bridges v. Winn-Dixie Atlanta, Inc., 176 Ga. App. 227, 229, 335 S.E.2d 445 (1985). In order to sustain a cause of action, the defendant's actions must have been so terrifying as naturally to humiliate, embarrass or frighten the plaintiff.