Opinion
Case No. 5:03-CV-122
January 2, 2004
ORDER
In accordance with the Opinion filed on this date,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's Complaint (docket no. 1) is DISMISSED on the grounds that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint, and Defendant is immune from suit.
OPINION
Plaintiff, Latasha Yancey, filed a Complaint in this Court against Defendant, the Los Angeles Superior Court, Dependency Division, Department of Children and Family Services (the "state court"). The Court granted Plaintiff's' motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff is the mother of a 13 year old girl named Corinthia Yancey. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant wrongfully terminated Plaintiff's custody of the child and transferred the case to a Wisconsin state court. The Court reads the Complaint as attempting to establish federal question jurisdiction over the matter by asserting claims for violations of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment, the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, the federal Violence Against Women Act, and a California statute. Defendant has not filed an Answer. For the reasons stated below, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint without prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.
I. Facts and Allegations
The Court distills the following account of the facts from the Complaint. On May 15, 2002, police officers detained Plaintiff in Inglewood, California, where she had been visiting for six weeks. So far as the Court can tell, the detention was conducted pursuant to a bench warrant for failure to appear at a child custody hearing. Plaintiff's daughter, Corinthia Yancey, was with Plaintiff at the time of the detention. After a hearing on May 17, 2002, local authorities placed Corinthia Yancey in a foster home in Los Angeles. In December of 2002, the California state court ordered Corinthia Yancey to be sent to live with a great uncle in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, where, insofar as the Court can discern, she remains to this day. Plaintiff apparently now lives in Pontiac, Michigan, although her filings with this Court state an address in Hamilton, Ontario, Canada.The Complaint sets forth two general grievances. First, Plaintiff takes issue with the California state court's decision denying her custody of the child and ultimately sending the child to live with a relative in Milwaukee. Plaintiff claims these decisions violated her "constitutional right of custody" and right to "family decision making." Plaintiff also argues that the California state court violated her due process right to "life, liberty, and freedom" when the state took custody of the child while the mother and child were in California for a six week visit. In addition, Plaintiff contends that the state court harassed and intimidated her, thereby violating her constitutional "freedom of speech." Plaintiff further maintains that the state court's decisions were unconstitutionally infected with disability, race, and age bias on the part of the judge. Next, Plaintiff argues the California state court violated a California statute which purportedly requires that when a child is taken from a parent's custody, the child should either be placed with the noncustodial parent or placed with a relative or in a foster home in the county in which the parent whose custody was terminated resides. Finally, Plaintiff claims the state court's order to send the child to Milwaukee violated the federal Violence Against Women Act. Insofar as the Court can tell, as relief for these alleged violations, Plaintiff seeks a nullification of the state court's custody ruling.
Second, Plaintiff argues that her pending child custody dispute, including an upcoming hearing, is improperly before a Wisconsin state court and should be transferred to the "United States Court, District of Michigan." Plaintiff claims she cannot obtain a "fair and impartial trial" in the Wisconsin court. In addition, Plaintiff argues that in transferring the case to the Wisconsin court, the California court violated California Welfare and Institutions Code § 375, which she argues requires that a child custody case be transferred to the state of residence of the parent who would be the child's legal custodian were it not for the existence of a court order denying custody.
Cal. Welf. Inst. Code § 375 states "Whenever a petition is filed in the juvenile court of a county other than the residence of the person named in the petition, or whenever, subsequent to the filing of a petition in the juvenile court of the county where such minor resides, the residence of the person who would be legally entitled to the custody of such minor were it not for the existence of a court order issued pursuant to this chapter is changed to another county, the entire case may be transferred to the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides at any time after the court has made a finding of the facts upon which it has exercised its jurisdiction over such minor, and the juvenile court of the county wherein such person then resides shall take jurisdiction of the case upon the receipt and filing with it of such finding of the facts and an order transferring the case".
II. Analysis
Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. It is the Court's responsibility to establish that jurisdiction is proper. Lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable in the trial court, and may be raised sua sponte. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action."); Louisville Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43 (1908) (court must dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction even if neither party raises issue). Here, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction for several reasons. The Complaint fails to allege the amount in controversy required for diversity jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and also fails to raise a substantial federal question sufficient to establish federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Moreover, the Court must abstain from reviewing the Complaint under theRooker-Feldman doctrine. Also, the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction over this case because the Defendant, a California state court, enjoys state sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.Dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint is appropriate under the statute governing proceedings in forma pauperis, 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss any action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. See also Benson v. O'Brian, 179 F.3d 1014, 1016 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that "§ 1915(e)(2) applies only to in forma pauperis proceedings"). Here, the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction.
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Substantial Federal Question
A federal district court has subject matter jurisdiction over all civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. However, the issue of federal law presented must be substantial, meaning that the claims cannot be so implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions, or otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy within the jurisdiction of the district court. See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67, 94 S.Ct. 772, 777 (1974). In this case, the Court cannot discern a substantial federal question from the vague allegations presented in the Complaint. Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires only "a short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends." Pro se pleadings, such as the Complaint in this case, are construed even more liberally than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10, 101 So. Ct. 173, 176 (1980) (pro se prisoner complaint held to less stringent standards, and unartful pleading should be dismissed only if it is beyond doubt plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of claim). Even so, the Court can find nothing in the Complaint that would implicate the United States Constitution or federal law. Standing alone, this insufficiency would cause the Court to permit Plaintiff leave to amend the Complaint, but because of the Complaint's other jurisdictional faults, dismissal is appropriate.
B. Rooker-Feldman Abstention Doctrine
Plaintiff's Complaint appears to ask this Court to review a final judgment of a California state court. The Court is barred from performing such review by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. This doctrine, which has its roots in the Supreme Court's decisions in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983) and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 So. Ct. 149(1923), provides that federal district courts are without authority to review final judgments of state courts in judicial proceedings. Sun Valley Foods Co. v. Detroit Marine Terminals. Inc. (in re Sun Valley Foods Co.), 801 F.2d 186, 189 (6th Cir. 1986). Under Feldman. United States district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain general challenges to the validity of rules promulgated in a non-judicial proceeding but do not have subject matter jurisdiction to entertain "challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court's action was unconstitutional." 460 U.S. at 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1317.
In this case, Plaintiff's requests would, if granted, have the effect of overturning the state court's judicial determination denying custody and transferring the case to the Wisconsin court. Plaintiff's attempt to cast her claim as a civil rights violation does not avoid this result. See Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750, 754 (7th Cir. 1993). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine therefore precludes the relief requested by Plaintiff.
C. Subject Matter Jurisdiction: Eleventh Amendment — State Sovereign Immunity
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution grants sovereign immunity to the states against suits in federal court.Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-59, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 1122-25 (1996). Eleventh Amendment immunity is a jurisdictional issue that the Court may raise and decide on its own motion.Pennhurst State Sch. Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 121, 104 S.Ct. 900, 919 (1984); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 206 (6th Cir. 1996), amended on other grounds, 107 F.3d 358 (6th Cir. 1997) (federal courts are required to decide jurisdictional issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity as part of their general obligation to ensure their own jurisdiction). An entity acting as an arm of the state enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal suit to the same extent as the state itself. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 47-51, 115 S.Ct. 394, 404-406 (1994).
Defendant in this case, the Los Angeles Superior Court, is an arm of the state, and as such enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit.See, e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness. Inc. v. Zolin, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that California state case law and statutes "make clear" that the Los Angeles County Superior Court, despite its name and despite receiving county funds, is a state agency, and thus concluding that "a suit against the Superior Court is a suit against the State, barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). Plaintiff's suit must be dismissed on this ground.