Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Alameda County Super. Ct. No. RG 08-365545
Sepulveda, J.
A terminated employee, Morgan Yan, sued his former employer, Orkin Exterminating Company, Inc. (Orkin), for breach of contract and other claims arising from his employment relationship with Orkin. Orkin demurred to Yan’s first amended complaint on several grounds. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10.) Orkin maintained, among other things, that Yan’s claims should have been raised in a cross-complaint in Orkin’s prior employment-related lawsuit against Yan and that Yan’s failure to file that compulsory cross-complaint barred the current action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer. Yan appeals and represents himself before the court. We affirm the order and judgment of dismissal.
I. Facts
Yan worked for Orkin, first as a pest control technician and then as a commercial route manager, from about December 1996 to January 2005, when Orkin terminated Yan. In February 2005, Orkin filed a complaint against Yan for misappropriation of trade secrets and related claims.
Yan answered Orkin’s complaint with a general denial in March 2005. Several months later, in July 2005, Yan filed a cross-complaint for breach of contract and other claims arising from his former employment relationship with Orkin. Orkin demurred to the cross-complaint. The demurrer to Yan’s cross-complaint was sustained with leave to amend but Yan failed to amend his cross-complaint. The court therefore dismissed the cross-complaint in November 2005.
In May 2006, Yan sought leave to file a late cross-complaint for wrongful termination and other claims. The court denied the request. Yan appealed the court’s order denying leave to file a cross-complaint. We dismissed the appeal because the order was purely interlocutory and thus not appealable. (Orkin, Inc. v. Yan (May 16, 2007, A115124) [nonpub. opn.].) We explained that “[a] challenge to such an order must be made by petitioning for a writ of mandate, or appealing the final judgment.” (Id. at p. 1.)
Yan reacted by instituting a new and separate action against Orkin—the one at issue here. In January 2008, Yan sued Orkin for breach of contract and other claims arising from his former employment relationship with Orkin. The original complaint was not served but a first amended complaint was filed and served in August 2008. The first amended complaint in this action is substantially the same as the proposed cross-complaint that was rejected as untimely in the previous Orkin lawsuit.
Orkin demurred to the first amended complaint in September 2008. Orkin maintained, among other things, that Yan’s claims had to be raised in a cross-complaint in Orkin’s prior employment-related lawsuit against Yan and that Yan’s failure to file that compulsory cross-complaint barred the current action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 426.30, subd. (a).) The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer in May 2009. This appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Appellant Yan fails to address the pertinent issues on appeal. The only brief he has submitted on appeal is the exact same brief submitted on the earlier appeal—that is, a brief written in a different case addressing the distinct issue of a trial court’s discretion to deny leave to file a late cross-complaint. Yan makes no effort to address this case and the demurrer ruling at issue here.
Yan’s failure to address the relevant issues is fatal to his appeal. Trial court rulings are presumed correct, and an appellate court cannot overturn a challenged ruling absent an affirmative demonstration of error. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140.) “ ‘[E]very brief should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as waived, and pass it without consideration.’ ” (People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) “ ‘The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error.’ ” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) Appellant Yan “is not exempt from the foregoing rules because he is representing himself on appeal in propria persona. Under the law, a party may choose to act as his or her own attorney. [Citations.] ‘ “[S]uch a party is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Thus, as is the case with attorneys, [propria persona] litigants must follow correct rules of procedure.” (Id. at pp. 1246-1247.)
Yan has failed to provide adequate argument or authority establishing trial court error. Absent an affirmative demonstration of error, the ruling must be affirmed. (Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1140.)
III. Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Reardon, Acting P.J.Rivera, J.