Opinion
No. 1590 C.D. 2012
06-18-2013
Jo-Marie Yamin (Title No. 35559419) v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, Appellant
BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE McGINLEY
The Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (DOT) contests the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County (trial court) which sustained the appeal of Jo-Marie Yamin (Yamin) from a three-month suspension of the registration of her 1983 Chevrolet truck (the "Truck"), pursuant to Section 1786(d) of the Vehicle Code (Code), 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d).
Section 1786(d)(1) of the Code provides:
(1) The Department of Transportation shall suspend the registration of a vehicle for a period of three months if it determines the required financial responsibility was not secured as required by this chapter and shall suspend the operating privilege of the owner or registrant for a period of three months if the department determines that the owner or registrant has operated or permitted the operation of the vehicle without the required financial responsibility. The operating privilege shall not be restored until the restoration fee for operating privilege provided by section 1960 (relating to reinstatement of operation privilege or vehicle registration) is paid.
By official notice dated April 30, 2012, DOT informed Yamin that the registration for the Truck was to be suspended for three months because the insurance policy covering the vehicle was terminated on March 11, 2012. Yamin appealed to the trial court.
At a de novo hearing on July 18, 2012, DOT introduced into evidence a packet of documents that established Yamin's violation of Section 1786(d) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d) and, also, that she was notified of the suspension.
Yamin testified that she currently had insurance and had reinstated it on April 13, 2012. Yamin testified that she did not drive the Truck during the period that she did not have insurance because it was at Joe's Body Shop (Joe's). Notes of Testimony, July 18, 2012, at 3; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 12a. She submitted a statement from Joe's which stated that the Truck had been there since March 10, 2012. Joe's Body Shop Statement, July 16, 2012, at 1; R.R. at 25a.
By order dated July 18, 2012, the trial court sustained the appeal and reversed on the basis that Yamin "presented documentation of reinstatement of auto insurance and evidence that vehicle has been in a repair shop throughout the period of lapsing coverage." Trial Court Order, July 18, 2012, at 1; R.R. at 26a.
DOT contends that the trial court erred when it sustained Yamin's registration suspension appeal where Yamin's lapse in financial responsibility lasted for thirty-two days and Yamin failed to prove she was entitled to one of the Section 1786(d)(2) exceptions.
This Court's review is limited to a determination of whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence of record, whether the trial court committed an error of law, and whether the trial court abused its discretion. Todd v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 555 Pa. 193, 723 A.2d 655 (1999).
DOT has the initial burden of proof in a vehicle registration suspension proceeding pursuant to Section 1786(d)(3) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(3). In order to shoulder this burden, DOT must establish that the vehicle is registered or of a type that is required to be registered under this title, and either that DOT received a notice of a lapse, termination, or cancellation in the financial responsibility coverage or that the owner, registrant or driver was requested to provide proof of financial responsibility to DOT, a police officer or another driver and failed to do so. See Fell v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 925 A.2d 232 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007).
To establish its initial burden of proof for a vehicle registration suspension, the Department must submit the necessary documentation as set forth in Section 1377(b)(2) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b)(2). This Court agrees with DOT that it shouldered its burden.
Section 1377(b)(2) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1377(b)(2) provides:
(b) DOCUMENTATION
....
(2) In a proceeding relating to the suspension of the registration of a motor vehicle imposed under section 1786 (relating to required financial responsibility), the department's certification of its receipt of documents or electronic transmission from an insurance company informing the department that the person's coverage has lapsed, been canceled or terminated shall also constitute prima facie proof that the lapse, cancellation or termination of the policy of insurance described in the electronic transmission was effective under the laws of this Commonwealth.
Here, DOT introduced a packet of documents which established the rebuttable presumption that 1) the vehicle was required to be registered in the Commonwealth; and 2) DOT received a notice of a cancellation in the financial responsibility coverage. This constituted prima facie proof of the cancellation of Yamin's policy.
To successfully defend an appeal of a vehicle registration suspension once DOT establishes its prima facie burden of proof, a vehicle owner must prove that financial responsibility was continuously maintained on the vehicle as required by Section 1786(a) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(a), or that the vehicle owner fits within one of the three statutorily defined defenses outlined in Section 1786(d)(2)(i-iii) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i-iii).
The three statutorily defined defenses set forth in Section 1786(d)(2)(i-iii) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i-iii), are:
(i) The owner or registrant proves to the satisfaction of the department that the lapse in financial responsibility coverage was for a period of less than 31 days and that the owner or registrant did not operate or permit the operation of the vehicle during the period of lapse in financial responsibility.
(ii) The owner or registrant is a member of the armed services of the United States, the owner or registrant has previously had the financial responsibility required by this chapter, financial responsibility has lapsed while the owner or registrant was on temporary, emergency duty and the vehicle was not operated during the period of lapse in financial for 30 days after the owner or registrant returns from duty as long as the vehicle is not operated until the required financial responsibility has been established.
(iii) The insurance coverage has terminated or financial responsibility has lapsed simultaneously with or subsequent to expiration of a seasonal registration, as provided in section 1307(a.1) (relating to period of registration).
The burden then shifted to Yamin to rebut the presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Yamin does not deny that her vehicle insurance lapsed. DOT established that the prior insurance coverage terminated on March 11, 2012. Yamin testified and provided evidence that she resumed insurance coverage on April 13, 2012. That is a period of thirty-two days, more than the maximum number of days of less than thirty-one that a vehicle may be without insurance coverage to meet the exception contained in Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Code, 75 Pa. C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i). Although Yamin established that she did not drive the vehicle during that time, she still failed to meet the "less than thirty-one days" requirement.
Yamin does not allege that either of the other two exceptions applies. --------
In Banks v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004), this Court held that a trial court does not have authority to sustain an appeal of a vehicle registration suspension under Section 1786 based on hardship to the licensee. "This is not a case where the trial court has discretion to consider the hardship and other equitable factors involved. A three-month suspension is mandatory." Banks, 856 A.2d at 297. (Emphasis added).
Here, it is undisputed that DOT established Yamin's failure to maintain financial responsibility on the Truck. Furthermore, Yamin failed to present any evidence that she fit within one of the statutory defenses. Yamin testified that she did not operate the vehicle during the period of lapse in insurance. However, because the lapse was greater than thirty-one days she did not establish a valid defense under Section 1786(d)(2)(i) of the Code, 75 Pa.C.S. §1786(d)(2)(i). Though the trial court sustained Yamin's appeal, the trial court lacked the authority to do so.
Accordingly, this Court must reverse.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge ORDER
AND NOW, this 18th day of June, 2013, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County in the above-captioned matter is reversed.
/s/_________
BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge BEFORE: HONORABLE BERNARD L. McGINLEY, Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
DISSENTING OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE COLINS
I dissent. We are reinstating a draconian result in the instant matter, due to a one-day delay. I think that it is time for this Court to reconsider its holding in Banks v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Motor Vehicles, 856 A.2d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004).
/s/ _________
JAMES GARDNER COLINS, Senior Judge