Opinion
B321313
04-30-2024
Estate of JUNICHI FRISCO YAMASAKI, Deceased. v. REIKO NAKAZAWA, Objector and Respondent. GENE YAMASAKI et al., Petitioners and Appellants,
Jay Oberholtzer for Petitioners and Appellants. John Paladin for Objector and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BP148064 Michael Small, Judge. Affirmed.
Jay Oberholtzer for Petitioners and Appellants.
John Paladin for Objector and Respondent.
LAVIN, Acting P. J.
INTRODUCTION
Between the 1960s and the 1980s, decedent Junichi Frisco Yamasaki made repeated oral promises to leave his entire estate to his two sons, petitioners Daniel and Gene Yamasaki, in exchange for their financial support. In the 2000s, after a falling out with his sons, Junichi executed a will and a revocable living trust, through which he completely disinherited his children. In 2012, Junichi amended his trust, naming his long-time girlfriend and new wife, Reiko Nakazawa, as the trust's trustee and the primary beneficiary of his entire estate.
To avoid confusion, we refer to members of the Yamasaki family by their first names. We also sometimes refer to Gene and Daniel collectively as "the brothers" or "the sons."
Junichi also had a daughter. She is not a party to this appeal.
Junichi died in July 2015. In September 2016, Daniel and Gene filed a petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate when he died. The trial court denied the petition, finding the brothers' claim was barred by Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3's one-year statute of limitations because they filed their petition more than a year after Junichi died. The court also denied the petition on the merits, finding the brothers' claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises was barred by the statute of frauds. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Junichi's Relationship with Daniel and Gene
Junichi and his first wife divorced around the mid-1960s, when Daniel and Gene were teenagers. Around the time of the divorce, Junichi told his sons that they needed to contribute to the mortgage payments for their house and an apartment complex that Junichi owned. Junichi promised to leave his sons "everything" when he died in exchange for their financial support.
Throughout middle school and high school, Daniel and Gene worked as box boys at a local butcher shop. The brothers gave half of their salaries to Junichi, and they used the rest of the money to pay for their own food, clothing, hygiene products, and school supplies.
Daniel and Gene lived with Junichi until their 20s. Around the time they moved out, the brothers stopped giving their father half of their salaries, but they continued to support him in other ways. For instance, Daniel managed Junichi's apartment complex for several decades, often using his own money for repairs and maintenance costs.
Around 1973, Gene gave Junichi money to buy a Porsche. Junichi told his sons that they would inherit the car when he died. A few years later, Junichi sold the car and pocketed the proceeds without telling his sons.
In 1978, Gene purchased a laundromat on Western Avenue in Los Angeles (Western Laundromat). Gene paid the $25,000 down payment, and Junichi co-signed an $80,000 loan to finance the purchase of the property.
In 1982, Junichi proposed that he, Gene, and Daniel purchase a laundromat on Whittier Boulevard in Los Angeles (Whittier Laundromat). Junichi insisted that Gene and Daniel ask their wives to sign quitclaim deeds disclaiming any interest in the property. When Gene and Daniel refused to do so, Junichi promised to leave them his entire estate if they helped him purchase the property in his own name. Gene agreed and contributed $80,000 to the down payment.
According to Daniel, this was the last time Junichi promised to leave his estate to his sons when he died.
In 1984, Gene sold the Western Laundromat. By that time, he was operating the Whittier Laundromat and paying Junichi "rent" under an informal lease agreement. Gene also used his own money, including the proceeds from the sale of the Western Laundromat, to help Junichi pay off the mortgage for the Whittier Laundromat.
Around the mid-1980s, Junichi sold his apartment complex. He used the proceeds to fund the construction of a new building for the Whittier Laundromat. From 1987 to 2000, Gene paid Junichi $3,000 a month to operate the laundromat and to compensate Junichi for the rent he no longer collected from the apartment complex.
In 2000, Gene purchased a house he leased from Junichi, which was located across the street from where Junichi lived. Junichi agreed to sell the house, but he was angered by Gene's decision. Junichi told Gene to stop visiting him, and he directed his son to mail all future checks to his house. After this incident, Gene did not speak to Junichi for 13 years.
2. Junichi's Relationship with Nakazawa
Junichi met Nakazawa in 1987. They started dating shortly thereafter, and they continued to date until they married in late 2012. For most of their relationship, Junichi and Nakazawa lived in separate homes.
According to Nakazawa, Gene and Daniel rarely visited Junichi. Nakazawa often cared for Junichi throughout their relationship. She would drive him to his appointments and help him run errands. Nakazawa moved into Junichi's home after they married, when Junichi's health began to decline.
3. Junichi's Estate
In September 2006, Junichi established the Junichi Frisco Yamasaki Revocable Living Trust (Trust). Through the Trust, Junichi left one of his properties to Nakazawa and the rest of his assets, including the Whittier Laundromat, to the Japanese American National Museum. Junichi also executed a will, which expressly disinherited his children.
In September 2012, after marrying Nakazawa, Junichi amended the Trust (Amended Trust). The Amended Trust named Nakazawa as the primary beneficiary, and the Japanese American National Museum as the secondary beneficiary, of Junichi's entire estate. The Amended Trust expressly disinherited Junichi's children and their families.
Around late October 2012, Junichi began showing signs of dementia.
In November 2012, Junichi's sister told Daniel that Junichi had disinherited his children. The next month, Gene drafted a lease agreement for the Whittier Laundromat (Lease). The Lease identified Junichi as the landlord and Gene as the tenant, and it provided that Gene would pay Junichi $2,500 per month over a 10-year term. The Lease also included two options, which allowed Gene to extend the term of the lease for an additional 10 years. Junichi signed the Lease on December 31, 2012. Nakazawa signed the Lease as a witness to Junichi's signature.
Around late January 2013, Junichi was hospitalized, and later moved to a nursing facility, after his health deteriorated.
In April 2013, Gene drafted a new lease agreement for the Whittier Laundromat (Amended Lease). The Amended Lease named Junichi as the landlord and Gene as the tenant, and it provided that Gene would pay Junichi $500 per month for a 10-year term. The Amended Lease included two options, allowing Gene to extend the term of the lease for an additional 10 years. The Amended Lease also included an option allowing Gene to purchase the Whittier Laundromat for $5,000 at any time during the initial 10-year lease term or the extended terms. On April 15, 2013, Junichi signed the Amended Lease. Nakazawa signed the agreement as a witness to Junichi's signature.
Nakazawa later testified that she did not review the Lease and the Amended Lease, or otherwise understand what they were, before she signed them.
4. Prior Court Proceedings
In April 2013, Nakazawa filed a petition to be appointed as Junichi's conservator. Nakazawa alleged Junichi had been diagnosed with dementia, a heart condition, and macular degeneration and, as a result, was incapable of caring for himself, including his financial affairs. Nakazawa also alleged that Junichi never read or understood the Lease and the Amended Lease before he signed them. In December 2013, the trial court granted Nakazawa's petition.
In August 2014, Gene filed a petition to confirm the Lease and the Amended Lease under Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(3)(A) (Lease Petition).
In July 2015, Junichi died.
In September 2016, the court denied the Lease Petition, finding the Lease and the Amended Lease were unenforceable because Junichi suffered from dementia when he signed them and, therefore, lacked the capacity to enter into the agreements.
5. Petition to Enforce Junichi's Oral Promises
In December 2016, over a year after Junichi died, Daniel and Gene filed another petition under Probate Code section 850, subdivision (a)(3)(A), which sought to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate when he died. The brothers named Nakazawa as a respondent in her individual capacity and as the trustee of the Amended Trust.
In the operative first amended petition, Gene and Daniel asserted they detrimentally relied on Junichi's oral promises by supporting him financially throughout their lives for little, to no, compensation. The brothers also alleged they timely filed their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises. They claimed the Lease and the Amended Lease were "presumptively valid" and "modifi[ed] and fufill[ed]" Junichi's oral promises. They believed they "could not present the instant Petition [to enforce Junichi's oral promises] as long as the leases remained presumptively valid." According to Daniel and Gene, any claim to enforce the oral promises "did not exist on [Junichi's] death. Rather, [it] was brought to life upon the Court's determination that [Junichi] was not competent at the time that the [Lease and the Amended Lease] were executed."
Daniel and Gene also alleged they were led to believe they did not need to file an action to enforce Junichi's oral promises because Junichi and Nakazawa signed the Lease and the Amended Lease without objection. The brothers acknowledged, however, that Nakazawa disputed the validity of the leases in her petition to establish a conservatorship over Junichi, which she filed more than a year before Gene filed the Lease Petition and more than two years before Junichi died.
In May 2017, Nakazawa filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing the brothers' petition was time-barred under Code of Civil Procedure section 366.3 (Section 366.3) because they filed it more than one year after Junichi died. The court denied Nakazawa's motion, finding there were disputed factual issues as to whether Nakazawa should be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.
Prior to trial, Gene and Daniel filed a motion in limine, arguing Nakazawa was collaterally estopped from denying the following issues: (1) Junichi repeatedly promised Gene and Daniel that they would receive his entire estate when he died; (2) Junichi intended for Gene and Daniel to rely on his promises; (3) Gene and Daniel relied on Junichi's promises; and (4) if Junichi's promises were not enforced, Gene and Daniel would suffer unconscionable injury and Junichi's estate would be unjustly enriched. The court granted Gene and Daniel's motion as to the first three issues and denied it as to the fourth issue.
The court held a bench trial between March and December 2020. Gene, Daniel, and Nakazawa testified. Several appraisers and a certified public accountant testified as expert witnesses.
In July 2021, the court issued a 23-page statement of decision. As a preliminary matter, the court found the brothers' claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises was barred by Section 366.3's one-year statute of limitations because they filed their petition more than one year after Junichi died. The court found that Nakazawa, as the Amended Trust's trustee and primary beneficiary, was not estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense because neither she nor Junichi engaged in any conduct that caused the brothers to refrain from timely filing their petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises.
The court also found the brothers' claim was barred by the statute of frauds. The court rejected the brothers' argument that Nakazawa was equitably estopped from relying on the statute of frauds because they did not show they would suffer unconscionable injury, or that the Amended Trust would be unjustly enriched, if Junichi's promise was not enforced.
In March 2022, the court entered judgment dismissing Daniel and Gene's petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises. The brothers filed a timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
Under Section 366.3, "a claim that arises from a promise or agreement with a decedent to distribution from an estate or trust or under another instrument, whether the promise or agreement was made orally or in writing," must be brought within one year of the decedent's death. (§ 366.3, subd. (a).) This limitations period may not be tolled for any reason, except in limited circumstances not relevant to this case. (Id., subd. (b).) Where, as here, the relevant facts are not in dispute, we independently review whether a plaintiff's claim is barred by the statute of limitations. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen &Co. (1995) 9 Cal.4th 606, 611.)
Gene and Daniel do not dispute that their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises falls within the scope of Section 366.3.
Junichi died on July 21, 2015. Gene and Daniel did not file their petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate when he died until December 16, 2016. Because the petition was filed more than one year after Junichi died, Gene and Daniel's claim is untimely under Section 366.3.
Gene and Daniel argue their claim is not time-barred because they could not enforce Junichi's oral promises until after the court invalidated the Lease and the Amended Lease, which occurred in September 2016, or more than one year after Junichi died. According to the brothers, the leases were "presumptively valid" when they were executed. Because Gene and Junichi intended the leases to supersede Junichi's oral promises to leave his estate to his sons, the oral promises could not be enforced until the leases were invalidated. In essence, Gene and Daniel argue that the statute of limitations to enforce Junichi's oral promises was tolled until the court invalidated the Lease and the Amended Lease. This argument lacks merit for a couple of reasons.
First, it conflicts with the language of Section 366.3. As we noted above, subdivision (b) of that statute provides that the limitations period "shall not be tolled or extended for any reason," except in circumstances that don't apply here. (See § 366.3, subd. (b).) Gene and Daniel cite no authority to the contrary.
Second, it is well-settled that a plaintiff may plead inconsistent theories of recovery. (Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 593.) That is, if a plaintiff is in doubt about what can be established by the evidence, he may plead in the alternative and make inconsistent factual allegations. (Mendoza v. Continental Sales Co. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1395, 1402; see also Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 691 [a plaintiff may "allege any and all 'inconsistent counts' that a reasonable attorney would find legally tenable on the basis of the facts known to the plaintiff at the time"].) When Gene filed the Lease Petition, nothing prevented him and Daniel from asserting a claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate as an alternative theory of recovery should the court find the Lease and the Amended Lease were unenforceable. Nor did anything prevent the brothers from amending the Lease Petition to add a claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises, or from filing a separate petition to include such a claim, within one year of Junichi's death.
Daniel and Gene next contend that even if their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises is untimely under Section 366.3, Nakazawa, as trustee and beneficiary of the Amended Trust, should be equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. A party whose conduct causes the plaintiff not to file his claim in a timely manner may be estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense. (McMackin v. Ehrheart (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 128, 140-142.) For estoppel to apply, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the defendant is aware of the facts; (2) the defendant must intend for the plaintiff to rely on her conduct; (3) the plaintiff must be ignorant of the facts; and (4) the plaintiff must detrimentally rely upon the defendant's conduct. (Spray, Gould &Bowers v. Associated Internat. Ins. Co. (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1267.) Whether equitable estoppel applies is a factual issue that we review for substantial evidence. (McMackin, at p. 142.)
To the extent Gene and Daniel argue the court was precluded from finding equitable estoppel does not apply in this case because it previously denied Nakazawa's motion for judgment on the pleadings on statute of limitations grounds, that argument is not adequately developed or supported by citations to pertinent legal authority. We therefore do not address it any further. (See Keyes v. Bowen (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 647, 655-656 [an appellant forfeits any points that are not properly raised or that are not supported by cognizable legal argument and factual analysis].)
Gene and Daniel argue that Junichi and Nakazawa led them to believe the Lease and the Amended Lease were enforceable and that they did not need to file an action to enforce Junichi's oral promises until the leases were invalidated. Specifically, the brothers point to the following conduct: (1) Junichi signed the Lease and the Amended Lease without objection; (2) Nakazawa witnessed Junichi's signatures on the leases without objection; and (3) Nakazawa failed to take formal legal action to invalidate the leases. As we explain, this argument lacks merit.
As for Junichi's conduct, the court in the Lease Petition action found that Junichi suffered from dementia when he signed the Lease and the Amended Lease and could not comprehend the nature of those agreements. The brothers never challenged those findings. Nor do they otherwise contend that Junichi comprehended the nature of the leases, let alone that he understood the leases were intended to supersede his oral promises to leave his estate to his sons when he died. Gene and Daniel, therefore, failed to prove that, by signing the Lease and the Amended Lease, Junichi intended to cause his sons to forgo filing an action to enforce his oral promises to leave his estate to them when he died.
As for Nakazawa witnessing Junichi's signature on the Lease and the Amended Lease, nothing in the record suggests she reviewed the leases, let alone understood what they were, before Junichi signed them. In any event, the brothers presented no evidence that Nakazawa intended to dissuade them from pursuing their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises by witnessing Junichi's signatures on the leases.
Nor does the fact that Nakazawa took no formal legal action to invalidate the Lease and the Amended Lease mean she intended to cause Gene and Daniel to delay pursuing their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises. In fact, as Gene and Daniel alleged in the operative first amended petition, Nakazawa questioned the validity of the leases when she petitioned to establish a conservatorship over Junichi, which she filed more than a year before Gene filed the Lease petition and more than two years before Junichi died.
Finally, Gene and Daniel testified at trial that Nakazawa never told them not to file their petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises before the statute of limitations expired. Indeed, according to Daniel, Gene and their lawyer made the decision to wait to file the petition until after the court resolved Gene's claim to confirm the Lease and the Amended Lease.
In sum, Gene and Daniel failed to prove that Junichi or Nakazawa engaged in any conduct intended to delay the filing of their petition to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate when he died. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the court's finding that Nakazawa was not estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense.
Because Gene and Daniel filed their petition more than a year after Junichi died, their claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises to leave them his estate is time-barred. (See § 366.3.) The court, therefore, properly dismissed the brothers' petition.
Considering our conclusion that Gene and Daniel's claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises is barred by Section 366.3's one-year statute of limitations, we need not address the brothers' argument that the court erred in finding their claim is also barred by the statute of frauds. Likewise, we need not address Nakazawa's claim that the court should have dismissed the underlying petition because the brothers should have raised a claim to enforce Junichi's oral promises in the prior proceedings on Gene's Lease Petition.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: EGERTON, J., ADAMS, J.