Whether laches should apply depends on a consideration of the particular circumstances, including the length of the delay in the claimant's assertion of rights, the sufficiency of the excuse for the delay, the loss of evidence on disputed matters, the opportunity for the claimant to have acted sooner. . . . These factors are relevant because laches is not merely a question of time, but principally a matter of inequity in permitting the claim to be enforced. Hall v. Trubey, 269 Ga. 197 ( 498 S.E.2d 258) (1998); Troup v. Loden, 266 Ga. 650, 651(1) ( 469 S.E.2d 664) (1996); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 708(2) ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). But lapse of time is an important element and in itself may be telling on the question of inequity.

These factors are relevant because laches is not merely a question of time, but principally a matter of inequity in permitting the claim to be enforced. Hall v. Trubey, 269 Ga. 197 ( 498 S.E.2d 258) (1998); Troup v. Loden, 266 Ga. 650, 651 (1) ( 469 S.E.2d 664) (1996); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 708 (2) ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). But lapse of time is an important element and in itself may be telling on the question of inequity.

This is so because laches is not merely a question of time, but principally the question of the inequity in permitting the claim to be enforced. Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 708 (2) ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). Here, a consideration of the circumstances compels the conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine of laches to bar Hall's claims.

In determining what constitutes laches, each case must be determined according to its particular circumstances. Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693 ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). Additionally, the question of laches is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and on appeal the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed unless "it is so clearly wrong as to amount to an abuse of discretion. Mountain Manor Co. v. Greenoe, 205 Ga. 619, 621 ( 54 S.E.2d 629)."

Absent "clear, unequivocal and decisive" evidence as to the mistake, relief on grounds of mistake will not be granted. See Parker v. Fisher, 207 Ga. 3 ( 59 S.E.2d 715) (1950); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693 ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). There is evidence in the record to support the correctness of the stipulation.

For a mistake to be relievable in equity by reformation, it must be mutual, or else mistake on the part of one to the contract and fraud on the part of the other." Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 704 ( 38 S.E.2d 534) (1946). "A petition for reformation of a written contract will lie where by mistake of the scrivener and by oversight of the parties, the writing does not embody or fully express the real contract of the parties.

The fact that both parties move for a directed verdict does not constitute a waiver by each party of the right to have fact issues decided by the jury if such fact issues remain. Code Ann. § 81A-150 (a). Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693 (1) ( 38 S.E.2d 534). Therefore the trial court erred in granting a directed verdict for Mrs. Bush because the evidence is not sufficiently clear to eliminate a fact question concerning whether Mrs. Walker accepted the easement stipulation or otherwise waived her right to object to it. Her own testimony was that she never agreed to it, and that depositing the papers in escrow was done for a double purpose: to allow correction of the legal description to be made, and also to have the dispute over the easement straightened out in some fashion by further negotiation.

These two requirements will be dealt with in the order of their statement. (a) In Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 705 ( 38 S.E.2d 534), this court unanimously said that a mistake which the draftsman makes in the preparation of a contract, while acting by the direction of only one of the contracting parties, is a unilateral mistake, and is one which will not warrant reformation. In this case there is no evidence showing or tending to show that the grantee was present when the deed sought to be reformed was prepared, and it is a reasonable and logical inference that the grantor was present at such time and gave the draftsman direction respecting its contents; and this is especially true since he prepared it for her and she signed it in his presence as a subscribing witness.

Being in no wise a mutual mistake, reformation was properly denied. Code § 37-207; Quiggle v. Vining, 125 Ga. 98 ( 54 S.E. 74); Salvage Sales Co. v. Aarons, 181 Ga. 133 ( 181 S.E. 584); Helton v. Shellnut, 186 Ga. 185 ( 197 S.E. 287); Hill v. Agnew, 199 Ga. 644 ( 34 S.E.2d 702); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693 ( 38 S.E.2d 534). Discussion of the numerous decisions of this court, holding that reformation therein was authorized — but every one of them stating that mutuality was essential to reformation, in the absence of fraud — cited by counsel for the company, is unnecessary further than to say that they, because of their facts, are wholly inapplicable here. Despite both established rules of law and the expressed provision of the policy, that the contract is the intention of the parties and cannot be altered by extrinsic evidence, counsel cite much evidence, admitted over objections on the trial, for proof of the intention of the parties as to what the premium should be, retaining a deadly silence as to the contrary intention expressed in the application part of the policy which they do not seek to reform.

In the present case, as in the former action, the plaintiff prayed for a reformation of the description in her contract with Randall. The petition does not allege that the description as contained in the contract was the result of a mistake on the part of both parties, or mistake on the part of one party and fraud on the part of the other, and no right to reformation of the contract is shown. Code §§ 37-207, 37-215; Gibson v. Alford, 161 Ga. 672 ( 132 S.E. 442); Salvage Sales Co. v. Aarons, 181 Ga. 133 ( 181 S.E. 584); Rawson v. Brosnan, 187 Ga. 624 ( 1 S.E.2d 423); Yablon v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 200 Ga. 693, 704 ( 38 S.E.2d 534). John Clyde Randall was not merely a proper party, but an essential party, to the reformation of his contract; and the plaintiff having recovered a final judgment (which judgment was for a full recovery of the amounts paid by her), she can not pursue the matter further for a reformation of her contract with Randall, and for specific performance of that contract by the Robinsons, on the theory that they purchased from Randall with knowledge of her contract. Questions settled by a former final judgment must be considered an end of the litigation; they can not be litigated in other actions, directly or indirectly. Lankford v. Holton, 196 Ga. 631 ( 27 S.E.2d 310).