Opinion
21-16434
09-20-2022
XIA LI NELSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY; ARIZONA DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, Defendants-Appellees.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Appeal from the United States District Court No. 2:20-cv-02178-JJT for the District of Arizona John Joseph Tuchi, District Judge, Presiding
Before: O'SCANNLAIN, RAWLINSON, and OWENS, Circuit Judges.
MEMORANDUM
Xia Li Nelson appeals pro se from the district court's judgment dismissing her employment discrimination action alleging violations of Title VII and 42 U.S.C § 1981. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a district court's dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Nelson's action because Nelson failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Surrell v. Cal. Water Serv. Co., 518 F.3d 1097, 1107-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating elements of hostile work environment and retaliation claims under Title VII and § 1981); Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating elements of a discrimination claim under Title VII); Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 797 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[L]egal principles guiding a court in a Title VII dispute apply with equal force in a § 1981 action.").
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend because the record reflects that Nelson's proposed amendments would be futile. See Cervantes v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that denying leave to amend is proper when amendment would be futile).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). Nelson's "Motion to Appeal Judge's Order That Terminated Plaintiff's Complaint" (Docket Entry No. 3) is denied as unnecessary.
AFFIRMED.
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).