See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018). Pleadings are to be liberally construed with a view of doing substantial justice between the parties. Wysocki v. Bedrosian, 124 Ill. App. 3d 158, 162 (1984). The reviewing court should interpret the assertions of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff by accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.

¶ 18 Pleadings must be construed liberally with the aim of “doing substantial justice between the parties.” Wysocki v. Bedrosian, 124 Ill.App.3d 158, 162, 79 Ill.Dec. 564, 463 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (1984). The reviewing court should interpret the assertions of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff by accepting as true all well-pleaded facts and the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from them.

Summary judgment is proper where the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; however, it should be granted "only when the party's right to it is clear and free from doubt." ( Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, 164.) The function of the summary judgment procedure is to determine the existence or absence of triable issues of fact, not to try them. ( Winnetka Bank v. Mandas (1990), 202 Ill. App.3d 373, 387.

IV Next, plaintiff alleges that the trial court erroneously dismissed count XI of her third amended complaint, which was an action for replevin of the treasury note. Plaintiff and defendant Skokie Federal rely upon section 19-104 of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 19-104), and International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Helland (1985), 130 Ill. App.3d 836. Defendants also rely upon Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, Laue v. Leifheit (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 937, and Blum v. City of Chicago (1970), 126 Ill. App.2d 228. • 18 A person may bring an action for replevin to recover his chattel from one who has wrongful possession of the chattel.

The court indicated that detrimental reliance is sufficient by itself, but that estoppel is particularly compelling where, in addition, the oral modification is induced by the one who later seeks to assert the Statute of Frauds defense against enforcement of the oral modification. That the party who detrimentally relied upon the waiver of strict compliance with the original written contract and upon the oral modification need not have been induced by the other party is evident in Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, 463 N.E.2d 1339. There, the buyers needed an extension of the real estate sales contract in order to obtain their mortgage.

Summary judgment is a remedy that must be awarded with caution in order to avoid preempting a litigant's right to trial by jury or his right to fully present the factual basis of a case where a material dispute may exist. ( Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, 164, 463 N.E.2d 1339.) It is well established that, on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must construe the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file against the moving party and in favor of the opponent of the motion. ( Wysocki, 124 Ill. App.3d at 164.)

• 2 Because of the extreme nature of summary judgment, a court must exercise extraordinary diligence in its review of the record so as not to preempt a party's right to trial by jury or its right to fully present the factual basis for its claim. ( Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, 164, 463 N.E.2d 1339, 1344.) The court must construe the pleadings, depositions and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent.

In considering a summary judgment motion, a trial court must construe the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits most strictly against the moving party and most liberally in favor of the opponent. ( Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158.) Summary judgment should be granted only when the moving party's entitlement to such relief is clear and free from doubt. ( Estate of Kern v. Handelsman (1983), 115 Ill. App.3d 789, 793.)

Kelley cites a string of Illinois cases, each dealing with oral modifications to written contracts, for the proposition that "an oral extension of the written permit is a valid modification of the permit and the Statute of Frauds." See Rose v. Dolejs, 116 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1953); Heitz v. Circle Four Realty Co., 548 N.E.2d 11 (Ill.App.Ct. 1989); Wysocki v. Bedrosian, 463 N.E.2d 1339 (Ill.App.Ct. 1989). However, none of the cases cited by Kelley deals with municipal permits; rather they all deal with land sale agreements or oral agreements to pay money.

But the condition stated in XL Disposal's obligation to Blair would also seem to undermine the notion that there was any liability for Sexton to assume. The condition — a condition subsequent to the promised payment (J. Calamari J. Perillo, Contracts § 11-7, at 441-44 (3d ed. 1987); see also Wysocki v. Bedrosian (1984), 124 Ill. App.3d 158, 163) — seems to contemplate a single entity's operation of XL Disposal's two waste transfer facilities. XL Disposal promised to pay Blair until: