Opinion
C23-882-RAJ-MLP
06-30-2023
CAMERON DAVID WYNNE, Plaintiff, v. SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DECLINING TO SERVE COMPLAINT AND GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND
MICHELLE L. PETERSON UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY CONCLUSION
Plaintiff Cameron Wynne is currently confined at the King County Jail (“the Jail”) in Seattle, Washington. He has submitted to this Court for filing a civil rights complaint, which is properly construed as one filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and an application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). (See dkt. ## 1, 1-1.) This Court has reviewed Plaintiff's proposed complaint and concludes that Plaintiff has not alleged a viable claim for relief in his pleading. The Court therefore declines to order that the complaint be served, but grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint correcting the deficiencies identified below.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Claims
Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that the Seattle Police Department (“SPD”), the Jail Health Staff, and the Jail have violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. (See dkt. # 1-1 at 4-8.) With respect to the SPD, Plaintiff asserts that while in police custody at the Harborview Medical Center Emergency Room, he informed an officer that he needed to use the restroom, but the officer wouldn't allow it. (Id. at 4-5.) According to Plaintiff, he ended up defecating on himself, but the officer still refused to allow him to use a restroom. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff claims that he sat in his own feces for over an hour before another officer came on duty and allowed Plaintiff to clean himself. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that this incident caused him mental and emotional distress, that it was unsanitary, unsafe, and ruined his clothes, and that it gave him severe PTSD. (Id.)
With respect to the Jail Health Staff, Plaintiff asserts that during the course of his confinement at the Jail he has repeatedly asked to be provided multi-vitamins, which are a necessary part of his diet because he “lost [his] stomach” in 2017, but his requests have been denied because “they don't care.” (See dkt. # 1-1 at 6.) Plaintiff further asserts that he pursued his remedies through the grievance process in an effort to obtain the vitamins, but he was advised he would not be receiving them while at the Jail. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that his health has deteriorated as a result of not getting his vitamins, his teeth have almost fully decayed and/or fallen out, he lacks energy, and he loses his breath quickly. (Id. at 7.) Plaintiff also claims that he has trouble concentrating, which has interfered with his ability to fully understand the criminal charges pending against him. (See id. at 7, 10.)
With respect to the Jail, Plaintiff asserts that since he was booked into the Jail last year, he has been given foods he cannot eat. (Dkt. # 1-1 at 7.) Plaintiff claims that though the Jail has various diets available, “there is no dietary program in place to protect or provide the basic human right to food to somebody with severe dietary needs as me.” (Id. at 8.) Plaintiff asserts that he has been given foods that have caused severe pain and cramps, sudden dumping syndrome, and nausea, which leaves him exhausted and unable to complete the tasks necessary to defend himself in court, or to “even exist.” (Id.) Plaintiff indicates that he has “gotten with” the kitchen and medical staffs multiple times in an effort to correct his diet, but those efforts have been unsuccessful. (Id.) Plaintiff claims that the Jail's failure to provide him a proper diet has caused him to suffer weight loss, weakness, lethargy, and hunger pains, and it has also caused him to become epileptic and to develop severe mental issues such as depression and eating disorders. (Id.)
Plaintiff identifies the SPD, the Jail Health Staff, and the Jail as Defendants in his complaint. (See dkt. # 1-1 at 1, 3.) Plaintiff seeks $2 million in damages, an order directing that “all dental work [be] compensated,” and orders directing that he be provided vitamins and a proper diet. (Id. at 9.)
B. Screening Standards
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, the Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity, officer, or employee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must “dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint: (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that in order for a pleading to state a claim for relief it must contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and a demand for the relief sought. The statement of the claim must be sufficient to “give the defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). The factual allegations of a complaint must be “enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In addition, a complaint must allege facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
In order to sustain a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he suffered a violation of rights protected by the Constitution or created by federal statute; and (2) the violation was proximately caused by a person acting under color of state law. See Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1420 (9th Cir. 1991). The causation requirement of § 1983 is satisfied only if a plaintiff demonstrates that a defendant did an affirmative act, participated in another's affirmative act, or omitted to perform an act which he was legally required to do that caused the deprivation complained of. Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The inquiry into causation must be individualized and focus on the duties and responsibilities of each individual defendant whose acts or omissions are alleged to have caused a constitutional deprivation.” Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 633 (9th Cir. 1988).
A local government unit or municipality can be sued as a “person” under § 1983. Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978). However, a municipality cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely because it employs a tortfeasor. Id. at 691. A plaintiff seeking to impose liability on a municipality under § 1983 must identify a municipal “policy” or “custom” that caused his or her injury. Board of Comm'rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403 (1997) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
C. Deficiencies
1. Defendants
Plaintiff fails to identify in his complaint any proper Defendants. Plaintiff first names the SPD as a Defendant in his complaint. (Dkt. # 1-1 at 1, 3.) However, while the City of Seattle is a legal entity which is suable under § 1983, see Monell, 436 U.S. at 691, police departments are generally not considered suable entities separate from the city itself, see West v. Waymire, 114 F.3d 646, 646-47 (7th Cir. 1997); Ricketts v. City of Hartford, 74 F.3d 1397, 1400 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996); Dean v. Barber, 951 F.2d 1210, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1992). Because the SPD is not a legal entity subject to suit under § 1983, Plaintiff may not proceed against the SPD in this action.
Plaintiff may pursue a claim against the City of Seattle itself, but in order to do so he must specifically identify the City as a Defendant, he must identify a City “policy” or “custom” that caused him harm, and he must identify the federal constitutional right he believes was violated by the identified “policy” or “custom.” Plaintiff may also proceed against individual SPD officers, but in order to do so Plaintiff must identify the officers by name, and he must allege clear and specific facts demonstrating that each named officer personally participated in the violation of his constitutional rights.
If Plaintiff does not know the name of the police officer involved, it is possible he may be able to obtain such information by submitting a public records request to the Seattle Police Department.
Plaintiff next names the Jail Health Staff as a Defendant. (See dkt. # 1-1 at 1, 3.) However, the “Health Staff” is not a proper Defendant in an action brought under § 1983. Plaintiff may pursue claims against individual members of the Jail's health staff, but as explained above, if he chooses to do so he must specifically identify individual members of the staff whom he believes caused him harm, and he must allege clear and specific facts demonstrating that each named individual personally participated in causing him harm of federal constitutional dimension.
Finally, Plaintiff names the Jail as a Defendant in his complaint. (See dkt. # 1-1 at 1, 3.) However, the Jail is an entity of King County and, as such, is not a proper defendant in this action. See Nolan v. Snohomish County, 59 Wn.App. 876, 883 (1990) (“[I]n a legal action involving a county, the county itself is the only legal entity capable of suing and being sued.”). Plaintiff may pursue a claim against King County itself, but in order to do so he must specifically identify the County as a defendant in this action, he must identify a County “policy” or “custom” that caused him harm, and he must identify the federal constitutional right he believes has been violated by the identified “policy” or “custom.”
2. Constitutional Claims
Plaintiff alleges in each of his claims that Defendants violated his rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and he asserts in his first and third claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment, which specifically references rights protected by the Eighth Amendment. (See dkt. # 1-1 at 4-8.) However, the events Plaintiff describes in his complaint appear to have occurred while he was in pretrial detention. Plaintiff's rights therefore derive from the Due Process Clause and not from the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 n.16 (1979). Thus, the Eighth Amendment is not applicable in the context of this case and provides no basis for relief.
With respect to any intended due process claims, the Ninth Circuit has explained that a pretrial detainee's challenge to the conditions of his confinement is evaluated under an objective deliberate indifference standard. See Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2018) (applying objective standard to medical care claims and describing similar treatment afforded to medical care and other conditions of confinement claims) (citing Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 400-01 (2015); Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070 (9th Cir. 2016)). To state a claim of unconstitutional conditions of confinement against an individual defendant, a pretrial detainee must allege facts that show:
(i) the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (ii) those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (iii) the defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable official in the circumstances would have appreciated the high degree of risk involved-making the consequences of the defendant's conduct obvious; and (iv) by not taking such measures, the defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries.Id. at 1125 (citation omitted).
Here, Plaintiff fails to set forth plausible conditions of confinement claims because he does not identify Defendants who made any intentional decision that put him at substantial risk of serious harm. If Plaintiff wishes to pursue such claims, he must assert his claims under the Fourteenth Amendment, he must identify the individuals responsible for the alleged deficient conditions, and he must set forth specific facts demonstrating that the individuals identified personally participated in causing him constitutional harm.
III. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court ORDERS as follows:
(1) The Court declines to direct that Plaintiff's complaint be served on Defendants because of the deficiencies identified above. However, Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint curing the noted deficiencies within thirty (30) days of the date on which this Order is signed. The amended complaint must carry the same case number as this one. If no amended complaint is timely filed, or if Plaintiff fails to correct the deficiencies identified above, the Court will recommend that this action be dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).
(2) Plaintiff is advised that an amended pleading operates as a complete substitute for an original pleading. See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc., 896 F.2d 1542, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (as amended)). Thus, any amended complaint must clearly identify the Defendant(s), the constitutional claim(s) asserted, the specific facts which Plaintiff believes support each claim, and the specific relief requested.
(3) The Clerk shall note this matter on the Court's calendar for July 31, 2023, for review of Plaintiff's amended complaint.
(4) The Clerk is directed to send Plaintiff the appropriate forms so that he may file an amended complaint. The Clerk is further directed to send copies of this Order to Plaintiff and to the Honorable Richard A. Jones.