Browder v. State, 294 Ga. 188 (1), 751 S.E.2d 354 (2013). Malice aforethought may be formed in an instant and there need not be a showing of any premeditation. See Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861 (1), 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000). In this case, appellant shot Johnson because he was angered when Johnson punched him in the face.

A conviction of malice murder, however, does not require a showing that the defendant had a " ‘premeditation’ or a ‘preconceived’ intention to kill; malice aforethought can be formed instantly." Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 861 (1), 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000)."Whether a killing is intentional and malicious is for the jury to determine from all the facts and circumstances."

As the jury was instructed, “there is no requirement that there be ‘premeditation’ or a ‘preconceived’ intention to kill; malice aforethought can be formed instantly.” Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 861(1), 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000). The evidence was sufficient to support the jury's verdict.

Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566 (1) ( 492 SE2d 201) (1997). It is not error to limit cross-examination when one of the three requirements is not met. Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861 (2) ( 535 SE2d 758) (2000). In the case at bar, it was established during the cross-examination of the witness who allegedly made a prior inconsistent statement that the prior statement being used by trial counsel was not inconsistent with the witness's in-court testimony.

As to the question of malice, there is no requirement of premeditation or a preconceived intention to kill; "malice aforethought can be formed instantly." Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861(1) ( 535 S.E.2d 758) (2000). The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Lamb guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the malice murder of Smith. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560) (1979).

In this case, the trial court correctly ruled that Taylor’s resignation from Kroger, including any purported reason for resigning, was a collateral matter since "the testimony [Daniels] wished to elicit from [Taylor] regarding [the reason she left a job several months prior to the robbery] was irrelevant to the issues to be considered by the trier of fact[.]" Wynn v. State , 272 Ga. 861, 862 (2), 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000). The trial court thus did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Daniels to introduce a prior statement to attempt to impeach the victim on a collateral matter.

Wynn v. State.Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 862(2) ( 535 S.E.2d 758) (2000). As an initial matter, the allegedly impeaching statements were made by Edwards' counsel, not Edwards. McEntyre has provided us with no legal authority that legal arguments of counsel may be later used against their clients, and we decline to create such a rule.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 862 (2) ( 535 S.E.2d 758) (2000). These foundation requirements are necessary to allow the witness to explain or deny the prior inconsistent statement.

”); United States v. Roulette, 75 F.3d 418, 423 (8th Cir.1996) (“[U]nder [Rule] 613(b) a witness may not be impeached on a collateral matter by use of extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements.”). See also Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 862, 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000) (affirming the exclusion of a prior inconsistent statement under the old Evidence Code because it “was irrelevant to the issues to be considered by the trier of fact” (citing Duckworth v. State, 268 Ga. 566, 567, 492 S.E.2d 201 (1997) )). Thus, although aspects of Georgia's Evidence Code dealing with prior inconsistent statements used to impeach have changed, the principle that such statements may not be introduced to impeach a witness on collateral matters remains intact. See Paul S. Milich, Georgia Rules of Evidence § 14:3, at 437 (2015–2016 ed.).

Moreover, the State was not required to show premeditation or a preconceived intention on appellant's part as malice aforethought can be formed instantly. See Wynn v. State, 272 Ga. 861, 535 S.E.2d 758 (2000). Construed most strongly in support of the verdict, we find the evidence in this case was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of malice murder.