Opinion
A22-1598
06-01-2023
Daniel John Wyatt, petitioner, Appellant, v. State of Minnesota, Respondent.
Scott County District Court File No. 70-CR-19-15840
Considered and decided by Cochran, Presiding Judge; Frisch, Judge; and Florey, Judge. [*]
ORDER OPINION
JENNIFER L. FRISCH, JUDGE
BASED ON THE FILE, RECORD, AND PROCEEDINGS, AND BECAUSE:
1. In September 2019, respondent State of Minnesota charged appellant Daniel John Wyatt with one count of violating a no-contact order related to calls he made to the protected party in violation of Minn. Stat. § 629.75, subd. 2(d)(1) (2018).
2. In December 2019, the state offered Wyatt a plea agreement whereby Wyatt would plead guilty to the charge in exchange for the dismissal of another file and a sentence within the guidelines range, which the parties understood to be 21 to 28 months' imprisonment. Wyatt indicated to the district court that he was concerned about going to prison for the charge. Wyatt rejected the plea agreement and requested a trial.
3. In January 2020, the state amended the complaint to add two additional felony charges for violations of a no-contact order. Wyatt waived counsel and proceeded pro se. In April 2020, Wyatt reconsidered the state's plea offer and asked if he could receive probation instead of a prison sentence. The state explained that Wyatt's criminal history and conduct did not support a dispositional departure.
4. Wyatt ultimately accepted the state's plea offer and completed a written plea petition. The district court reviewed the plea petition with Wyatt. Wyatt testified, among other things, that he understood the document, that he gave up certain rights by pleading guilty, and that he agreed to a 21-month prison sentence. Wyatt pleaded guilty to one count of violating a no-contact order, and the state agreed to dismiss the other counts.
5. In May 2020, prior to sentencing, Wyatt moved to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective. The district court denied the motion and sentenced Wyatt to 21 months' imprisonment pursuant to the plea agreement.
A district court may allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing if it is "fair and just to do so." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2.
6. In August 2020, Wyatt filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of conviction. He subsequently abandoned his direct appeal, and we granted his motion to dismiss before the parties filed their briefs.
7. In May 2021, Wyatt moved the district court for correction of his sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, based on an amendment to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines that went into effect on August 1, 2019. Citing State v. Robinette, 944 N.W.2d 242 (Minn.App. 2020), aff'd, 694 N.W.2d 143 (Minn. 2021), Wyatt argued that his 21-month executed sentence was illegal because, under the amelioration doctrine, the August 2019 amendment to the sentencing guidelines must apply to his case even though his offense occurred before August 2019. As a result, Wyatt argued, the presumptive sentence under the guidelines should have been 21 months' imprisonment stayed. The district court granted Wyatt's motion, resentenced him to a stayed probationary sentence, and discharged Wyatt from probation.
The amendment provided that only one-half of a custody-status point should be assigned if the offense was committed while the offender was on probation for a non-traffic grossmisdemeanor conviction. Minn. Sent'g Guidelines II.B.2.a (2019).
8. In May 2022, Wyatt filed a petition for postconviction relief requesting plea withdrawal and reversal of his conviction. Wyatt asserted in his petition that his guilty plea was manifestly unjust because it was involuntary and unintelligent. He alleged that his plea was involuntary because it was induced by a threatened illegal sentence. Wyatt also alleged that his plea was unintelligent because it was based on a mutual mistake about the presumptive sentence. Wyatt requested an evidentiary hearing.
9. The postconviction court summarily denied Wyatt's petition without a hearing. The postconviction court concluded that withdrawal was not necessary to correct a manifest injustice because Wyatt had "not offered any facts or proof that would support his allegations" and entitle him to relief. The postconviction court also observed that "[t]his case is over three years old, [Wyatt's] plea was made over two years ago, and his resentencing over a year ago." Further, the postconviction court reasoned that Wyatt "has already raised the issue of his criminal history score and received the benefit of resentencing," citing in part Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (2022), for the proposition that it "may summarily deny a second or successive petition for similar relief." Wyatt appeals.
10. Wyatt argues that the postconviction court abused its discretion by concluding that he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because he failed to allege sufficient facts showing that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent. Because Wyatt alleged sufficient facts in his petition demonstrating that his plea was involuntary, we agree.
Wyatt also argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding his petition was time and procedurally barred. To the extent the district court dismissed his petition on these alternative grounds, we agree with Wyatt. Wyatt's petition was timely filed within two years of the entry of judgment of conviction. Minn. Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4(1) (2022). Wyatt's petition was not Knaffla-barred because he voluntarily dismissed his direct appeal and none of his claims received appellate review. See State v. Olson, 609 N.W.2d 293, 304 (Minn.App. 2000) ("Issues raised, but not reviewed, in a direct appeal that is dismissed may be considered in a subsequent petition for postconviction relief."), rev. denied (Minn. July 25, 2000); see also Rairdon v. State, 557 N.W.2d 318, 322 (Minn. 1996) (declining to apply Knaffla-bar when petitioner had filed a direct appeal, but it was dismissed and the claims did "not receive actual appellate review"). Further, Wyatt's petition was not procedurally barred as a successive petition under Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3, because Wyatt's motion to correct his sentence pursuant to Minn. R. Crim. P. 27.03, subd. 9, was properly brought pursuant to the independent procedure established by the rules of criminal procedure, and thus it cannot be construed as a petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Reynolds, 888 N.W.2d 125, 132-33 (Minn. 2016).
11. A postconviction petition may be summarily denied when the petition and the files and records of the proceeding conclusively show that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2022). In deciding whether to summarily deny a petition, the postconviction court presumes the facts alleged in the petition to be true. Bobo v. State, 820 N.W.2d 511, 517 (Minn. 2012). The petitioner bears "the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, facts that would warrant relief." Wilson v. State, 726 N.W.2d 103, 106 (Minn. 2007). We review a postconviction court's decision for an abuse of discretion. Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (2012). A postconviction court abuses its discretion only when it has "exercised its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner, based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law, or made clearly erroneous factual findings." Rhodes v. State, 875 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Minn. 2016) (quotation omitted).
12. A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea. State v. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d 90, 93 (Minn. 2010). If a defendant moves to withdraw their guilty plea after sentencing, the postconviction court must allow withdrawal only if it "is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 1. A manifest injustice exists when a plea is not constitutionally valid because it is not accurate, voluntary, and intelligent. Raleigh, 778 N.W.2d at 94. A defendant bears the burden of showing their plea was invalid. Id. Although we review the denial of an evidentiary hearing and a petition for postconviction relief for an abuse of discretion, the overall question of whether a guilty plea was valid is a question of law that we review de novo. Taylor v. State, 887 N.W.2d 821, 823 (Minn. 2016).
13. To be voluntary, a guilty plea may not be based on "any improper pressures or inducements." Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). "[W]hen a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or consideration, such promise must be fulfilled." State v. Brown, 606 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Minn. 2000) (quotation omitted). The state "cannot induce a guilty plea based on a promise by the prosecutor that goes unfulfilled or was unfulfillable from the start, such as a plea agreement involving the promise of an illegal sentence." Dikken v. State, 896 N.W.2d 873, 877 (Minn. 2017). We consider all relevant circumstances to determine whether a plea is voluntary. State v. Danh, 516 N.W.2d 539, 544 (Minn. 1994).
14. Wyatt alleged sufficient facts in his petition for postconviction relief to establish that his plea was based on the state's promise of an illegal sentence. He alleged that he pleaded guilty in exchange for the state's recommendation of a sentence at the bottom of the presumptive range. He alleged that sentence was based on an incorrect calculation of his criminal-history score and that therefore, the state promised an illegal sentence. See State v. Maurstad, 733 N.W.2d 141, 147 (Minn. 2007) ("[A] sentence based on an incorrect criminal history score is an illegal sentence.").
15. Wyatt also alleged sufficient facts in his petition to establish that the state's promise of an illegal sentence induced his plea. See Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877 (considering whether a guilty plea was involuntary because it was induced by an unfulfillable promise). Wyatt alleged that he accepted the state's plea offer based on the "misunderstanding that he could avoid a longer prison term if he pleaded guilty and sought to apply his custody credit."
The district court made several comments throughout the proceedings, including before Wyatt accepted the state's plea offer and without any pending departure motion, that it was unwilling to depart from the guidelines. While our decision is based on the sufficiency of the allegations in the petition to warrant an evidentiary hearing, we emphasize that a district court must maintain impartiality at all times, which includes not predetermining a sentence or expressing a predisposition on a motion that has not been brought by any party. Minn. Code Jud. Conduct Rule 1.2 ("A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary ...."); 2.2 ("A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of judicial office fairly and impartially.").
16. The postconviction court was required to accept these factual allegations as true in determining whether to grant the request for an evidentiary hearing. See Bobo, 820 N.W.2d at 517. Because Wyatt alleged sufficient facts in his petition which, if true, establish that his plea was involuntary, the district court abused its discretion in summarily denying Wyatt's postconviction petition without a hearing. See Dikken, 896 N.W.2d at 877. We therefore remand the matter to the district court for an evidentiary hearing, at which the district court may exercise its discretion in assessing the evidence presented related to the merits of the petition. See Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 3 (describing procedure for a hearing on a postconviction petition).
Wyatt also argues that the district court abused its discretion in concluding he did not allege sufficient facts showing that his plea was involuntary because it was coerced or unintelligent due to mutual mistake. Because we conclude that Wyatt sufficiently alleged facts that his plea was involuntary due to being induced by an illegal sentence, we do not address his alternative grounds for reversal. See Carlton v. State, 816 N.W.2d 590, 611 n.9 (Minn. 2012) (declining to address a nondispositive issue); State v. Lopez, 794 N.W.2d 379, 385 (Minn.App. 2011) (holding that appellant was entitled to plea withdrawal before sentencing and declining to address alternative grounds for reversal).
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1. The district court's order is reversed and remanded.
2. Pursuant to Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c), this order opinion is nonprecedential, except as law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
[*] Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.