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concluding that plaintiff's Monell claim could not proceed against the county insofar as the acts of state judicial officers were concerned because state judicial officers are state actors, not county actors
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2:06-cv-1003-GEB-DAD.
November 22, 2006
ORDER
This case was determined to be suitable for decision without oral argument. L.R. 78-230(h).
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint ("Complaint") under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiffs oppose the motion. For the following reasons, Defendants' motion will be granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs are Victor Wyatt ("Wyatt"), Marshall K. McMurray ("McMurray"), Charles Mitchell ("Mitchell"), Edgar M. Collins ("Collins") and Terrance Haltiwanger ("Haltiwanger") (collectively "Plaintiffs"). Defendants are the County of Butte ("County") and Deputy Patrick McNelis ("McNelis"). Plaintiffs were arrested in 2004 or 2005 and incarcerated in the Butte County Jail. (Compl. ¶ 9.)Plaintiffs assert the County committed various constitutional violations against them under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 during their pre-trial detention and criminal trial proceedings, including a denial of equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment, a violation of their right to counsel and speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment, a violation of their right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment and to be free from excessive bail under the Eighth Amendment and a violation of their right to due process under the Fifth Amendment. (Id. ¶¶ 10-38.) Plaintiffs also allege Defendants applied duress to harass or obtain a guilty plea; deprived Plaintiffs of the right to a fair trial; systematically and unreasonably deprived Plaintiffs of medical treatment during incarceration; opened legal mail and withheld Plaintiffs' other mail in line with jail practice; limited their access to the jail library and legal services (identified in the Complaint as "CLC"), also in accord with jail practice; eavesdropped on confidential counsel visits; and conspired with others to deprive Plaintiffs of their civil rights. (Id. ¶¶ 17, 24, 25, 26, 33, 36.)
Plaintiffs also allege in a vague and conclusory manner that the County is liable for "its failure to supervise and train jail personnel to be cognizant and respectful of the civil rights of jail detainees and to handle recurring situations which present an obvious potential for constitutional violation in a fair and non-discriminatory manner." (Id. ¶ 37.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs assert it was "jail policy and practice . . . to disregard [civil] rights or unevenly apply them to African American inmates." (Id.)
Collins asserts against McNelis a § 1983 Fourth Amendment excessive force claim and an intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claim. (Id. ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs McMurray, Mitchell, Collins and Haltiwanger allege claims against the County under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"). (Id. ¶¶ 39-45.)
While the Complaint appears to assert an IIED claim against the County (see Compl. ¶ 46-52), Plaintiffs state in their Opposition that "[t]he only IIED claim is Collins versus McNelis as an individual." (Pls.' Opp'n at 9.)
DISCUSSION
Dismissal is appropriate under Rule 12(b)(6) if Plaintiffs failed to (1) present a cognizable legal theory, or (2) plead sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 749 F.2d 530, 533-34 (9th Cir. 1984). When considering a motion to dismiss, all material allegations in the Complaint must be accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974); Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). In addition, Plaintiffs are given the benefit of every reasonable inference that can be drawn from the allegations in their Complaint.Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Shermahorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n. 6 (1963). Accordingly, a motion to dismiss must be denied "unless it appears beyond doubt that [Plaintiffs] can prove no set of facts in support of [their] claim which would entitle [them] to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
I. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims are barred because they failed to exhaust administrative remedies. Defendants contend "Plaintiffs do not allege that they have complied with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 USC § 1997e, ("PRLA") which requires exhaustion of jail administrative procedures prior to filing a Section 1983 claim." (Defs.' Mot. at 6.) Defendants also assert that although Plaintiffs acknowledge the Butte County Jail offers a limited avenue of redress, "[Plaintiffs] do not allege that they have exhausted either the jail's grievance procedures or the [State's] Consent Decree's procedures to assert violations which occurred in jail." (Id.)
"Section 1997e(a) creates a defense — defendants have the burden of . . . proving the absence of exhaustion." Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1119 (9th Cir. 2003). However, Defendants have not proved that Plaintiffs failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See id. at 1220 (explaining that defendants must produce adequate documentary evidence when attempting to establish that administrative remedies have been exhausted). Further, Defendants' conclusory argument about a consent decree's procedures is insufficient to support their motion. Accordingly, "Defendants have failed to meet their burden of establishing that [Plaintiffs] did not exhaust administrative remedies." Id. II. County liability under Section 1983
Defendants assert that Plaintiffs fail to state a claim against the County under § 1983. (Defs.' Mot. at 2.) To state a claim of municipal liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that "his injuries were inflicted pursuant to an official county policy or custom." Thompson v. City of Los Angeles, 885 F.2d 1439, 1444 (9th Cir. 1989) (citing Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690-94 (1978)). As a general rule, "a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not sufficient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823-24 (1985). "[A] claim of municipal liability under section 1983 is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss `even if the claim is based on nothing more than a bare allegation that the individual officers' conduct conformed to official policy, custom, or practice.'" Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dept., 839 F.2d 621, 624 (9th Cir. 1988) (citingShah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986). Nevertheless, Plaintiffs' claims about the manner in which guards handled their mail, interfered with their access to the library and CLC legal services and eavesdropped on confidential counsel visits, fail to state sufficient facts to allege § 1983 claims against the County.
The bare allegation that guards opened Plaintiffs' legal mail and withheld other mail is insufficient to state a constitutional violation. Furthermore, a prisoner is required to allege that the asserted limitation to "the library or [to the CLC] legal [services] hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim" since "inmates do not have `an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal [services].'" Diaz v. Turner, 2004 WL 2165374, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2004) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Plaintiffs' allegations concerning their limited access to the jail library and "CLC" legal services do not state a claim. Finally, the assertion that Defendants eavesdropped on confidential counsel visits fails to state a claim because the allegation "that a party monitored the accused's conversations with his attorney does not necessarily establish a Sixth Amendment violation. Rather, the accused must [allege], in addition, that the substance of the overheard conversation was of some benefit to enforcement officials. Absent this [assertion], a monitoring allegation must be denied." Mastrian v. McManus, 554 F.2d 813, 821 (8th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Hernandez, 937 F.2d 1490, 1493 (9th Cir. 1991) ("[T]he Supreme Court has twice held that government invasion of [the attorney-client privilege] . . . is not sufficient by itself to cause a Sixth Amendment violation. The defendant must have been prejudiced by some actions. Our circuit has also explicitly held that prejudice is required."). Since Plaintiffs have not alleged how they have been prejudiced as a result of the eavesdropping of confidential counsel visits, they have not stated a constitutional violation.
Plaintiffs have also made other conclusory allegations which are insufficient to state a Monell claim. These include allegations that physical abuse of African Americans during their arrest is a common occurrence in the County of Butte (Compl. ¶ 5); that Wyatt was the victim of excessive force by C.O. McBride, an individual who is not a party to this case (id. ¶ 37); the failure to supervise and train jail personnel to be aware of jail detainees' civil rights (id.); that it was jail policy and practice to disregard, or unevenly apply to African Americans, a state consent decree concerning rights deriving from custody (id.); and that evidence was mishandled or planted in Collins' and McMurray's cases (id. ¶ 25). In addition, Plaintiffs also allege that the County conspired with "prosecutors, defense attorneys, independent contractors, investigators and judicial officials to deprive plaintiffs of their civil rights in ways not fully revealed or discovered to date." (Id. ¶ 36.) These allegations are either so vague that it is not possible to ascertain what the claimed wrong is or they are only allegations of a single incident of a constitutional wrong that fails to specify that it was "caused by an existing, unconstitutional municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal policymaker." City of Oklahoma City, 471 U.S. at 823-24.
Nor do Plaintiffs' allegations concerning public defenders, the district attorney and state judges state a claim against the County under Monell, because liability only attaches if the actor responsible for the alleged actions is a county actor.See Brewster v. Shasta County, 275 F.3d 803, 805 (9th Cir. 2001) ("The question is whether [the actor] is a policymaker on behalf of the state or the county; if he is a policymaker for the state, then the county cannot be liable for his actions."). Plaintiffs' allegations concerning public defenders are not attributable to the County since the referenced public defenders were not acting on behalf of the County when they performed "a lawyer's traditional function as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding." Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981). Nor are Plaintiffs' allegations concerning the district attorney attributable to the County. In California, a district attorney acts as a state official when involved with criminal proceedings in state court. See Galbraith v. County of Santa Clara, 2006 WL 954182, at *3 (N.D. Cal. April 12, 2006) (indicating that a district attorney was a state actor when filing charges against and criminally prosecuting the plaintiff) (citing Weiner v. San Diego County, 210 F.3d 1025, 1028 (9th Cir. 2000)). Finally, the state judicial officers referenced in the Complaint are also state actors. Petty v. Petty, 2003 WL 21262369, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 28, 2003) (stating "judges are . . . state actors, and thus plaintiff may not maintain a claim against the County for the judges' actions").
This includes Plaintiffs' excessive bail allegations which are insufficient to allege a Monell claim against the County.
Plaintiffs' allegations that they were deprived of necessary medical treatment in the jail also fail to state claims against the County. (See Compl. ¶ 26 (asserting Plaintiffs were "systematically and unreasonably deprived of necessary medical treatment" and "were denied access to and the delivery of necessary medical care").) "In order to state a cognizable claim [of medical mistreatment], a prisoner must allege acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence deliberate indifference to serious medical needs." Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Deliberate indifference is only evidenced when "the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must be both aware of the facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 904 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994)). Furthermore, "mere negligence is insufficient for liability."Id. Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to show the County acted with deliberate indifference.
Collins acknowledges he was taken to the hospital and seen in the emergency room for treatment of injuries that allegedly resulted from an altercation with an officer. Collins asserts, however, that when he was taken to the jail, "he received inadequate pain medication, little care for his medical condition and no treatment for his emotional distress following a brutal attack upon him by arresting officers." (Compl. ¶ 27.) Although these allegations may amount to a showing of negligence by the jailors, they do not show that the jailors were deliberately indifferent. On the contrary, the Complaint explicitly states that Collins received some medication and care for his medical condition. (Id.)
McMurray concedes he "was provided little pain relieving medicine" but alleges he was not provided physical therapy, and his treatment for abscesses was either delayed or not received. (Id. ¶ 31.) These allegations are insufficient to show the County acted with deliberate indifference. In addition, McMurray's claim that his repeated requests for "surgical relief" were denied does not amount to a showing of deliberate indifference because this allegation does not show that the jailors knew, yet disregarded, an excessive risk to McMurray's health. (Id.) Finally, the allegation that McMurray "was unable to receive a healthy diet in strict conformance with [the] requirements [of a practicing vegetarian]" does not amount to a showing of deliberate indifference. (Id. ¶ 26.)
Mitchell alleges he had a heart condition and that "[h]is jailors failed to take him for an evaluation, failed to comply with his outside physician's monitoring prescriptions, and ignored urgent requests for treatment in a manner which could have been fatal." (Id.) Mitchell also states he did not receive "appropriate care for his heart condition"; however, he concedes he was taken to the hospital on two separate occasions. (Id. ¶ 32.) These allegations do not show that the jailors were made sufficiently aware of the severity of Mitchell's heart condition and yet chose to disregard Mitchell's requests for treatment.
Wyatt and Haltiwanger allege "claims arising from their mental health issues." (Id. ¶ 35.) "Wyatt alleges that his capacity was questioned and he was required to wait many months before he went to [Napa State Hospital]. Soon after his arrival it was clear he was competent to stand trial and he was returned to jail and soon thereafter released." (Id.) These allegations fail to meet the deliberate indifference standard.
Haltiwanger alleges he "was deprived of his prescription medication upon his arrest." (Id.) However, he also asserts that "[e]ventually [his] bipolar aspect was satisfactorily regulated by Lithium." (Id.) These allegations indicate that Haltiwanger's mental illness was treated subsequent to his arrest. These allegations do not allege a claim under the deliberate indifference standard. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' medical treatment claims are dismissed.
III. ADA Claims
Defendants argue Plaintiffs' claims under the ADA should be dismissed since Plaintiffs "do not adequately allege an ADA" "cause of action." (Defs.' Mot. at 6.) Plaintiffs counter that their ADA claims are based on a lack of accommodation for their disabilities and lack of access to community treatment programs in the area of mental health. (Pls.' Opp'n at 11.) Title II of the ADA prescribes: "[N]o qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court has held that "[s]tate prisons fall squarely within the statutory definition of `public entity,'" and thus the provisions of the ADA apply.Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210 (1998). Accordingly, "programs or services provided at jails, prisons, and any other `custodial or correctional institution'" come within the scope of the ADA. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 691 (9th Cir. 2001). However, none of these Plaintiffs "allege that he was denied [accommodation or access]because of his disability." Mark v. Imberg, 2005 WL 1587797, at *10 (W.D. Wis. July 6, 2005). Accordingly, these ADA claims are dismissed.
IV. Excessive Force Claim against McNelis
McNelis also moves for dismissal of Collins' § 1983 excessive force claim. (Defs.' Mot at 5.) Collins alleges that at the time of his arrest, McNelis used excessive force "in applying a taser in multiple places" and the "tasering continued after Collins was handcuffed and in custody." (Compl. ¶ 29.) McNelis responds that "no facts are [pled] to support an inference that [his] use of non-lethal force was unreasonable." (Defs.' Mot. at 5.)
This claim is "analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard." Forrester v. City of San Diego, 25 F.3d 804, 806 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). It is obvious that Collins has pled sufficient facts to state an excessive force claim against McNelis. Therefore, the motion to dismiss Collins' excessive force claim is denied.
CONCLUSION
For the stated reasons, Defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, in which they are authorized to cure the deficiencies of the dismissed claims, provided that the Second Amended Complaint is filed and served within ten days of the date on which this Order is filed.IT IS SO ORDERED.