Opinion
# 2011-015-273 Claim No. 116854 Motion No. M-80160
11-17-2011
WYANT v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
PRS claim was dismissed. Case information
UID: 2011-015-273 Claimant(s): SHAWN M. WYANT Claimant short name: WYANT Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 116854 Motion number(s): M-80160 Cross-motion number(s): Judge: FRANCIS T. COLLINS Leigh E. Anderson, Esquire Claimant's attorney: No Appearance Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Michael T. Krenrich, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: November 17, 2011 City: Saratoga Springs Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Defendant moves, pursuant to CPLR 3212, for summary judgment dismissing the claim which alleges the claimant was wrongfully imprisoned for violating one or more of the conditions of an administratively imposed period of postrelease supervision (PRS) (defendant's Exhibit O). The motion is granted without opposition.
Claimant was sentenced to a six-year determinate term of imprisonment on January 18, 2001 (defendant's Exhibit A). He was released from prison on October 28, 2005 at which time a five-year period of PRS was administratively imposed by the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS)(defendant's Exhibit B). Claimant was declared delinquent in abiding by the conditions of his PRS as of November 11, 2005 and a warrant for his arrest was issued on November 14, 2005 (defendant's Exhibits C and D). Claimant was arrested on November 16, 2005 for allegedly issuing a bad check (Exhibit E). Claimant waived a preliminary hearing (Exhibit F) and, following a final parole revocation hearing, was found guilty of violating one or more of the conditions of his parole. A 24-month delinquent time assessment was imposed (defendant's Exhibit G).
Now known as the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision.
Claimant was released to parole supervision on November 14, 2007 (Exhibit H). Thereafter, he was declared delinquent in abiding by the conditions of his PRS as of October 14, 2008 and a warrant for his arrest was issued on October 31, 2008 (Exhibits I , J, K). By Memorandum and Judgment dated November 10, 2008, claimant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus was granted, the administratively imposed period of PRS was vacated, and claimant's immediate release from confinement was ordered (Exhibit M). Claimant alleges in the instant claim that he was falsely imprisoned for violations of an administratively imposed period of PRS from November 14, 2005 through November 17, 2007 and from October 31, 2008 until his release from confinement 11 days later (Exhibit O).
To establish a cause of action for false imprisonment a claimant must show that "(1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975]), cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). In the case at bar, claimant's confinement for violating the conditions of an administratively imposed term of PRS was privileged.
The Court of Appeals held in both Matter of Garner v New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs. (10 NY3d 358 [2008]) and People v Sparber (10 NY3d 457 [2008]) that only a sentencing judge may impose the PRS component of a sentence, thereby invalidating the longstanding practice of administratively imposing statutorily required periods of PRS. In the wake of these decisions numerous claims for false imprisonment arising from periods of confinement imposed for violations of a term of PRS not authorized or directed at sentencing were commenced in this Court with varying results (see e.g. Nazario v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 443 [2009], affd 75 AD3d 715 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010]; Mickens v State of New York, 25 Misc 3d 191 [2009]; Donald v State of New York, 24 Misc 3d 329 [2009], revd 73 AD3d 1465 [2010], affd 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Eanes v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1297 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Ortiz v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1314 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]; Orellanes v State of New York, 78 AD3d 1308 [2010], affd sub nom. Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d 389 [2011]). The Court of Appeals resolved the divergent views in Donald v State of New York (supra), holding in two of the four appeals decided that the failure to allege (let alone establish sufficiently to oppose a motion for summary judgment) the fourth element of a cause of action for wrongful confinement, that the confinement was not privileged, was fatal: " 'A detention, otherwise unlawful, is privileged where the confinement was by arrest under a valid process issued by a court having jurisdiction' . . . Neither Donald nor Eanes alleges any defect in the process by which he or she was arrested for violating PRS, or in the jurisdiction of the court that issued that process" (Donald v State of New York, 17 NY3d at 395, quoting Davis v City of Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 842 [1985]). Here, too, claimant fails to allege any defect in the process by which he was arrested or in the jurisdiction of the entity which issued that process. In addition, the proof submitted in support of defendant's motion establishes that claimant's arrests were effected by use of warrants. As a result, defendant established its prima facie entitlement to judgment dismissing the wrongful confinement claim as a matter of law (Alvarez v Prospect Hosp., 68 NY2d 320 [1986]).
The Court of Appeals in Donald also held the State was immune from liability for the alleged negligence of DOCS in subjecting the claimants to unauthorized PRS terms. In reaching this conclusion, the Court found that DOCS' actions in recording the inmates' sentences were discretionary because, as the Court explained:
"In each of these cases, DOCS was presented with a prisoner sentenced to a determinate prison term, for whom PRS was mandatory under state law. DOCS made the 'reasoned judgment' that it should interpret their sentences as including PRS, though the sentences rendered by the courts did not mention it. We held in Garner that that judgment was mistaken, but it clearly was just that - - a mistake in judgment - - not a ministerial error, like mistranscribing an entry or confusing the files of two different prisoners."
Here, like the facts in Donald, the State is immune from liability for any alleged negligence of DOCS in imposing the PRS term as its conduct in doing so was the result of a discretionary mistake in judgment rather than ministerial negligence.
Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion is granted, and the claim is dismissed.
November 17, 2011
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court considered the following papers:
1. Notice of motion dated July 21, 2011;
2. Affirmation of Michael T. Krenrich dated July 21, 2011 with exhibits.