Opinion
CA. No. 95C-10-053-CHT.
Submitted: July 7, 1999.
Decided: December 28, 1999.
Henry A. Heiman, Esquire, Heiman, Aber, Goldlust, Baker, 600 First Federal Plaza, 702 King Street, Wilmington Delaware 19801, Attorney for Plaintiff.
Arthur D. Kuhl, Esquire, 200 West 9th Street, Suite 700, Wilmington, Delaware Defendant.
Upon Plaintiffs's Motion for Declaratory Judgment Denied
OPINION AND ORDER
Before the Court is Plaintiff's motion seeking declaratory judgment pursuant to Superior Court Rule 57. Both sides have submitted legal memoranda addressing the motion. The Court's resolution of the issue is as follows.
FACTS
Plaintiff Monica L. Wyant sustained injuries in an automobile accident caused by Defendant Chester G. O'Bryan ("O'Bryan"). O'Bryan's blood alcohol content (BAC) was .134%, which is .034% above Delaware's DUI limit of .10%. Chester G. O'Bryan, age 38 at the time, was severely injured in this accident and is described as "childlike" in terms of his present mental capacity. As a result, the Delaware Department of Justice elected not to charge him in connection with the collision. In fact, no formal proceedings of any kind were instituted against him, and he was not, as a result, convicted of DUT or any other offense.
As a resident of Pennsylvania, and pursuant to 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(A)(1), Wyant limited her ability to sue for personal injuries by selecting the Limited Tort Alternative of Pennsylvania's Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MYREL) in return for lower insurance premiums. This option bars a party from making claims for non-monetary damages unless certain statutory exceptions apply. The applicable exception to this case, (D)(1)(i), precludes the injured party from seeking damages unless the person at fault is either convicted or accepts ARD for DIJI for that accident.
Wyant contends that the policy behind exception (i) is to prevent intoxicated drivers from benefiting from the election of the Limited Tort Alternative by their victims. Furthermore, the intent of the Pennsylvania Legislature was to protect the insured from injuries caused by drunk drivers. Since it is likely that O'Bryan would have been convicted of DUI had he been charged, assuming that the level of alcohol in his blood could be established as alleged, he should be precluded from benefiting from Wyant's election of the Limited Tort Alternative, and Wyant should be entitled to the protections of the exception.
O'Bryan argues that the statute is very specific as to what circumstances must be present for the exception to apply. The intoxication of the person at fault, by itself is not enough. The exception clearly states that there must be either a conviction of DUI, or an acceptance of ARD for the exception to apply. Since neither of the requirements is present, he concludes that Wyant's claim is precluded by the statute.
Thus, the issue presented to the Court is: will the coverage of exception (i) [to 75 Pa. C. S. A. § 1705(D), the Limited Tort Alternative of the (MVFRL)], be construed to include an instance where the Defendant was intoxicated but never charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants? Both parties stipulate that Pennsylvania law governs the resolution of the issue.
DISCUSSION
Given the stipulation as the applicable law, the interpretation of § 1705 is governed in this case by 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Section 1921 holds in part:
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.
(c) When the words of the statute are not explicit, the intention of the General Assembly may be ascertained by considering, among other matters: (1) The occasion and necessity for the statute. (2) The circumstances under which it was created. (3) The mischief to be remedied. (4) The object to be attained. (5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the same or similar subjects. (6) The consequences of a particular interpretation. (7) The contemporaneous legislative history. (8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such statute.
Section MVRFL, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(D)(1)(i) provides as follows:
(D) LIMITED TORT ALTERNATIVE. — Each person who elects the limited tort alternative remains eligible to seek compensation for economic loss sustained in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person pursuant to applicable tort law. Unless the injury sustained is a serious injury, each person who is bound by the limited tort election shall be precluded from maintaining an action for any noneconomic loss, except that:
(1) An individual otherwise bound by the limited tort election who sustains damages in a motor vehicle accident as the consequence of the fault of another person may-recover damages as if the individual damaged had elected the full tort alternative whenever the person at fault:
(i) is convicted or accepts Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition (ARD) for driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance in that accident;
The language in question is clear and free from all ambiguity. The court must therefore apply the statute as it is written and is "not free to disregard the plain, clear meaning of statutory language under the guise of pursing its spirit." Walker v. Fennell. Pa. Supr., 627 A.2d 771, 773 (1993). The clear language of the statute requires that for Wyant to be able to seek compensatory damages without limitation given her election under the statute, O'Bryan must have been convicted of DUI or accepted ARD for the offense. The lack of a finding of guilt or participation in ARD means that Wyant is precluded from pursuing a claim for any non-economic loss under this exception. Wyant, on the other hand, argues that a liberal construction of the statute is appropriate, and that the statute should be construed in a light most favorable to her.
"When construing an insurance statute, courts must apply a liberal interpretation to the statute and avoid a result which is contrary to purpose of the statute." McClung v. Breneman., Pa. Super Ct., 700 A.2d 495, 497 (1997). If the court "should err in determining the meaning of an insurance policy provision or the legislative intent of a statute, . . . error should be in favor of coverage for the insured." Motley v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co. Pa. Supr., 466 A.2d 609, 611 (1983). Wyant's argument proceeds that while the MVFRL's overriding purpose is to lower insurance costs, the public policy served by the specific exception is to discourage driving under the influence. The statute should be construed to include situations where the person at fault is intoxicated, without regard to whether there is an adjudication of guilt. This Court does not agree.
First, absent ambiguous language, the court may not construe the language of a statute to include provisions not clear on its face. "In construing a statute, the court must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intention as expressed in the language of the statute, and cannot, under its powers of construction, supply omissions in a statute, especially where it appears that the matter may have been intentionally omitted." Panik v. Didra, Pa. Supr., 88 A.2d 730, 733 (1952). Furthermore, "where the words of a statute are clear and free from ambiguity, legislative intent is to be gleaned from those very words."Pennsylvania Financial Responsibility Assigned Claims Plan v. English, Pa. Supr., 664 A.2d 84, 87 (1995). Therefore, Wyant's claim is barred because the clear language of the statute precludes a construction that expands the coverage of the exception to include intoxication without guilt.
Second, when the Legislature includes a specific term, but excludes a general term, the implication is that the exclusion of the general term was intentional. "Inclusion of a specific matter in a statute implies the exclusion of other matters." Ken R. on Behalf of C.R. v Arthur Z., 682 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1996). Thus, the conspicuous absence of the word "intoxicated," and the inclusion of the words "convicted" and "accepted" clearly indicates that the Legislature specifically sought to include only those situations where the person at fault admitted to, or was found guilty of DUT, and it sought to exclude all other situations; even where the person at fault was intoxicated but not guilty.
Lastly, if the Legislature intended to give the exception the meaning proposed by Wyant, its language could simply state that the plaintiff is eligible to seek compensatory damages without limitation where the person at fault is "intoxicated." Then the coverage of the exception would extend to all situations where the person at fault was intoxicated; guilty or not. However, this is not the case; the statute carefully states that there must be some finding of guilt upon the defendant. Therefore, O'Bryan's absence of guilt precludes Wyant from bringing a claim under exception (I).
CONCLUSION
Wyant's motion to have 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1705(D)(1)(I) interpreted to include a driver whose blood alcohol level exceeds the legal limit in Delaware, but who is not guilty of DUT, must be denied. The statute clearly states that for Wyant to receive the benefit of the exception, O'Bryan must have either accepted ARD or been convicted of DUI. This language is clear and free from all ambiguity.
For the reasons stated above, the Plaintiff's motion is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.