Wundsam v. Gilna

6 Citing cases

  1. Recreational Vehicle United Citizens Ass'n v. City of Sterling Heights

    165 Mich. App. 130 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 9 times

    In any event, the equal protection clause is concerned with acts of invidious discrimination among classes and not with mere acts of unequal enforcement which may be the result of erroneous or even arbitrary administration of facially-neutral ordinances. See, e.g., Wundsam v Gilna, 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 578; 52 Ill Dec 900; 422 N.E.2d 1109 (1981), app den 85 Ill.2d 576 (1981). Hence, while we disagree with the trial court that RVPSO was entirely a regulatory ordinance, we affirm the trial court's order as reaching the right result although, in part, for the wrong reason.

  2. City of Chicago v. Unit One Corp.

    218 Ill. App. 3d 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 16 times
    Applying manifest weight standard in considering estoppel

    In the meantime, as long as its enforcement methods are not based upon impermissible classifications, the City does not violate equal protection rights, even where it is unequal or arbitrary in the administration of its power. ( Wundsam v. Gilna (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 422 N.E.2d 1109.) For these reasons, the ruling of the circuit court is affirmed. Affirmed.

  3. County Commissioners of Carroll County v. Zent

    86 Md. App. 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991)   Cited 18 times
    Reviewing definitions of accessory use adopted in different jurisdictions

    dge v. Villari, 350 Mass. 176, 213 N.E.2d 861 (1966); State v. Smiley, 182 Neb. 211, 153 N.W.2d 906 (1967) (the rental of cargo trailers, where the income was minor compared to the service station's other income, was held to be an accessory use customarily incident to the primary service station use); Dettmar v. County Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 28 Ohio Misc. 35, 273 N.E.2d 921, 922 (1971); Lawrence v. Zoning Bd. of Lower Gwynedd Township, 19 Pa.Cmwlth. 128, 338 A.2d 779 (1975) (boarding of dogs a continuation of prior nonconforming use involving occasionally boarding of dogs in connection with breeding); Gross v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 424 Pa. 603, 227 A.2d 824 (1967) (a restaurant was determined to be an "accessory use" of a bowling alley, where the evidence showed a large percentage of bowling alleys customarily had restaurants); City of Warwick v. Campbell, 82 R.I. 300, 107 A.2d 334 (1954) (defining accessory use). As to cases not finding accessory uses see Wundsam v. Gilna, 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 52 Ill.Dec. 900, 907, 422 N.E.2d 1109, 1116 (1981) (storage of recreational vehicle in residential zone not incidental or accessory to residential use); City of Middlesboro v. Billingsley, 371 S.W.2d 23 (Ky. 1963); Building Inspector of Groton v. Vlahos, 10 Mass. App. 890, 409 N.E.2d 795 (1980); City of Lincoln v. Bruce, 221 Neb. 61, 375 N.W.2d 118 (1985); Charlie Brown of Chatham, Inc. v. Board of Adjustment for the Township of Chatham, 202 N.J. Super. 312, 495 A.2d 119 (1985) (sleeping quarters for restaurant employees not customarily incidental); Heagen v. Borough of Allendale, 42 N.J. Super. 472 127 A.2d 181 (1956); Medford Assembly of God v. City of Medford, 72 Or. App. 333, 695 P.2d 1379, cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1020, 106 S.Ct. 570, 88 L.Ed.2d 554 (1985); Clackamas County v. Portland City Temple, 13 Or. App. 459, 511 P.2d 412 (1973); IMS American, Ltd. v. Zoning Hearing Bd., 94 Pa.Cmwlth. 501, 503 A.2d 1061 (1986) (car wash not invariably an accessory use to a service station so as to justify the extension of the nonconforming us

  4. People v. Martinez

    120 Ill. App. 3d 305 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 10 times
    In Martinez, this court held that the trial court's preclusion of the defendant's cross-examination of the accident victim as to whether he contemplated filing a civil suit, for the purpose of showing the victim's bias, was proper because the civil suit had not yet been filed.

    • 5 We fail to see how constitutional "overbreadth" has any application to the instant case. The United States Supreme Court, in Broadrick v. Oklahoma (1973), 413 U.S. 601, 37 L.Ed.2d 830, 93 S.Ct. 2908, suggested that a law is void for overbreadth only if the harmfulness of its chilling effect on first amendment freedoms is greater than the interest furthered by the legislation at issue implying further that even a minimal State interest could justify the law if speech-plus-conduct were involved. (See also Wundsam v. Gilna (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 574, 422 N.E.2d 1109, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill.2d 576; Note, Overbreadth Review and the Burger Court, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 532 (1974); Comment, Constitutional Law: A New Test for Overbreadth? 13 Washburn L.J. 524 (1974).) No first amendment freedom is impinged upon by any action taken or required to have been taken in the present case.

  5. Firestone v. Fritz

    119 Ill. App. 3d 685 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 36 times
    Dismissing claim based on failure to enforce building code

    In any event, the equal protection clause is concerned with acts of invidious discrimination, not with mere acts of unequal enforcement, or the erroneous and even arbitrary administration of a regulatory power. ( Wundsam v. Gilna (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 578.) The court did not err therefore in dismissing count II of the complaint.

  6. Parkway Bk. T. Co. v. City of Chicago

    437 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 2 times

    • 1 The constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance must be measured against the well-established rules. There is the presumption of validity in favor of existing zoning ordinances, and one who attacks the validity of an ordinance must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the ordinance, as applied to their property, is arbitrary, unreasonable and without a substantial relationship to the public health, safety, morals or welfare. ( Wundsam v. Gilna (1981), 97 Ill. App.3d 569, 422 N.E.2d 1109; LaSalle National Bank Trust Co. v. County of Cook (1981), 94 Ill. App.3d 341, 418 N.E.2d 932.) This rule recognizes that zoning is primarily a legislative function, and the court's role is to determine if the exercise of this function invades private constitutional rights without reasonable justification in the public welfare.