Wulfjen v. Dolton

31 Citing cases

  1. Thomas v. Thomas

    192 Cal.App.2d 771 (Cal. Ct. App. 1961)   Cited 16 times
    In Thomas v. Thomas, supra, 192 Cal.App.2d 771, for example, plaintiff was blocked from enforcing an alimony judgment against a private, unfunded pension system of which her former husband was a beneficiary.

    The existence of the foregoing limitations and conditions was asserted below in the form of a stipulation of facts executed by counsel for the respective parties. Edison's position on this appeal may be stated as follows: As answering garnishee, having made a good faith denial of any indebtedness to Roy or its possession of any personal property belonging to its former employee, (1) such denial operated to deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to proceed further by way of supplementary proceedings, and it was incumbent on Freda to maintain an independent action against Edison for the recovery of the interest or debt (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 720) where title to the interest or debt is properly tried and determined ( Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878, 890 [ 151 P.2d 840]); and (2) a pension annuity payable under the circumstances at bar is not subject to garnishment in the course of supplementary proceedings or at all. Section 720, Code of Civil Procedure provides: "If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have property of the judgment debtor, or to be indebted to him, claims an interest in the property adverse to him, or denies the debt, the judgment creditor may maintain an action against such person or corporation for the recovery of such interest or debt; and the judge or referee may, by order, forbid a transfer or other disposition of such interest or debt, until an action can be commenced and prosecuted to judgment . . ."

  2. Estate of Callahan

    67 Cal.2d 609 (Cal. 1967)   Cited 17 times

    [8] This contention ignores the well-settled rule that, upon a motion for nonsuit, "Evidence, whethererroneously admitted or not, if relevant to the issues joined, must be given the credit and benefit of its full probative strength, . . ." (Italics added.) ( Berger v. Lane (1923) 190 Cal. 443, 452-453 [213 P. 45]; see also Gregg v. WesternPac. R.R. Co. (1924) 193 Cal. 212, 216 [ 223 P. 553]; Mitchell CameraCorp. v. Fox Film Corp. (1937) 8 Cal.2d 192, 197 [ 64 P.2d 946]; Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 878, 880 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Van Buskirk v. McClenahan (1958) 163 Cal.App.2d 633, 636 [ 329 P.2d 924].) [7b] It is therefore clear that Mr. Ely's evidence as to the time of execution, which was clearly relevant to the issues joined, must be given full effect in the instant case regardless of whether or not its admission was erroneous.

  3. Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot

    59 Cal.2d 227 (Cal. 1963)   Cited 50 times
    In Pigeon Point Ranch, Inc. v. Perot, 59 Cal.2d 227 [ 28 Cal.Rptr. 865, 379 P.2d 321], although involving a dissimilar situation โ€” a minute order denial of motion to dismiss an appeal without opinion โ€” the court held the denial to be a conclusive determination of the issue of appealability and therefore the law of the case.

    [7] A director or officer of a corporation acts in a fiduciary capacity, and the law does not allow him to secure any personal advantage as against the corporation. ( Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878, 888 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Bainbridge v. Stoner, 16 Cal.2d 423, 427-428 [ 106 P.2d 423]; Western StatesLife Ins. Co. v. Lockwood, 166 Cal. 185, 190-191 [ 135 P. 496].) [5b] The first count states a cause of action under this rule. [8] Although it is true, as defendants assert, that Perot used corporate funds to pay a corporate obligation, he did so knowing that under the contract he had personally agreed to discharge this obligation.

  4. Gwinn v. Ryan

    33 Cal.2d 436 (Cal. 1949)   Cited 21 times
    In Gwinn v. Ryan, 33 Cal.2d 436 [ 202 P.2d 51], it was held that a minute order of the trial court dismissing an action pursuant to section 581a of the Code of Civil Procedure is a final judgment and the time for appeal therefor runs from the entry of such minute order, not from a judgment of dismissal subsequently filed.

    The rule has never been questioned on principle or as a matter of practice. It is consistent with the practice in nonsuits, a similar form of statutory dismissal (see Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878, 879-880 [ 151 P.2d 840]; McColgan v. Jones, Hubbard Donnell,Inc., 11 Cal.2d 243 [ 78 P.2d 1010]; Code Civ. Proc., ยง 581), and has recently received legislative approval and clarification. See Code of Civil Procedure, section 581d, which was not in effect at the time of this appeal, providing that: ". . . All dismissals ordered by the court shall be entered upon the minutes thereof, or in the justice's docket, as the case may be, and such orders when so entered shall constitute judgments and shall be effective for all purposes.

  5. Morrical v. Rogers

    220 Cal.App.4th 438 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013)   Cited 11 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Describing former Civil Code ยง 315 and ยง 2238 as predecessors to ยง 709

    We are not convinced that the narrow construction of section 709 urged by Altamont is necessary to avoid unconstitutionality under the due process clause. Altamont cites Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 878, 151 P.2d 840 (Wulfjen ) for the proposition that summary procedures might deprive a defendant of his or her right to due process of law. Wulfjen raised due process concerns about the use of money judgment enforcement procedures to order third parties to surrender their property despite their claims of superior ownership rights. (Id. at p. 890, 151 P.2d 840; see Blake v. Blake (1927) 86 Cal.App. 377, 380โ€“381, 260 P. 937 (Blake ), citing Code Civ. Proc., former ยงยง 717โ€“720 [Stats.

  6. Credit Managers Assn. v. Superior Court

    51 Cal.App.3d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)   Cited 21 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Stating that a control lender's fiduciary obligation also extends to the stockholders and creditors of borrower

    Directors of a corporation are trustees of the stockholders and indirectly for the creditors. ( Winchester v. Howard, 136 Cal. 432 [ 64 P. 692, 69 P. 77]; Title Ins. etc. Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173 [ 152 P. 542]; Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Lowe v. Copeland, 125 Cal.App. 315 [ 13 P.2d 522]; Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson Co., 1 Cal.3d 93 [ 81 Cal.Rptr. 592, 460 P.2d 464]; Armstrong Manors v. Burris, 193 Cal.App.2d 447 [ 14 Cal.Rptr. 338].) In San Pedro Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 121 Cal. 74, 82 [53 P. 410], the Supreme Court speaking of the duties of a corporate manager said: "Reynolds was the agent of the corporation.

  7. Brawthen v. H R Block, Inc.

    28 Cal.App.3d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)   Cited 52 times
    In Brawthen v. H R Block, Inc., 28 Cal.App.3d 131, 104 Cal.Rptr. 486 (1972), the court held that the trial court erred in excluding parol evidence of an oral agreement that plaintiff would be terminated only for cause although the written contract appeared to provide for termination at will.

    (1) Such an order is appealable. ( Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 878, 879-880 [ 151 P.2d 840].) We discuss the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff against whom the nonsuit was ordered.

  8. Hustead v. Superior Court

    2 Cal.App.3d 780 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 6 times

    " ( Farmers Merchants Bank v. Bank of Italy (1932) 216 Cal. 452, 455-456 [ 14 P.2d 527]. See also Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 878, 890 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Bond v. Bulghereni (1932) 215 Cal. 7, 10 [ 8 P.2d 130]; Finn v. Butler, supra, 195 Cal. 759, 764-765; Phillips v. Price (1908) 153 Cal. 146, 149-150 [ 94 P. 617]; William Deering Co. v. Richardson-Kimball Co. (1895) 109 Cal. 73, 82-85 [41 P. 801]; Lewis v. Chamberlain (1895) 108 Cal. 525, 527-528 [41 P. 413]; Herrlich v. Kaufmann (1893) 99 Cal. 271, 274-275 [33 P. 857, 37 Am.St.Rep. 50]; McDowell v. Bell (1890) 86 Cal. 615, 616 [25 P. 128]; Kapelus v. Family Health Foundation (1969) 276 Cal.App.2d 181, 183-184 [ 80 Cal.Rptr. 763]; Oksner v. Superior Court (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 672, 684-685 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 621]; Thomas v. Thomas (1961) 192 Cal.App.2d 771, 776-777 [ 13 Cal.Rptr. 872]; Takahashi v. Kunishima (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 367, 373-374 [ 93 P.2d 645]; Pacific Coast Auto. Assn. v. Superior Court (1932) 121 Cal.App. 664, 666 [ 9 P.2d 880]; G. Cavaglieri Mortg. Co. v. Superior Court (1926) 79 Cal.App. 655, 658 [ 250 P. 700].)

  9. Kapelus v. Family Health Foundation

    276 Cal.App.2d 181 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 1 times
    In Kapelus v. Family Health Foundation, supra, the court indicated that prohibition was a proper remedy to prevent enforcement of an order against a garnishee who has denied the obligation to the judgment debtor.

    The court does not have jurisdiction to try the issue which the referee did in this case in the summary proceeding provided by sections 717 to 720 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( Wulfjen v. Dolton (1944) 24 Cal.2d 878, 889 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Oksner v. Superior Court (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 672, 684 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 621]; Takahashi v. Kunishima (1939) 34 Cal.App.2d 367, 373 [ 93 P.2d 645]; Booge v. First Trust Sav. Bank (1941) 46 Cal.App.2d Supp. 879, 882 [ 116 P.2d 503].) The order of October 27, 1966, was, therefore, invalid ( G. Cavaglieri Mortg. Co. v. Superior Court (1926) 79 Cal.App. 655, 658 [ 250 P. 700]) and void (cf.

  10. Holstein v. Superior Court

    275 Cal.App.2d 708 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 5 times

    Each of the defendants, petitioners herein, at all pertinent times was a resident of the County of Orange. [1] An action by a judgment creditor against a person allegedly indebted to the judgment debtor to recover the amount of the debt, where the person allegedly owing the debt denies the indebtedness, is an action in the nature of a creditor's bill; is an equitable proceeding; is independent of the action in which the judgment was obtained; and, although recognized in section 720 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is not a part of the statutory proceedings supplemental to execution. ( Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.2d 878, 889 [ 151 P.2d 840]; Bond v. Bulgheroni, 215 Cal. 7, 9-11 [ 8 P.2d 130]; Deering v. Richardson-Kimball Co., 109 Cal. 73, 79, 82-83 [41 P. 801]; Woodcock v. The Petrol Corp., 48 Cal.App.2d 652, 656 [ 120 P.2d 889]; Booge v. First Trust Sav. Bank, 46 Cal.App.2d Supp. 879, 881-883 [ 116 P.2d 503]; see also Rapp v. Whittier, 113 Cal. 429, 431 [45 P. 703].) [2] Under the statutorily prescribed general rule (Code Civ. Proc., ยง 395, subd. (1)), a defendant, upon demand, is entitled to have an action tried in the county of his residence unless the plaintiff, by his complaint, establishes his case is within a statutory exception to the general rule.