Wu v. Thomas

87 Citing cases

  1. Rivero v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of New Mexico

    No. CIV 16-0318 JB\SCY (D.N.M. Mar. 7, 2019)   Cited 20 times

    In Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271 (11th Cir. 1993), the Eleventh Circuit considered whether a federal district judge should recuse from a case involving a university for which he serves as an adjunct professor and to which he had made financial contributions. See 996 F.2d at 275.

  2. Davis v. Town of Lake Park

    245 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2001)   Cited 906 times
    Holding that job performance memoranda rarely constitute adverse employment actions

    It has been imposed in cases under Title VII's retaliation clause, even though that provision is not limited to unlawful conduct with respect to the "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." See Bass v. Board of County Comm'ns, 242 F.3d 996, ____ _ ___, slip op. at 1477-78 (11th Cir. 2001); Gupta v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 587 (11th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 772, 148 L.Ed.2d 671 (2001); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998); Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 273-74 (11th Cir. 1993). Adverse action is also a requirement in other employment discrimination cases.

  3. Banik v. Tamez

    CIVIL ACTION NO. 7:16-CV-00462 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 2, 2016)

    Though the Fifth Circuit says little else on the issue, courts within other circuits have clarified that a judge need not recuse herself when her alma mater is a party, even when the judge makes yearly financial contributions to the university, presents educational programs to the university, teaches as an adjunct professor at the university, donates money to the university in exchange for football tickets, or even plans to create a university scholarship.Harris v. Bd. of Sup'rs of Louisiana State Univ. & Agr. & Mech. Coll. ex rel. LSU Health Sci. Ctr. Shreveport, 409 Fed. Appx. 725, 727 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Levitt v. University of Texas at El Paso, 847 F.2d 221, 225-26 & n. 13 (5th Cir.1988); Lunde v. Helms, 29 F.3d 367, 370-71 (8th Cir.1994); Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 274-75 & n. 7 (11th Cir.1993)). Harris, 409 Fed. Appx. at 728.

  4. Arnold v. Tuskegee University

    Case No. 3:03-cv-515-F (M.D. Ala. Jan. 9, 2006)

    Certainly, "every unkind act" will not be held to violate Title VII. Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 273-74 (11th Cir. 1993). It is clear that the actions taken by Webster โ€” denying her requests to take courses, requesting sexual favors, yelling at her, and telling her to find another job โ€” do not, independently or collectively, constitute a tangible employment action.

  5. Johnston v. Henderson

    144 F. Supp. 2d 1341 (S.D. Fla. 2001)   Cited 29 times
    Holding that improper denial of sick leave, unauthorized release of confidential medical records, issuance of unfounded notice to report questioning employee's leave of absence from duty, unspecified allegation of harassment, improper filing of insurance forms, improper alteration of worker's compensation records, institution of an unfounded collection action, and incorrect processing of FMLA forms did not constitute adverse employment action

    Clearly, if such were the case, this act would constitute an "adverse action." See Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 273-74 (11th Cir. 1993) (generally the "terms and conditions" of a plaintiff's employment are affected by a loss of salary, benefits or position). Here, however, the record is clear that the reduction in pay in Johnston's case was completely unrelated to any protected activity she engaged in.

  6. Perryman v. West

    949 F. Supp. 815 (M.D. Ala. 1996)   Cited 36 times
    Holding that the continuing violation theory did not permit an employee to use EEO complaints against the Army, which she settled pursuant to a written agreement, to determine whether there was a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII

    The Eleventh Circuit has not conclusively determined whether or not harassment can constitute an adverse employment action. See Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 274 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033, 114 S.Ct. 1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). The Wu court noted that although the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted Title VII to mean that an employer cannot retaliate by taking an "adverse employment action," that general phrase has never been defined.

  7. Gorman v. Roberts

    909 F. Supp. 1479 (M.D. Ala. 1995)   Cited 2 times
    Dismissing a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment where the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before an administrate body and state courts

    Qualified Immunity as to ยง 1983 The defendants further assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity in this action, because Mr. Gorman is presently employed by the State of Alabama, he has lost no back pay, and he has suffered no tangible injury. The defendants rely on Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 273 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994), in which the court could not find any case that clearly established that retaliatory harassment โ€” as opposed to sexual or racial harassment โ€” could violate Title VII where the employer caused the employee no tangible harm, such as loss of salary, benefits, or position. Id. at 273.

  8. Boyd v. Brookstone Corp. New Hampshire

    857 F. Supp. 1568 (S.D. Fla. 1994)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that alleged retaliation in form of fabricated evidence submitted to EEOC did not affect "terms and conditions" of employment

    At the outset, the Court recognizes that, although ยง 704(a) specifically states that an employer cannot retaliate against protected employees, the statute does not make all hostile acts wrongful. Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 274 (11th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 1543, 128 L.Ed.2d 195 (1994). Moreover, while the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the statutory language to mean that an employer cannot retaliate against an employee by making an "adverse employment decision," it has not defined what constitutes such an action.

  9. Garrett v. Ohio State Univ.

    No. 21-3982 (6th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023)   Cited 5 times

    We join our sister circuits in concluding that recusal is not required just because a judge serves as an adjunct professor at the law school of a party-university. See, e.g., Sessoms v. Trs. of Univ. of Penn., 739 Fed.Appx. 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that the district court judge who served as an adjunct professor at the defendant university's law school did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse in a case against the university); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 887 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming decision not to recuse in a case against the university where district judge was an alumnus of the undergraduate school and law school, taught at the law school, and made "positive comments about the school"); Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that district judge's "status as an adjunct professor [at law school] and his past contributions to the [u]niversity" did not require recusal in a case against the university). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for recusal on this basis.

  10. Garrett v. Ohio State Univ.

    60 F.4th 359 (6th Cir. 2023)   Cited 8 times

    We join our sister circuits in concluding that recusal is not required just because a judge serves as an adjunct professor at the law school of a party-university. See, e.g., Sessoms v. Trs. of Univ. of Penn., 739 F. App'x 84, 90 (3d Cir. 2018) (concluding that the district court judge who served as an adjunct professor at the defendant university's law school did not abuse its discretion in declining to recuse in a case against the university); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 887 (8th Cir. 2014) (affirming decision not to recuse in a case against the university where district judge was an alumnus of the undergraduate school and law school, taught at the law school, and made "positive comments about the school"); Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 275 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that district judge's "status as an adjunct professor [at law school] and his past contributions to the [u]niversity" did not require recusal in a case against the university). The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motions for recusal on this basis.