" W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So.2d 572, 580-81 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). Thus, the focus of this case must remain solely on the best interest of the child.

The juvenile court asserted that it could award visitation to the foster parents pursuant to W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So.2d 572 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (plurality opinion), and Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-314(a) ("If a child is found to be dependent, the juvenile court may make any of the following orders of disposition to protect the welfare of the child: ... (4) Make any other order as the juvenile court in its discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the child.").

Ex parte M.J.W., 62 So. 3d 531, 536 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). See also W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (Murdock, J., with Thompson and Pittman, JJ., concurring in the result) ("[W]e have long stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child."). Moreover, in its April 11, 2022, judgment, the juvenile court set forth other conditions and limitations on the award of custody to the father.

Ex parte M.J.W., 62 So. 3d 531, 536 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). See W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) ("[W]e have long stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child."), and Price v. Price, 440 So. 2d 1110, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983) ("The paramount consideration for a court in a child custody case is the best interests and welfare of the child."). See also § 12-15-101(d), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act "shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, necessary for the welfare of the child and the best interests of the state").

Ex parte M.J.W., 62 So.3d 531, 536 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010). See W.T.M. v.S.P., 889 So.2d 572, 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)("[W]e have long stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child."), and Price v. Price, 440 So.2d 1110, 1110 (Ala. Civ. App. 1983)("The paramount consideration for a court in a child custody case is the best interests and welfare of the child."). Seealso § 12-15-101(d), Ala. Code 1975 (providing that the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act "shall be liberally construed to the end that each child coming under the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall receive the care, guidance, and control, preferably in his or her own home, necessary for the welfare of the child and the best interests of the state").

In its December 12, 2020, order, out of an abundance of caution and in an effort to ensure the protection and best interests of the minor child, the juvenile court ruled on the issues raised by Dykes in the .02 action. See W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So. 2d 572, 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) ("[W]e have long stated in both child-custody and dependency cases that the primary concern is the best interests and welfare of the child."). The guardian ad litem has failed to argue before this court how reversing the judgment dismissing the .02 action and remanding the cause would impact the proceedings below, i.e., he has failed to demonstrate how remanding the .02 action to the juvenile court for it to consider the same evidence or proffer that was made during the November 5, 2020, hearing would impact or affect the child's dependency and disposition.

This is the seventh time that issues related to the custody of A.M.A. have been before this court. See W.T.M. v. Department of Human Res., 736 So.2d 1120 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999); W.T.M. v. S.P., 802 So.2d 1091 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (plurality opinion); Ex parte W.T.M., 851 So.2d 55 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (plurality opinion); Ex parte E.T., 895 So.2d 271 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (plurality opinion); W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So.2d 572 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (plurality opinion); and S.P. v. E.T., 957 So.2d 1127 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). Because of our disposition of the instant appeal, a detailed recitation of the facts is not necessary.

This is the sixth time that issues related to the custody of A.M.A. have been before this court. See W.T.M. v. Department of Human Res., 736 So.2d 1120 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (" W.T.M. I"); W.T.M. v. S.P., 802 So.2d 1091 (Ala.Civ.App. 2001) (" W.T.M. II") (plurality opinion); Ex parte W.T.M., 851 So.2d 55 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (" W.T.M. III") (plurality opinion); Ex parte E.T., 895 So.2d 271 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (" W.T.M. IV") (plurality opinion); and W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So.2d 572 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (" W.T.M. V") (plurality opinion). We will not provide a detailed recitation of the background of this case as it can be found in W.T.M. Ill, W.T.M. IV, and W.T.M. V. It is sufficient to say that in January 2003, on remand from this court's opinion in W.T.M. Ill, the Jefferson Juvenile Court entered an order awarding custody of A.M.A. to her paternal aunt and uncle, V.T. and E.T. Before the January 2003 custody award, A.M.A., who was approximately six years old at the time, had been in the physical custody of her foster mother, S.P., for over five years.

"Although a juvenile court's orders in a dependency case are never `final' in the sense that the court retains jurisdiction during the child's minority to modify its judgments upon a showing of changed circumstances, see Ashbee v. Cozart, 611 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Ala.Civ.App. 1992), and Committee Comments, Rule 4, Ala. R.App. P., in order to exercise its continuing jurisdiction over a juvenile, the court must be presented with a properly filed new petition to modify its former judgment in which changed circumstances are alleged, cf. Ex parte Davidson, 782 So.2d 237, 240 (Ala. 2000) (applying the principle with respect to modification of the child-custody provision in a divorce judgment), and Farmer v. Farmer, 842 So.2d 679 (Ala.Civ.App. 2002) (applying the principle with respect to a petition to modify periodic alimony)."W.T.M. v. S.P., 889 So.2d 572, 582 (Ala.Civ.App. 2003) (Crawley, J., dissenting, with writing, which Yates, P.J., joined). The juvenile court also did not have subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain an original action pursuant to § 30-3-4.1(b)(5).