However, that presumption does not apply in the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding. W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 70–71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). Once the trial court has made a finding of dependency, § 12–15–71(a), Ala. Code 1975, empowers the trial court to make various dispositions of the child, including ‘any ... order as the court in its discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the child.’
However, that presumption does not apply in the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding. W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 70-71 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). Once the trial court has made a finding of dependency, § 12-15-71(a),[[] Ala. Code 1975, empowers the trial court to make various dispositions of the child, including 'any . . . order as the [juvenile] court in its discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the child.' § 12-15-71(a)(4).
However, that presumption does not apply in the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding. W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 70-71 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005). Once the trial court has made a finding of dependency, § 12-15-71(a), Ala. Code 1975, empowers the trial court to make various dispositions of the child, including "any . . . order as the court in its discretion shall deem to be for the welfare and best interests of the child."
Those findings are essential to overcome the presumption in favor of parental custody in a child-custody case between a parent and a nonparent, see Ex parte Terry, 494 So.2d 628 (Ala. 1986) (also holding that those facts must be proven by clear and convincing evidence), but those findings are not required in a dependency case. See O.L.D. v. J.C., 769 So.2d 299, 302 (Ala.Civ.App. 1999) (" This case is not simply a custody dispute between a parent and nonparent, but, rather, is a dependency case; therefore, Terry is not applicable."); J.P. v. S.S., 989 So.2d 591 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008); and W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64 (Ala.Civ.App. 2005); see also K.B. v. Cleburne County Dep't of Human Res., 897 So.2d 379, 387 (Ala. Civ.App. 2004) (holding that Terry "`parental unfitness'" standard is "more stringent" than the dependency "best interests" standard). Likewise, the finding that the maternal grandparents had met the [ Ex parte] McLendon[, 455 So.2d 863 (Ala. 1984),] standard is inconsistent with a disposition under the dependency statute, which is governed by the "best interests" standard.
This court has consistently held that a complaint or a petition alleges the dependency of a child, so as to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile courts, when it avers facts that, if proven to be true, would establish the dependency of the child under § 12-15-102(8), regardless of the particular language pleaded. See, e.g., C.E. v. M.G., 169 So. 3d 1061, 1064 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015) ; T.K. v. M.G., 82 So. 3d 1, 3 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ; P.S.R. v. C.L.P., 67 So. 3d 917, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) ; B.R.G. v. G.L.M., 57 So. 3d 137 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010) ; M.B. v. R.P., 3 So. 3d 237 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008) ; W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So. 2d 64 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ; and L.L.M. v. S.F., 919 So. 2d 307 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). This court recently summarized the law on this point as follows: "In deciding whether a pleading alleges the dependency of a child, so as to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of a juvenile court, the court shall look to the substance of the pleading and not to the nomenclature employed by the pleader."
NO OPINION. See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C), Ala. R. App. P.; Ala. Code 1975, §§ 12-15-102(8)2., 12-15-102(8)5., & 12-15-301(1); Ex parte R.E.C., 899 So. 2d 272, 279 (Ala. 2004); A.V. v. Houston Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res. [Ms. 2190464, February 26, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021); P.D. v. S.S., 67 So. 3d 128, 131-32 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); and W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So. 2d 64, 70-71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005). Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
NO OPINION. See Rule 53(a)(1) and (a)(2)(C), Ala. R. App. P.; Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-117(c); B.H. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Human Res., 161 So. 3d 1215, 1218-19 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014); H.H.J. v. K.T.J., 114 So. 3d 36, 41 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012); P.D. v. S.S., 67 So. 3d 128, 130-34 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011); N.T. v. P.G., 54 So. 3d 918, 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 2010); W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So. 2d 64, 70-71 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005); and In re F.W., 681 So. 2d 208, 211-12 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996). Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Although doing so was not necessary to the disposition of this appeal, this court has examined the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction and has determined that no jurisdictional defect has been proven. See, e.g., W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 71–72 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ; and M.W.H. v. R.W., 100 So.3d 603,606–07 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). Rule 1(A), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides, in pertinent part: "If no procedure is specifically provided in these Rules or by statute, the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable to those matters that are considered civil in nature and the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable to those matters that are considered criminal in nature."
As we have previously stated, the issue of improper venue is waivable. W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 73 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (holding that an argument concerning improper venue is waived on appellate review when no authority is cited to support the proposition). It is well settled that “[t]his court will address only those issues properly presented and for which supporting authority has been cited.”
“ Terry applies in child-custody disputes between a parent and nonparent; it does not apply if the child or children, the custody of whom is disputed, have been found to be dependent, as is the case here. See W.T.H. v. M.M.M., 915 So.2d 64, 70 (Ala.Civ.App.2005) (discussing the abundance of caselaw regarding the distinction between child-custody disputes and the dispositional phase of a dependency proceeding). Therefore, because the juvenile court found the children to be dependent, no finding of unfitness was necessary.