Opinion
No. 02 C 4992
March 7, 2003
OPINION
In this action, Laura Wroble brought suit against Mestek, Inc., alleging that it negligently released TCE, a hazardous chemical, into the environment, resulting in the contamination of Wroble's water supplies. Wroble claimed that this exposure caused her to contract cervical and/or uterine cancer. Mestek has moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Rule 12(c) permits a party to move for judgment after the parties have filed the complaint and answer. Northern Indiana Gun Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of South Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). All well-pleaded allegations in the plaintiff's pleadings are taken as true, and the facts and inferences to be drawn from those allegations are viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993). However, the Court is "not obliged to ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim or to assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law." R.J.R. Services, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 895 F.2d 279, 281 (7th Cir. 1989).
Mestek argues that Wroble's claim has been precluded by a prior action. In determining whether this is so, I may take judicial notice of matters of public record such as judgments in other cases. United States v. Wood, 925 F.2d 1580, 1582 (7th Cir. 1991). Under Illinois law, "the doctrine of res judicata holds that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as to the rights of the parties, and constitutes an absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim, demand or cause of action." Long v. Shorebank Development Corp., 182 F.3d 548, 560 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, Mestek's liability as to the negligent release of TCE into the environment has already been decided against Wroble in another case, DeVane v. The Lockformer Company, et al., Circuit Court of the 18th Judicial Circuit, DuPage County, Illinois, No. 01 L 377. In DeVane, the Court dismissed Mestek with prejudice because the Court determined that Mestek had no connection to the cause of action.
Wroble challenges the use of res judicata in this action because she believes that facts used in the DeVane action (among them, that Mestek was not the owner of the Lockformer/Met-Coil facility that released TCE into the environment) were false. She therefore asks the court to release from judgment, pursuant to 735 ILCS 5/2-1401, the Court's decision in DeVane. To be entitled to relief under § 2-1401, Wroble must set forth specific factual allegations establishing due diligence in presenting the claim or defense in the original action, the merit of her claim or defense, and due diligence in filing the § 2-1401 petition for relief. Lakewood Engineering Mfg. Co. v. Dyna-Tel, Inc., No. 91 C 7374, 1993 WL 57511, *4 (N.D.Ill. March 4, 1993). Here, Wroble has set forth none of the above. She has not proved that the Court in DeVane used incorrect facts. Her claim that the Court in LeClercq v. The Lockformer Company et al., U.S. D. Ct. N.D. Ill. No. 00 C 7164, determined that Mestek owned or operated the Lockformer/MetCoil facility is wrong because the Court explicitly stated that it did not find Mestek to be the owner for purposes of CERCLA or common law liability. Additionally, Wroble has not shown due diligence because she has not explained why she failed to discover the alleged mistakes of fact and file a § 2-1404 petition earlier than over a year after the decision in DeVane.
For the reasons stated above, Mestek's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.