Wright's Estate

11 Citing cases

  1. Harrold v. First Nat. Bank of Fort Worth

    93 F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Tex. 1950)   Cited 5 times

    Undoubtedly that Quinn v. Peoples Trust Sav. Co., 223, Ind. 317, 60 N.E.2d 281; Dye v. Beaver Creek Church, 48 S.C. 444, 26 S.E. 717; Cooke v. Woman's Medical College, 82 N.J. Eq. 179, 87 A. 131; Alstork v. Curry, 207 Ala. 135, 91 So. 796; In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 A. 188. Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Forsyth, 130 Tex. 563, 109 S.W.2d 1046; Lipscomb v. Lofland, Tex.Civ.App., 141 S.W.2d 983; Harrison v. Craddock, Tex. Civ.App., 178 S.W.2d 296; Porter v. Sweeney, 61 Tex. 213. is the view prevailing in Texas.

  2. Little Estate

    168 A.2d 738 (Pa. 1961)   Cited 1 times

    At no time did the auditing judge abdicate his province of determining whether what Falk had suggested to the executors as a possible memorial qualified as such as a matter of law. As for the testator's intention in the use of the words "memorial" and "memorials", what we said in Funk Estate, 353 Pa. 321, 325, 45 A.2d 67, may pertinently be reiterated, viz., "if there be any doubt, a testator is presumed to intend the meaning which makes his gift legally effective rather than one which renders it nugatory and void: Anderson's Estate, 269 Pa. 535, 538, 112 A. 766, 767; Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 342, 131 A. 188, 191." The appellant, Ethel Silverman, also contends that paragraph (19) of the decedent's will creates a trust for her of $10,000, that the trust is dry, and that she, as the cestui que trust, is entitled to receive the $10,000 forthwith.

  3. Trattner Estate

    145 A.2d 678 (Pa. 1958)   Cited 4 times

    No particular estate is carved out with a gift over. "In Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, the will created a charitable trust with the further direction that the trustees might render necessary assistance out of income to the testator's own nephews and nieces. "Incidentally, it was held that the blending of the charitable and noncharitable bequests in one trust did not render the whole trust void.

  4. Goetz v. Bank of Martinsburg

    84 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1954)   Cited 19 times
    Finding that "[w]here a latent ambiguity exists in a testamentary paper, extrinsic evidence may be introduced to show intent."

    As so applied, the rule would prevent the vesting of the property in the ultimate beneficiaries for the reason that the trustees have an uncontrolled discretion and no time is fixed in the will for them to finally dispose of the property bequeathed by the testatrix. The rule against perpetuities does not apply to charitable uses. Pace v. Dukes (Ga.) 55 S.E.2d 367; Hulet v. Crawfordsville Trust Co. (Ind.) 69 N.E.2d 823; Miller v. Flowers (Fla.) 27 So.2d 667; In Re Wright's Estate (Pa.) 131 A. 188. The trust here considered, having in mind the unlimited discretion of the trustees, may possibly be converted into a charitable as well as a noncharitable trust.

  5. In re Estate of Pierce

    60 N.W.2d 894 (Iowa 1953)   Cited 28 times

    Other decisions which uphold bequests to establish student loan funds include Pattillo v. Glenn, 150 Fla. 73, 7 So.2d 328; Holsey v. Atlantic National Bank, 115 Fla. 604, 155 So. 821; Owens v. Owens' Executor, 236 Ky. 118, 32 S.W.2d 731; In re Will of Morgan, 200 Misc. 645, 646, 107 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 ("Nor does the fact that the persons receiving the benefits must repay the same with interest affect the validity of the trust."); In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 A. 188; Champlin v. Powers, R.I., 90 A.2d 787; Powers v. First National Bank of Corsicana, 138 Tex. 604, 161 S.W.2d 273, 280. See also as having some bearing Iowa Federation of Women's Clubs v. Dilley, 234 Iowa 417, 419, 12 N.W.2d 815, 816.

  6. Schellentrager v. Tradesmens Nat'l Co.

    88 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1952)   Cited 16 times
    Recognizing settlor's power to change beneficiaries

    Yet, the court mistakenly held that the right to change beneficiaries did not include the right to change the remaindermen. As it is a court's duty, if reasonably possible, to construe written instruments so as to make them legally effective ( Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 342, 131 A. 188), the error of the court below is apparent. The duty to so construe a written instrument as to render it legally valid, if possible, should, alone, have tipped the balance in favor of including remaindermen among the beneficiaries whom the settlor had the reserved power to change, had there been any substantial question on that score.

  7. In re Estate of Snyder

    195 Md. 81 (Md. 1950)   Cited 9 times
    In Snyder's Estate v. Denit, 195 Md. 81, 91, 72 A.2d 757, 761, 18 A.L.R.2d 663, 670, a will construction case, it is said: "It is perhaps an anachronism in this age to hold that the masculine includes all genders (Code Article 1, section 7), but that the feminine does not. That, however, is clearly true in the construction of statutes."

    As his son was 53 years old and had had no children for 26 years, and his daughter was 58 years old, while there was a possibility that he might have more grandchildren, on the other hand, it is quite probable that he considered this to be unlikely. Courts cannot assume from the age of parties the impossibility of their having children, In re Ricards Trust Estate, 97 Md. 608, 609, 55 A. 384, 63 L.R.A., 145, Williams v. Armiger, 129 Md. 222, 234, 98 A. 542, but they can consider the possibilities in order to determine what the testator may have thought when he was making his will. Reese v. Reese, [ Chism v. Reese], 190 Md. 311, 58 A.2d 643, In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 A. 188. The residuary clause which is in question is the second.

  8. Funk Estate

    45 A.2d 67 (Pa. 1946)   Cited 20 times

    Not even the most learned and erudite invariably use words with the precise meanings attributed to them by lexicographers; testators, like other persons, frequently create their own dictionaries, and indeed it is largely from that circumstance that there arise the necessity and the art of judicial interpretation. On the whole, we find little difficulty in concluding that the word "worthy", as used by testatrix, was meant by her to refer only to an institution which would fall within the legal definition of a charity, — a construction amply justified by the principle that, if there be any doubt, a testator is presumed to intend the meaning which makes his gift legally effective rather than one which renders it nugatory and void: Anderson's Estate, 269 Pa. 535, 538, 112 A. 766, 767; Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 342, 131 A. 188, 191. Nor are precedents for such a construction lacking in Pennsylvania. In Pickering v. Shotwell, 10 Pa. 23, a residuary bequest for the distribution of good books among poor people "or to the support of an institution, or free-school, in or near Philadelphia" was upheld.

  9. Pattillo v. Glenn

    7 So. 2d 328 (Fla. 1942)   Cited 5 times

    No accumulations are required to be added to the principal indefinitely and without limit, and the beneficiaries are a designated class of persons not particular individuals; and this is a charitable trust and not a private trust, where the rule against perpetuities may be applied. See Holsey v. Atlantic National Bank of Jacksonville, 115 Fla. 604, 155 So. 821; See Restatement of the Law of Trusts, Vol. 2, Ch. 11. Sec. 370 (d); In re Wright's Estate, 284 Pa. 334, 131 A. 188, 189. The provision in the will of Margaret C. Hall: I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, residue and remainder of my property, estate and effects, real or personal, which I may now own or may hereafter acquire and have power to dispose of at my decease, of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situated to James Carlton," etc., is manifestly not an attempt to, nor does it show an intent to, exercise any power of appointment, even if it had been given her by her deceased husband's will, to dispose of any part of the corpus of the trust property in which she had a beneficial interest to the extent of the net income from such trust estate during her natural life or during her widowhood.

  10. Shetter's Estate

    154 A. 288 (Pa. 1931)   Cited 6 times

    The destruction of the intervening will with the intention to revive the original operates as a revival irrespective of the codicil: Lawson v. Morrison, 2 Dallas 286; Boudinot v. Bradford, 2 Dallas 266; Flintham v. Bradford, 10 Pa. 82; Kerchner's Est., 41 Pa. Super. 112; Manning's Est., 46 Pa. Super. 607; Stephenson's Est., 6 Pa. C. C. 628; Wulff's Est., 26 Pa. Dist. R. 144. The fact, if it be a fact, that the codicil is not subscribed by two disinterested witnesses, does not invalidate the charitable bequest in the original will: Darlington's Est., 289 Pa. 297; Carl's App., 106 Pa. 635; Sloan's App., 168 Pa. 422; Morrow's Est., 204 Pa. 484; Wright's Est., 284 Pa. 334. OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE SCHAFFER, March 16, 1931: