Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2770-14T1
03-06-2017
KEVIN M. WRIGHT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. TOWNSHIP OF CHERRY HILL, NEW JERSEY, Defendant-Respondent.
Matthew S. Wolf, attorney for appellant. Brown & Connery, L.L.P., attorneys for respondent (Christine P. O'Hearn, of counsel; Ms. O'Hearn and Michael J. Miles, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Lihotz and Whipple. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-4769-12. Matthew S. Wolf, attorney for appellant. Brown & Connery, L.L.P., attorneys for respondent (Christine P. O'Hearn, of counsel; Ms. O'Hearn and Michael J. Miles, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiff appeals from a January 23, 2015 order denying his motion for reconsideration of a November 21, 2014 order, granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. We had previously remanded this case after plaintiff argued the trial judge erred in ordering summary judgment in the absence of findings of fact or conclusions of law as required by Rule 1:7-4. We agreed and remanded to the trial judge to comply with the requirements of the rule and retained jurisdiction.
On January 6, 2017, on remand, the trial judge delivered a decision on the record, and we have reviewed the transcript. Because of comments made by the judge, we are constrained to remand the matter once again. The judge recounted when he granted the unopposed summary judgment initially, he did so without
review[ing] [defendant's] brief and arguments to independently determine whether or not I agreed with them, since it's not uncommon in the Law Division, for Civil Division judges to have over 100 motions every other Friday. . . . I'm of the belief that I don't need to, basically, read the motion as a contested motion to make sure I agree with it. Now, some judges may disagree with that. That's fair enough. But I should point out a few court rules that I think support my position. The motion was unopposed . . . .
Under Rule 1:6-2(a), in pertinent part, provides:
"The motion shall be deemed uncontested and there shall be no right to argue orally in opposition unless responsive papers are timely filed and served stating, with particularity the basis of the opposition to the relief sought."
So, it was an uncontested motion.
I would also indicate under the summary judgment rules, specifically -- Rule 4:46-2 . . . (b) . . . .
"A party opposing the motion shall file a responding statement either admitting or disputing each of the facts in the movant's statements. Subject to Rule 4:46-5(a) all material facts in the movant's statement, which are sufficiently supported, would be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion only, unless specifically disputed by citation conforming to the requirements of Paragraph A, demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue as to the fact."
So, under [Rule] 4:46-2(b), I think there were 55 separate paragraphs in the moving parties' statement of the facts. They're all deemed admitted . . . they're true, they're not disputed . . . .
Based on the facts deemed admitted, the trial judge determined defendant was entitled to summary judgment.
However, the judge went on to say:
I want to be perfectly transparent and honest that I did not canvas and read the entire brief of the summary judgment motion, which, as I say, had 50 -- 55 separate paragraphs in the statement of the material facts to make sure that everything that was alleged in the material facts incited [sic] to on the record was accurate. I didn't read all 24 pages of the brief, and the appendix that's attached to the summary judgment motion contains several hundred pages of documents. I didn't read the several hundred pages of documents.
It's unrealistic to expect a trial court judge, who has in excess of 100 motions,
including, in many cases, dozens of dispositive motions every single motion Friday to give the type of attention to an unopposed . . . summary judgment motion. . . .
I assume that most trial judges do not -- are not as thorough in reviewing unopposed summary judgment motions, as they are [in] contested summary judgment motions. But to the extent that that's required in this case, I've read from the court rules, which indicate that everything that's been alleged factually, and cited to by the record, by the Township of Cherry Hill, is deemed admitted -- deemed uncontested, that clearly supplies ample basis for justifying granting summary judgment on the [Law Against Discrimination] civil rights types of claims, failure to accommodate, that type of thing.
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Fisher, we said, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate where the evidence fails to show a genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." 408 N.J. Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 2009) (citing R. 4:46-2(c)). In support of an order granting summary judgment, a judge is required to detail the findings of fact and conclusions of law in a written or oral opinion. R. 1:7-4(a); R. 4:46-2(c). A trial judge is obligated "to set forth factual findings and correlate them to legal conclusions. Those findings and conclusions must then be measured against the standards set forth in Brill v. Guardian Life Insurance Co. of America, 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Checchio, 335 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 2000). Neither the parties nor the appellate court is "well-served by an opinion devoid of analysis or citation to even a single case." Ibid.
Rule 4:46-2(b) provides that all sufficiently supported material facts will be deemed admitted for purposes of the motion unless "specifically disputed" by the party opposing the motion. Pursuant to Rule 1:7-4(a), however, the judge must still correlate those facts to legal conclusions. The court rules do not provide any exception from this obligation where the motion is unopposed. R. 1:7-4(a); R. 4:46-2(c). We have held "the trial judge may satisfy the court rules by relying on the facts or reasons advanced by a party; however, the court is obligated to make the fact of such reliance 'explicit.'" Allstate, supra, 408 N.J. Super. at 301 (citing Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 on R. 1:7-4 (2009)).
Because the judge did not read the movant's brief and supporting documents and relied only on the facts deemed admitted, we are constrained to remand once more in order for the court to meet the requirements of Rule 1:7-4(a).
We add the following comment. Any fair reading of the court rules does not support the suggestion an unopposed summary judgment motion is entitled to a less thorough review than a contested motion, particularly where, as here, one party is a self-represented litigant.
Reversed and remanded for additional findings consistent with this opinion within twenty-one days. We retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION