Opinion
No. CV06 4006889-S
January 9, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE MOTION TO DISMISS #107
The defendant, Teamsters Local 559, has filed a motion to dismiss contending the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the claims brought against it by the plaintiff, Lloyd Wright. For the reasons outlined below, the defendant's motion to dismiss is granted.
FACTS
The plaintiff filed an administrative complaint with the Connecticut Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CCHRO) on October 12, 2004, alleging he was the victim of race and color discrimination. Over seventeen months later, on or about April 4, 2006, the plaintiff amended his administrative complaint to add a new claim of age discrimination. On August 28, 2006, the plaintiff received a release of jurisdiction from the CCHRO and, thereafter, on November 28, 2006, he commenced this action. On February 7, 2007, the plaintiff revised his complaint at the defendant's request.
The revised complaint currently before the court is brought pursuant the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), General Statues § 46a-51 et seq. Specifically, it is brought pursuant to General Statutes § 46a-60, which provides in relevant part: "(a) It shall be a discriminatory practice in violation of this section . . . (3) [f]or a labor organization, because of the race, color, religious creed, age, sex, marital status, national origin, ancestry, present or past history of mental disability, mental retardation, learning disability or physical disability, including, but not limited to, blindness of any individual to exclude from full membership rights or to expel from its membership such individual or to discriminate in any way against any of its members or against any employer or any individual employed by an employer, unless such action is based on a bona fide occupational qualification . . ."
In his single-count revised complaint, the plaintiff, who is African American, alleges that he has been a member of the defendant for a long time, and is currently in good standing. He further alleges that he was removed from his position as a union steward by means of a vote taken on May 18, 2004, which he contends was rigged and called "on account of the desire of white members of the [Teamsters] Local [559] to replace [him]." The plaintiff further avers that as a result of the allegedly race-motivated vote, he was replaced as union steward by a Caucasian male.
In addition to the race-motivated discrimination that is alleged in his revised complaint, the plaintiff also contends that the adverse acts taken against him were in part attributed to age discrimination. He alleges that he is over the age of forty, while the man who replaced him as union steward is much younger.
The plaintiff also lists a variety of other adverse actions he claims the defendant and its Caucasian business manager, Thomas Gilmartin, took against him in the years prior to the May 18, 2004 vote, all of which he contends were motivated by race and/or age animus. These claims generally allege that the defendant failed to provide the plaintiff with adequate representation when he was given less desirable work or his contractual benefits were denied; that his seniority and the benefits that flow from it were not respected, in part because his seniority was unjustly diminished by the March 18, 2004 vote; that grievances he filed were repeatedly ignored and/or withdrawn by Gilmartin; that he was retaliated against for vocally supporting a fellow African American employee that formerly sued the defendant for racial discrimination; and that he was denied the right to work overtime.
The defendant filed the present motion to dismiss on September 30, 2008, arguing that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the plaintiff's claims. The motion is accompanied by a memorandum of law and various accompanying documents. The plaintiff has filed a memorandum of law in opposition.
DISCUSSION
"Pursuant to the rules of practice, a motion to dismiss is the appropriate motion for raising a lack of subject matter jurisdiction." St. George v. Gordon, 264 Conn. 538, 545, 825 A.2d 90 (2003). It is well-established that "a challenge to the jurisdiction of a court to render a judgment may be raised at any time, because the lack of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) DiBerardino v. DiBerardino, 213 Conn. 373, 377, 568 A.2d 431 (1990). "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n. 12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). "[I]n determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction, every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connor v. Statewide Grievance Committee, 260 Conn. 435, 443, 797 A.2d 1081 (2002).
General Statues §§ 46a-83a(a) and 46a-100 authorize any person that has filed a complaint of discrimination with the CCHRO and obtained a release of jurisdiction to bring an action in the Superior Court. These actions are governed by certain procedural rules and time constraints. General Statutes § 46a-101(e) provides that "[a]ny action brought by the complainant in accordance with [§]46a-100 shall be brought within ninety days of the receipt of the release [of jurisdiction] from the [CCHRO]." The rule most relevant to the present motion to dismiss is found in General Statutes § 46a-102, which provides in relevant part: "Any action brought in accordance with [§ 146a-100 shall be brought within two years of the date of filing of the complaint with the [CCHRO] . . ." These time limitations have been deemed subject matter jurisdictional and necessary for speedy resolution of discrimination claims filed pursuant to CFEPA. See generally Angelsea Productions, Inc. v. Commission on Human Rights Opportunities, 236 Conn. 681, 674 A.2d 1300 (1996).
Section 46a-83a(a) provides: "If a complaint is dismissed pursuant to subsection (b) of section 46a-83, or is dismissed for failure to accept full relief pursuant to subsection (c) of said section, and the complainant does not request reconsideration of such dismissal as provided in subsection (e) of said section, the executive director of the [CCHRO] shall issue a release and the complainant may, within ninety days of receipt of the release from the commission, bring an action in accordance with sections 46a-100 and 46a-102 to 46a-104, inclusive."
46a-100 provides in relevant part: "Any person who has timely filed a complaint with the [CCHRO] in accordance with section 46a-82 and who has obtained a release from the commission in accordance with section 46a-83a or 46a-101, may also bring an action in the [S]uperior [C]ourt for the judicial district in which the discriminatory practice is alleged to have occurred or in which the respondent transacts business . . ."
The defendant argues that the plaintiff's revised complaint must be dismissed because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action. It notes that the plaintiff originally filed his administrative complaint with the CCHRO on October 12, 2004, that the present action was not commenced until November 28, 2006, and that it is therefore barred by the two-year statute of limitations found in § 46a-102, and should thus be dismissed.
The plaintiff counters by arguing that April 4, 2006, the date he amended his administrative complaint to add a charge of age discrimination, should be the controlling date for purposes of the two-year statute of limitations and thus his action before this court was commenced in a timely fashion.
At oral argument on the motion, the defendant argued in rebuttal that the age discrimination claims found in the plaintiff's amended administrative complaint relate back to the race and color discrimination-claims found in his original CCHRO complaint, and that they, too, are therefore untimely.
As an initial matter, the court notes that it is undisputed that the plaintiff's claims of race and color discrimination were found in the original administrative complaint, and that the present lawsuit was not filed until over two years had elapsed from the time the administrative complaint was filed with the CCHRO. Thus, pursuant to § 46a-102, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the portions of the plaintiff's complaint that pertain to allegations of race and color discrimination. The sole remaining question is whether the claims of age discrimination found for the first time in the plaintiff's amended administrative complaint relate back to the original CCHRO complaint, and are therefore also barred by § 46a-102.
"`[I]t is well settled that an amended complaint relates back to and is treated as filed at the time of the original complaint unless it alleges a new cause of action . . . Thus, an amendment cannot allege a new cause of action that would be barred by the statute of limitations if filed independently.' (Citation omitted.) Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn.App. 286, 298, 925 A.2d 441, cert. denied, 285 Conn. 905, 942 A.2d 414 (2008).
"`A cause of action is that single group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff and which entitles the plaintiff to relief . . . A right of action at law arises from the existence of a primary right in the plaintiff, and an invasion of that right by some delict on the part of the defendant. The facts which establish the existence of that right and that delict constitute the cause of action . . . A change in, or an addition to, a ground of negligence or an act of negligence arising out of the single group of facts which was originally claimed to have brought about the unlawful injury to the plaintiff does not change the cause of action . . . It is proper to amplify or expand what has already been alleged in support of a cause of action, provided the identity of the cause of action remains substantially the same, but where an entirely new and different factual situation is presented, a new and different cause of action is stated . . . Our relation back doctrine provides that an amendment relates back when the original complaint has given the party fair notice that a claim is being asserted stemming from a particular transaction or occurrence, thereby serving the objectives of our statute of limitations, namely, to protect parties from having to defend against stale claims . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barrett v. Danbury Hospital, 232 Conn. 242, 263-64, 654 A.2d 748 (1995)." Little v. Plant Integration Ass'n. Home Care Solutions, Inc., Superior Court, complex litigation docket at Waterbury, Docket No. X10UWY CV 05 4010156 (April 29, 2008, Scholl, J.).
With the foregoing criteria in mind, the court finds that the plaintiff's age discrimination claim in the amended complaint relates back to the original complaint: it involves the very same set of alleged facts and actors as the race and color claims; it involves the same claims of harm and injury; and it is based on the very same statutory subsection. It is in effect, the same cause of action.
Further supporting the court's finding that the age discrimination claims do relate back is found in the pertinent CCHRO regulation, section 46a-54-38a(b) of the Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies ("the CCHRO regulation"), which provides, in relevant part: "(b) A complaint may be amended to restate its contents on a commission complaint form to cure technical defects and omissions or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts that constitute discriminatory practices which are reasonably like or related to or growing out of the allegations of the original complaint, including those facts discovered during the investigation of the original complaint, and including additional protected class status or naming additional respondents who have had notice of the complaint, relate back to the date the complaint was first received." (Emphasis added.)
General Statutes § 46a-54(5) provides the CCHRO with the power "[t]o adopt, publish, amend and rescind regulations consistent with" the statutory provisions applicable to the CCHRO. Furthermore, "[r]egulations have the force and effect of statutes and are construed in accordance with accepted rules of statutory construction." Caron v. Inland Wetlands Watercourses Commission, 25 Conn.App. 61, 65-66, 592 A.2d 964 (1991), aff'd., 222 Conn. 269 (1992); see also Commission on Hospitals Health Care v. Stamford Hospital, 208 Conn. 663, 668, 546 A.2d 257 (1988) ("the validly enacted regulations of an administrative agency carry the force of statutory law").
In accordance with Miller v. Fishman, 102 Conn.App. at 298 and other applicable case law, as well as the language of the CCHRO regulation, the court holds that the plaintiff's amended administrative complaint and the new allegations of age discrimination set forth therein relate back to the date of the original complaint, October 12, 2004. Thus, those claims found in the plaintiff's revised complaint pertaining to age discrimination are also time barred by § 46a-102, and the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear them.
Accordingly, the defendant's motion to dismiss must be granted.