Opinion
No. 05-02-01354-CR.
Opinion Filed July 2, 2003. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the 366th Judicial District Court, Collin County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 366-80913-02. AFFIRMED.
Before Justices WRIGHT, MOSELEY, and FRANCIS.
OPINION
Appellant William Jeffery Wright pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child without an agreement as to punishment, and the trial court sentenced him to twenty years in prison. In three points of error, appellant complains (1) the trial judge erred in failing to conduct a competency hearing sua sponte, (2) appellant's plea of guilty was not intelligently and voluntarily made, and (3) appellant did not receive reasonably effective assistance of counsel. We affirm. Appellant began sexually assaulting his stepdaughter when she was nine years old. He admitted penetrating her vagina with his penis, attempting to insert his hand inside her, and forcing her to masturbate him and watch pornography with him. Before his arrest in April 2002, appellant attempted to commit suicide by driving his vehicle into a highway retaining wall. Once in jail, a psychiatrist began treating appellant and prescribed anti-depressant medication. In his first point of error, appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing sua sponte to determine whether he was competent to stand trial. A person is incompetent to stand trial if he does not have (1) sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or (2) a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. Art. 46.02, § 1A(a) (Vernon Supp. 2003). The trial court must conduct a competency inquiry on whether to hold a jury trial on a defendant's competency "if evidence of the defendant's competency is brought to the attention of the court from any source." McDaniel v. State, 98 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003). A competency inquiry is required only if the evidence brought to the judge's attention raises a bona fide doubt in the judge's mind about the defendant's competency to stand trial. Id. Evidence is usually sufficient to create a bona fide doubt if it shows "recent severe mental illness, at least moderate retardation, or truly bizarre acts by the defendant." Id. We review the trial court's decision under an abuse of discretion standard. See Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). In his brief, appellant contends "the nature of his offense and the testimony concerning his truly bizarre acts" raised a bona fide doubt as to his competency and the trial court should have conducted a competency hearing sua sponte. We disagree. First, if the "nature of his offense" warranted a competency hearing, then every defendant accused of aggravated sexual assault of a child would automatically be entitled to a competency hearing — a costly waste of resources absent any other evidence of incompetency. Whether we agree or not that a person who sexually assaults a young child is "mentally ill," we do not agree that such a person, because of his illness, cannot understand the proceedings against him or have sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer. Second, while the claim that the "testimony concerning his truly bizarre acts" raised a bona fide doubt is vague as to exactly which acts the defendant is referencing, we will assume he is referring to his suicide attempt . The suicide attempt occurred several months before appellant's trial and, by itself, does not indicate a present inability to communicate with counsel or understand the proceedings against him. See Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395. Moreover, appellant's own psychologist testified appellant was no longer a suicide risk at the time of trial. To the extent appellant relies on evidence that he was prescribed anti-depressant medication while in jail to raise a bona fide doubt as to his competency, we reject the assertion. Prior hospitalizations, treatment for depression, or a determination that a person is mentally ill do not constitute a per se finding that the person is incompetent to stand trial. See Reeves v. State, 46 S.W.3d 397, 399-400 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. dism'd) (evidence of drug addiction and suicide attempt was no reflection on appellant's ability to understand or participate in proceedings against her); Townsend v. State, 949 S.W.2d 24, 27 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (suicidal tendencies and depression did not raise bona fide doubt about defendant's competency). Moreover, a defendant's propensity toward depression does not necessarily correlate with his ability to communicate with counsel or his ability to understand the proceedings against him. Moore, 999 S.W.2d at 395. Here, appellant testified but did not assert he was incompetent nor did he say or do anything to suggest he was incompetent. Prior to entering his plea, he told the court he had consulted with his lawyer on both the written admonishments and his waiver of rights and indicated he understood what he was doing. In all, having reviewed the evidence, we conclude there was no evidence to raise a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competency. Consequently, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to conduct a competency inquiry. We overrule the first point of error. In his third point of error, appellant complains his trial counsel was ineffective by not requesting a competency hearing. As discussed above, the evidence presented did not raise a bona fide doubt as to appellant's competency. Consequently, we cannot conclude that counsel provided ineffective assistance for requesting a hearing to which he was not entitled. We overrule the third point of error. In his second point of error, appellant contends his guilty plea was not entered knowingly and voluntarily because he was uninformed of the consequences of his plea and because he entered the guilty plea in order to ask the court for probation. The record indicates, and appellant concedes, he was properly admonished under article 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, which creates a prima facie showing that appellant entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily. See Martinez v. State, 981 S.W.2d 195, 197 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998) (per curiam). Thus, on appeal, appellant has to demonstrate that he did not fully understand the consequences of his plea such that he suffered harm. See id. In his brief, appellant refers to two letters he sent counsel complaining of a lack of communication; however, the letters were written two to three months before trial. At trial, appellant testified he had consulted with his lawyer about the admonishments and understood them. Thus, if there were problems with counsel's representation before trial, they were apparently resolved before appellant was admonished and entered his plea of guilty. Clearly, appellant never once indicated at trial that he was dissatisfied with his lawyer. With respect to his assertion that he pleaded guilty in order to obtain a probated sentence, appellant was admonished on the range of punishment and said he understood that the trial court could sentence him to anywhere within that range. "The mere fact that appellant may have received a higher punishment than he anticipated or hoped does not render his guilty plea involuntary." Thomas v. State, 2 S.W.3d 640, 642 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.). We conclude appellant has failed to demonstrate that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. Accordingly, we overrule the second point of error. We affirm the trial court's judgement.