Wright v. State

15 Citing cases

  1. Wright v. State

    941 So. 2d 538 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)   Cited 3 times
    Reversing and remanding in the same situation for attachment of records showing defendant agreed to be sentenced under the guidelines or for resentencing

    Because the appellant's allegation that his sentence is illegal where he did not affirmatively elect to be sentenced under the 1984 guidelines is facially sufficient, we reverse. On January 10, 1985, the appellant was sentenced for two counts of attempted second-degree murder, four counts of armed robbery, and three counts of attempted armed robbery that he committed on January 6, 1984. Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In determining the appellant's sentence, the trial court applied the sentencing guidelines adopted by the Florida Supreme Court on October 1, 1983, and enacted by the legislature on July 1, 1984.

  2. Schraffa v. State

    508 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 4 times

    Schraffa was immediately adjudicated guilty. Schraffa unsuccessfully moved for new trial and to dismiss, and he was subsequently sentenced to a term of 41/2 years in prison, with credit for time served. Appellant argues that because victim injury is not a necessary element of the felony of aggravated child abuse by maliciously punishing a child, under section 827.03(1)(c), Florida Statutes (1985), with which appellant was charged, there are eight points both in the prosecutor's point count and in the defense counsel's calculation that are incorrect. See, e.g., Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Thompson v. State, 483 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Whitfield v. State, 471 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Motyka v. State, 457 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). The charge against appellant was that he maliciously punished the child by repeatedly striking him with his hand, causing massive bruises on his buttocks and genital area, contrary to section 827.03(1)(c) Florida Statutes.

  3. Smelley v. State

    500 So. 2d 318 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)   Cited 9 times

    Therefore, the fourteen points assessed against appellant for victim injury must be removed from the scoresheet. See: Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Brown v. State, 474 So.2d 346 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985), rev. denied, 484 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1986); Whitfield v. State, 471 So.2d 633 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985); Motyka v. State, 457 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Since we have ruled that victim injury may not be scored because it is not a necessary element of the offense of robbery with a weapon, the victim's injury in this case may be used as a reason for departure from the recommended guideline sentencing range.

  4. United States v. Rashkovski

    No. 01-50374 (9th Cir. Jun. 4, 2002)

    1990);Lopez v. State, 555 So. 2d 1298 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990);Wright v. State, 487 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

  5. Hansbrough v. State

    509 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 1987)   Cited 76 times
    Holding that CCP did not apply to a robbery gone wrong and the defendant's frenzied stabbing did not prove CCP

    Because the sentencing guidelines apply to that sentence, however, the trial court should not have retained jurisdiction for one-third of the armed robbery sentence. Dawson v. State, 491 So.2d 310 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Kennedy v. State, 490 So.2d 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986); Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). Hansbrough also argues that he should not have been convicted of both felony murder and the underlying felony of armed robbery and asks that we reconsider State v. Enmund, 476 So.2d 165 (Fla. 1985).

  6. Lemorin v. State

    829 So. 2d 237 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002)

    Affirmed. See Crowley v. State, 558 So.2d 529 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990);Lopez v. State, 555 So.2d 1298 (Fla.3d DCA 1990); Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986).

  7. People v. Mitchell

    295 A.D.2d 916 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    We reject defendant's further contention that Supreme Court erred in its supplemental charge on asportation. As we concluded in the prior appeal of a codefendant, the court "properly instructed the jury that the movement of the property by the owner from his physical possession as a result of threats by defendants may constitute the degree of movement required by law" ( id. at 948; see also People v. James, 981 P.2d 637, 641 [Colo], cert denied 1999 Colo LEXIS 707 [Sup Ct, July 26, 1999]; Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176, 1178 [Fla]; Johnson v. State, 432 So.2d 758, 759 [Fla]; People v. Price, 25 Cal.App.3d 576, 579; People v. Martinez, 274 Cal.App.2d 170, 174). Finally, the court did not err in admitting evidence of uncharged crimes because the evidence was necessary "to complete the narrative of events to assist the jury in its comprehension of the crime" ( People v. Hamid, 209 A.D.2d 716, 717, lv denied 87 N.Y.2d 973; see People v. Zanghi, 256 A.D.2d 1120, 1121, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 881). In any event, the court's limiting instructions to the jury eliminated any prejudice to defendant ( see People v. Glass, 259 A.D.2d 989, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 924).

  8. Palmer v. State

    571 So. 2d 567 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 2 times
    In Palmer v. State, 571 So.2d 567 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), the Third District found that when stacking minimum mandatory sentences, the sentences should be ordered so that the sentence that does not allow for gain time is served first and the sentence that does allow for gain time is served last.

    We find no error in any of the points urged for appeal save and except the stacking of the consecutive minimum mandatory terms. Fonseca v. State, 547 So.2d 1032 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Montoya v. State, 489 So.2d 794 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Jimenez v. State, 480 So.2d 705 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Wiggins v. State, 460 So.2d 483 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); Orantas v. State, 452 So.2d 68 (Fla. 1984). As to the stacking of the minimum mandatories, the way the sentences are worded the defendants, as sentenced, must first serve a minimum mandatory three years under the trafficking statute, Section 893.135(1), Florida Statutes (1990), and then a three year minimum mandatory for possession of a firearm pursuant to the provision of Section 775.087(2), Florida Statutes (1990).

  9. Gainey v. State

    557 So. 2d 887 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990)   Cited 3 times

    Additionally, that portion of the sentence in which the judge retained personal jurisdiction over the case must be deleted, because appellant was sentenced under the guidelines. Hansbrough v. State, 509 So.2d 1081, 1087 (Fla. 1987) ("Because the sentencing guidelines apply to that sentence, however, the trial court should not have retained jurisdiction for one-third of the armed robbery sentence."); Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176, 1177 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986) (trial court directed on remand to strike that portion of the sentence retaining jurisdiction, because the defendant was sentenced under the guidelines). As to the state's argument that appellant should be resentenced for a first degree felony rather than a second degree felony by virtue of Section 775.087(1)(b), Florida Statutes (1987), we initially note that the state did not cross-appeal the sentence imposed.

  10. Fennell v. State

    528 So. 2d 1212 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 2 times

    The defendant correctly asserts the rule applicable at the time of sentencing that victim injury could only be properly scored if it was an element of the offense.See Fla.R. Crim.P. 3.701(d)(7); Massard v. State, 501 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), rev. dismissed, 504 So.2d 403 (Fla. 1987); Clifford v. State, 518 So.2d 983 (Fla.2d DCA 1988); Smith v. State, 501 So.2d 139 (Fla.2d DCA 1987); Wright v. State, 487 So.2d 1176 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). See also Mathis v.State, 515 So.2d 214 (Fla. 1987); State v. Whitfield, 487 So.2d 1045 (Fla. 1986).