Opinion
No. 05-05-00711-CR
Opinion Issued October 17, 2005. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex.R.App.P. 47.
On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 2, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F02-34819-KI. Dismiss.
Before Justices WHITTINGTON, FRANCIS, and LANG.
OPINION
Chuck Edward Wright waived a jury trial and entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated robbery with a deadly weapon. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. §§ 29.02, 29.03 (Vernon 2003). Pursuant to the plea agreement, the trial court deferred adjudicating guilt, placed appellant on community supervision for six years, and assessed a $1500 fine. The trial court also made an affirmative finding that appellant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, a firearm, during commission of the offense. The State later moved to proceed with adjudication of guilt, alleging appellant violated the conditions of his community supervision. Appellant pleaded true to the allegations. The trial court found the allegations true, adjudicated appellant guilty, and sentenced him to twelve years imprisonment. In a single issue, appellant contends he was denied due process and equal protection because he was denied the right to appeal a "whimsical capricious revocation" based solely on his economic status. For the reasons listed below, we dismiss the appeal. Appellant argues he was denied due process because the violations of his conditions of community supervision were due solely to economic hardship and fulfilling his statutory duties to care for his children. Appellant's complaint challenges the trial court's decision to adjudicate guilt, which is not permitted. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp. 2004-05); Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 942 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Appellant further argues article 42.12, section 5(b) violates both the United States and Texas Constitutions in that he is being treated differently from persons placed on regular probation. Appellant contends the statute deprives him of his fundamental right of access to the courts. Appellant did not object at trial that the statute deprived him of fundamental rights. See Tex.R.App.P. 33.1. Even constitutional complaints may be waived by failure to timely raise an objection in the trial court. See Wright v. State, 28 S.W.3d 526, 536 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Moreover, neither the Texas nor the United States Constitutions provides a right to appellate review of criminal convictions. See Phynes, 828 S.W.2d at 2. A state may limit or even deny the right to appeal a criminal conviction. See id. When a legislative enactment says an accused may not appeal a determination to adjudicate, there is no right to do so. See id.; Henderson v. State, 132 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.). Thus, appellant may not complain on direct appeal that he was denied his right to due process when his guilt was adjudicated. Because there is no complaint before us over which we have jurisdiction, we dismiss the appeal.