Wright v. State

2 Citing cases

  1. Simmons v. State

    274 So. 3d 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)   Cited 24 times
    Holding that the trial court lacked authority to rescind an order granting resentencing because that order became final when neither party moved for rehearing or appealed

    We agree.Vennisee v. State , 235 So.3d 947 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ; Wright v. State , 225 So.3d 360 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ; Rooks v. State , 224 So.3d 272 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ; Rogers v. State , 223 So.3d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017). Because the order granting resentencing became final when neither party moved for rehearing or appealed the order, the trial court had no authority to enter a second order rescinding the original order.

  2. Day v. State

    266 So. 3d 870 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019)

    As the Florida Supreme Court recently held, Florida's parole process "fulfills Graham 's requirement that juveniles be given a ‘meaningful opportunity’ to be considered for release during their natural life based upon ‘normal parole factors.’ " Franklin v. State , 258 So.3d 1239, 1241 (Fla. 2018) (citation omitted) (quoting Virginia v. LeBlanc , ––– U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1726, 1729, 198 L.Ed.2d 186 (2017) ). Indeed, Florida's parole process led to Day's actual release—more than once. Cf.Currie v. State , 219 So.3d 960, 960 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) ("Appellant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to obtain release and, in fact, was released on parole when he was 25 years old."); see alsoState v. Michel , 257 So.3d 3, 7 (Fla. 2018) (plurality) ("Michel's sentence does not violate Graham or Miller because Michel was not sentenced to life without the possibility of parole."); Wright v. State , 225 So.3d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (for successful postconviction motion based on Graham , appellant must "allege that he has never been released and has no meaningful opportunity to obtain release within his lifetime" (citing Currie ) ).Day argues that his case is different because the violations that ended his parole were "technical violations."