Wright v. State

4 Citing cases

  1. Watkins v. State

    379 S.E.2d 227 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989)   Cited 2 times

    "`On a trial of an indictment for [criminal damage to property], it is not error to admit evidence showing that feelings of anger or dislike existed on the part of the defendant toward the owner of the property.' [Cit.] . . . The evidence objected to in the case sub judice was of actions and words of the defendant toward the property owner and therefore admissible to show the `feelings' of the defendant toward such property owner." Wright v. State, 113 Ga. App. 436, 437 (1) ( 148 S.E.2d 333) (1966). See also Wilson v. State, 171 Ga. App. 120 (1) ( 318 S.E.2d 705) (1984).

  2. Smith v. State

    184 S.E.2d 224 (Ga. Ct. App. 1971)

    1. Substantially identical language as the italicized portion of this charge was approved in Crowe v. State, 117 Ga. App. 598, 599 ( 161 S.E.2d 512), although the case was reversed on additional wording of the charge. Appellants strongly contend that the holding in the Crowe case, supra, is in conflict with the holdings in the cases of Gibbs v. State, 112 Ga. App. 272 ( 145 S.E.2d 43) and Wright v. State, 113 Ga. App. 436 ( 148 S.E.2d 333). We do not agree. During the trial defendant made an unsworn statement.

  3. Crowe v. State

    161 S.E.2d 512 (Ga. Ct. App. 1968)   Cited 4 times

    " Held: 1. While the italicized portion of the charge is correct as an abstract principle of law concerning an unsworn statement, and is in language substantially identical to that which has met the approval of the courts of this State prior to 1962 (e.g., see Poppell v. State, 71 Ga. 276, 278; Murray v. State, 85 Ga. 378, 381 ( 11 S.E. 655); Teasley v. State, 105 Ga. 842 (1) ( 32 S.E. 335); Ryals v. State, 125 Ga. 266 (1) ( 54 S.E. 168); Harper v. State, 129 Ga. 770, 774 ( 59 S.E. 792); Goolsby v. State, 133 Ga. 427 ( 66 S.E. 159); Thurmond v. State, 198 Ga. 410, 417 ( 31 S.E.2d 804); Ash v. State, 109 Ga. App. 177 (3) ( 135 S.E.2d 507); Huff v. State, 113 Ga. App. 257, 264 ( 147 S.E.2d 840); cf. Gibbs v. State, 112 Ga. App. 272 (2) ( 145 S.E.2d 43); Wright v. State, 113 Ga. App. 436, 438 ( 148 S.E.2d 333) the statute as amended in 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 133, 134; Code Ann. § 38-415) expressly recognizes the right of an accused to be sworn and testify as any other witness, and prohibits any comment whatsoever on his failure to do so. We consider the distinction made by the trial court between an unsworn statement and testimony, in charging that the accused is not under oath and incurs no penalty by failure to tell the truth, as tantamount to a direct comment on his failure to submit to the compulsion of an oath, and such a comment is no longer permissible under the express prohibition of the amended statute, and to this extent the trial judge erred in his instructions.

  4. Apprendi v. New Jersey

    530 U.S. 466 (2000)   Cited 27,030 times   101 Legal Analyses
    Holding that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”

    Finally, it is likely that the statute in Brightwell, given its language ("a less period") and its placement in a separate section, was read as setting out an affirmative defense or mitigating circumstance. See Wright v. State, 113 Ga. App. 436, 437-438, 148 S.E.2d 333, 335-336 (1966) (suggesting that it would be error to refuse to charge later version of this statute to jury upon request of defendant). See generally Archbold [*]52, [*]105-[*]106 (discussing rules for determining whether fact is an element or a defense).