Wright v. St. John's Hospital

28 Citing cases

  1. Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co.

    678 N.E.2d 1093 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 3 times

    Both parties agree that in order to support plaintiff's contention that the defendant refused to recall him to a suitable position, the plaintiff must show that there was a job available that plaintiff could have performed given his medical restrictions. In Wright v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App.3d 680 (1992), the plaintiff sued her employer, the defendant, for retaliatory discharge after she filed a workers' compensation claim. Although we recognize that the instant case is for retaliatory refusal to recall, we nevertheless find the Wright decision to be instructive in this case.

  2. Olympic Restaurant Corp. v. Bk. of Wheaton

    251 Ill. App. 3d 594 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 18 times
    In Olympic, the clause provided, in relevant part, "[t]he parties agree that their respective attorneys may review and make modifications *** within ten (10) business days after the date of the Contract acceptance. If the parties do not agree and written notice thereof is given to the other party *** then this Contract will become null and void ***."

    On appeal of a trial court's grant of summary judgment, we have de novo review. ( Wright v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 680, 683.) Summary judgment should not be granted unless "the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt." ( Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 240; see also Palomar v. Metropolitan Sanitary District (1992), 225 Ill. App.3d 182, 188.)

  3. Coulter v. Sisters of St. Francis Servs., Inc.

    2016 Ill. App. 153655 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)

    "A defendant in a retaliatory discharge action is entitled to summary judgment if it shows that no genuine issue of material fact exists in that the plaintiff cannot prove any one or more of these propositions." Wright v. St. John's Hosp. of Hosp. Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 680, 684 (1992). The key here is that there is a causal relationship among these elements.

  4. Bd. of Trs. of S. Ill. Univ. v. Jones

    2015 Ill. App. 5th 140046 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    The plaintiffs appeal. ¶ 13 The plaintiffs' first argument is that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant in that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the defendant knowingly submitted false or fraudulent claims for travel reimbursement. In response, the defendant argues that he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact with respect to (1) the existence of a false or fraudulent claim and (2) whether he knowingly submitted any false claim. ¶ 14 Summary judgment is appropriate only where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Wright v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 680, 682 (1992). "In making this decision, the trial court may draw inferences from undisputed facts; if reasonable persons could draw divergent inferences from the undisputed facts, the issue should be decided by the trier of fact and the motion should be denied."

  5. Physicians Insurance Exchange v. Jennings

    316 Ill. App. 3d 443 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)   Cited 51 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding that a motion to tax deposition costs filed after the circuit court's declaratory judgment order did not directly challenge the declaratory judgment, had no bearing on the effect of the declaratory judgment, and did not deprive the circuit court of jurisdiction to hear the motion to tax deposition costs

    We agree with Continental that the trial court could not have made findings of fact if the case had been decided at the pretrial motion stage. In Wright v. St. John's Hospital of the Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App.3d 680 (1992), the plaintiff filed a retaliatory discharge suit against her employer. The trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the employer included a section entitled "findings of fact."

  6. Hall v. Burger

    277 Ill. App. 3d 757 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996)   Cited 17 times
    Concluding that the insurer should not be allowed to deduct the amounts paid by both underinsured tortfeasors, based on both the language of the insurance policy and public policy

    I. ANALYSIS A court properly grants summary judgment when the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits show no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. ( 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 1992); Wright v. St. John's Hospital ofthe Hospital Sisters of the Third Order of St. Francis (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 680, 682-83, 593 N.E.2d 1070, 1072.) The standard of review is de novo.

  7. Hess v. Clarcor, Inc.

    237 Ill. App. 3d 434 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 20 times
    Upholding the trial court's denial of injunctive relief where the evidence of a facially neutral absenteeism policy, adopted for a legitimate business purpose and applied evenhandedly did not support a finding of retaliatory intent on the part of the employer

    ) An employer is not proscribed from discharging an employee who is physically unable to perform his work. ( Wright v. St. John's Hospital (1992), 229 Ill. App.3d 680, 688; LaPorte v. Jostens, Inc. (1991), 213 Ill. App.3d 1089, 1093.) Furthermore, the employer is not required to find a new job for an employee who is physically unable to do his original job. Carter v. G C Electronics (1992), 233 Ill. App.3d 237, 244; Wright, 229 Ill. App.3d at 688; LaPorte, 213 Ill. App.3d at 1093.

  8. Johnson v. Chi. Bd. of Educ.

    Case No. 12 C 3670 (N.D. Ill. Jun. 29, 2018)

    Johnson argues that no such requirement exists, but her argument is unconvincing, because it relies on cases that were all decided before Webb, which first articulated the "reasonable expectation" requirement. See Motsch v. Pine Roofing Co., 178 Ill. App. 3d 169, 533 N.E.2d 1 (1988); Wright v. St. Johnson Hosp. of Hosp. Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 680, 593 N.E.2d 1070 (1992). Indeed, Webb expressly notes that one of those cases, Motsch, "provides tacit support" for the "reasonable expectation" requirement.

  9. Fortino v. Vill. of Woodridge

    Case No. 17 C 5037 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 7, 2018)   Cited 1 times

    Because Illinois law does not require an employer to retain an employee who is unable to work due to a disability, the Village argues that Fortino's retaliatory discharge claim fails as a matter of law. See Wright v. St. John's Hosp. of Hosp. Sisters of Third Order of St. Francis, 229 Ill. App. 3d 680, 688, 593 N.E.2d 1070, 1075 (1992). The Village also argues that Fortino has failed to allege sufficient facts to state a plausible claim of retaliatory discharge because he was terminated nearly two years after he filed his first workers' compensation claim and does not allege that anyone from the Village raised the issue during the termination process.

  10. Keffer v. Olin Corporation

    NO. 09-CV-023-WDS (S.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2010)

    Reliance on the medical report of Gragnani is not critical to that determination, nor does the reliance or lake of reliance on that report amount to retaliatory motive. Finally, Olin had no duty to offer plaintiff another job when he refused to return to his job. Wright v. St. John's Hospital, 593 N.E.2d 1070, 1076 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992), and there is no evidence that plaintiff made any effort to return to work at Olin in any capacity. He simply refused to respond to the letters requiring him to return and did not ask for a different assignment. IV. CONCLUSION