Opinion
3:00-CV-2605-L.
February 23, 2001
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), and an order of the District Court in implementation thereof, this cause has been referred to the United States magistrate judge. The findings, conclusions and recommendation of the magistrate judge, as evidenced by his signature thereto, are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS:
Type of Case: This is a civil rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Parties: Plaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Ellis I Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID) in Huntsville, Texas. He was incarcerated at the Hutchins State Jail of the TDCJ-ID in Dallas, Texas, during the events at issue in this case. Defendant is Assistant Warden Joe Smith at the Hutchins State Jail. The court has not issued process in this case. However, on December 14, 2000, the magistrate judge issued a questionnaire to Plaintiff who filed his answers on January 16, 2001.
Statement of Case: The complaint alleges that Defendant falsely imprisoned Plaintiff from March 25, 1998, until April 21, 1998, although he had completely served his 180-day sentence and no parole revocation warrants and/or detainers were outstanding against him. (Complaint ¶ V). Plaintiff requests declaratory and monetary relief. (Id. and Answer to Question 6 of the Magistrate Judge's Questionnaire).
Based upon the allegations in Plaintiff's complaint and in his answers to the magistrate judge's questionnaire the material facts on which his complaint is predicated are as follows: In 1966 Plaintiff was convicted for murder in the Fourth District Court of Dallas County, Texas, and sentenced to life in the TDCJ-ID (Answer to Question 3). In 1987, he was convicted of burglary of a building in the Fourth District Court and sentenced to forty years in the TDCJ-ID to run concurrent with the life sentence. (Id.). Subsequently, on June 20, 1994, the TDCJ-ID released Plaintiff on parole. (Id.). Plaintiff remained on parole until approximately September 26, 1997, when he was charged in Cause No. F97-78150 in the Fourth District Court. (Answer to Question 1). On February 19, 1998, the Fourth District Court sentenced Plaintiff to 180 days with back-time credits from September 26, 1997. (Id.). Plaintiff completed serving his 180-day sentence on March 25, 1998, under TDCJ-ID prisoner number 815914. (Complaint ¶ V). Defendant, however, detained him until April 21, 1998, although no criminal charges, including parole revocation warrants or detainers, were pending against him. (Id. and Answer to Question 2). Plaintiff is presently confined in the TDCJ-ID for the 1966 murder and 1987 burglary convictions. (Answer to Question 3). His complaint reflects that his current TDCJ-ID prisoner number is 203700.
Plaintiff alleges he was not given credit for November 9, 1997. (Complaint ¶ V).
Findings and Conclusions: The court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP). His complaint is, thus, subject to screening under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which imposes a screening responsibility on the district court. Section 1915A reads in pertinent part as follows:
The court shall review . . . as soon as practicable after docketing, a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity [and] [o]n review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief."28 U.S.C. § 1915A (emphasis added). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) ("Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . (B) the action or appeal — (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.").
Both sections 1915A(b) and 1915(e)(2)(B) provide for sua sponte dismissal if the Court finds that the complaint is "frivolous" or that it "fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." A complaint is frivolous, if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-32, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957).
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994), the Supreme Court stated:
We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, [footnote omitted] a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
Thus, a § 1983 claim that effectively attacks the constitutionality of a conviction or present confinement does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been overturned or otherwise invalidated by an authorized tribunal or executive body. Id.
In Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997), the Supreme Court extended Heck to a request for declaratory relief under § 1983.
By December 28, 2000, the date of filing of this case, Plaintiff was no longer in custody for the one-month term of confinement in dispute. Therefore, he was ineligible for federal habeas relief, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and was, thus, unable to satisfy the favorable termination requirement of Heck. Because Plaintiff seeks damages and declaratory relief pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment and has not satisfied the favorable termination requirement, he is barred from any recovery. See Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 300-01 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that a former prisoner who was no longer in custody, and thus unable to obtain habeas relief, could not recover damages under § 1983 for his alleged unconstitutional confinement, in absence of a showing that some authorized tribunal or executive body had overturned or otherwise invalidated his conviction).
Plaintiff has failed to allege any cognizable claim for relief against the named Defendant under § 1983. Therefore, the complaint should be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).
RECOMMENDATION:
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(b)(i).
A copy of this recommendation will be mailed to Plaintiff.
NOTICE
In the event that you wish to object to this recommendation, you are hereby notified that you must file your written objections within ten days after being served with a copy of this recommendation. Pursuant to Douglass v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc), a party's failure to file written objections to these proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law within such ten-day period may bar a de novo determination by the district judge of any finding of fact or conclusion of law and shall bar such party, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law accepted by the district court.