As such, he certainly qualifies as an "intelligent bystander who has heard and paid particular attention to the testimony of the witness." See, also, Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341, 34 S.E. 70. This assignment of error not sustained.

Jury service is not a matter of choice, or right, but is a duty, imposed by the state. State v. Walker, 192 Iowa 823, 185 N.W. 619; Garrett v. Weinberg, 54 S.C. 127, 31 S.E. 341, 34 S.E. 70. It is analogous to military duty in time of war, in that the citizen designated by the state for jury duty must, like the soldier, serve whether he likes it or not, on such terms as the state may fix. Such being the case, compensation for jury duty is not a common-law right, but is purely statutory and, in the absence of statute, compensation cannot be recovered. Hilton v. Curry, 124 Cal. 84, 56 P. 784. Let us then see what the Arizona legislature has said on this subject.

Having executed the contract, and no fraud appearing in the procurement of the execution, the Court is without power to relieve the defendant on the ground that the thought it contained provisions which it does not. He is concluded thereby to the same extent as if he had known what due diligence would have informed him of, to wit: its plain provisions that the agent had no authority to make agreements other than those contained therein, and that such agreements, if made, were not a part of the contract. Leonard v. Power Co., 155 N.C. 10; Machine Co. v. Feezer, supra; Wright v. R. R., 125 N.C. 1; Thomas v. Cooksey, 130 N.C. 148; Griffin v. Lumber Co., 140 N.C. 514; Dellinger v. Gillespie, supra: Hayes v. R. R., 143 N.C. 125; Floars v. Ins. Co., 144 N.C. 241; Dixon v. Trust Co., supra; Medlin v. Buford, 115 N.C. 260. The defendant, however, contends that plaintiff is not entitled to recover for that the delay in shipping the purchased articles was unreasonable, and that he is relieved thereby.

ontract or surrender any benefits accruing thereunder. It would be a strange result if, in accepting and acknowledging the receipt of the exact amount due him at the time, the plaintiff's receipt should be construed to be a surrender of all further claim under his contract with defendant for which he had paid a full consideration. It will be noted that the paper is a printed form used by the defendant, attached to the draft, the signature of which was required before payment. It is hardly probable that either party understood that it applied to or covered any other than the claim then made and due. It may be that the language of the voucher, without reference to the proof of claim and other papers attached, would be sufficiently broad to include all claims accruing by reason of the sickness of 6 July, 1907, but, when read in connection therewith, we think it manifestly referred to the claim then due and for which the draft was drawn. Defendant relies upon the decision of this Court in Wright v. R. R., 125 N.C. 1. In that case the damage for which the plaintiff sued had been sustained prior to the date of the release and was expressly referred to and included therein.

An opportunity should be given it to do so. This case differs from Wright v. R. R., 125 N.C. 1, in that there the issue of fraud was submitted to the jury. The release recited the consideration and the evidence proved it, and there being no evidence of fraud, this Court held that there being not a scintilla of evidence of the affirmative, the Judge should have directed a verdict on that issue against the party alleging the fraud.