Opinion
Case No. 1:03-cv-2043-DFH-TAB.
April 21, 2005
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Darren Wright has sued his employer, Richmond Power and Light ("RPL"), for race discrimination in three promotion decisions. He alleges violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and asserts a state law claim for emotional distress he says he suffered as a result of the discrimination. RPL has moved for summary judgment. For the reasons discussed in this entry, the court grant's RPL's motion.
Undisputed Facts
The following facts are either undisputed or reflect the evidence in the light reasonably most favorable to plaintiff Wright, as the party opposing summary judgment. Wright began working for RPL in September 1991. He has always worked in the same position, electrical equipment repair person. RPL employees like Mr. Wright are members of a collective bargaining unit represented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers ("IBEW"), Local 1395. A collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") is in place between RPL and the IBEW. The CBA in place at all relevant times for purposes of this lawsuit became effective October 7, 2002.
On October 10, 2002 RPL issued a Job Posting for the position of Equipment Operator. An Equipment Operator at RPL operates various heavy construction equipment such as backhoes, trenchers, snowplows, and similar powered equipment. Two employees responded to the Job Posting, Wright and James Field. Wright is African American; Field is not. Wright had no heavy equipment experience and admits as much. Field was a laborer who had previously been employed as a construction worker. He had worked alongside of heavy equipment operators for many years and had served numerous temporary transfers to equipment operator at RPL where he filled in for operators who were absent because of vacation, illness or other reasons. In fact, Field had been a temporary transferee so often that he would qualify for the equipment operator pay level, pursuant to the CBA, which ordinarily required six months on the job. However, Field had less overall seniority with RPL than did Wright.
Filling any Job Posting within the collective bargaining unit requires RPL to follow the CBA. The CBA provides: "consideration shall be given to bidders on the basis of departmental seniority, provided the employees have the qualifications and present ability to do the job." The IBEW and RPL have interpreted "present ability" to mean that the person is capable of performing the job without the need for any specialized training. Pursuant to the CBA and past practice, if a person bidding on a Job Posting has the qualifications and ability to take on the job without the need for training, his or her seniority is compared with any other bidders similarly qualified and able. Among those qualified and immediately able to perform the job, the person having the highest seniority receives the job. If no bidders are qualified and immediately able to perform the job, the person bidding with the highest seniority gets the position. If only one bidder is able and qualified, that person receives the job regardless of seniority ranking.
Field was awarded the Equipment Operator position because RPL found him to be qualified and able to perform the job duties without the need for training., while Wright was not able to perform the job without more training. Wright protested and filed a grievance. The grievance went to binding arbitration. In February 2004 the arbitrator issued a decision finding that the company did not violate the CBA. The arbitrator found that Field was clearly qualified and capable of performing the duties of the job while Wright had never operated most of the relevant machinery, leading to the inescapable conclusion that Wright would need training in order to properly operate the machinery.
On October 28, 2002 RPL issued a Job Posting for the position of Electrician C. An Electrician C helps maintain the power company's substations. It is a very safety-sensitive position, for it requires frequent exposure to high voltage lines and equipment such as transformers and breakers. An Electrician C tests various substation equipment, troubleshoots malfunctioning equipment, conducts high voltage switching, and performs other functions at substations, some of which require reading and interpretation of wiring diagrams, schematics, and electronic drawings. Wright and another employee with more seniority bid for the job opening.
RPL deemed neither applicant as being qualified with the present ability to handle the position. Consequently, the job was awarded to the other applicant who held the most seniority. In this instance, Wright did not file a grievance. However, he did apply again for a similar posting in June 2003. Two other employees bid for this second Electrician C opening as well. Again, none of the candidates for the position were deemed to have the requisite skills to immediately perform the job, so the position was awarded to the applicant with the most seniority. Wright did not file a grievance with respect to this appointment either. In both instances, the individual receiving the Electrician C position was caucasian. Also, in both instances, Eddie Wagers, the direct supervisor of those in the Electrician C position and a person who Wright agrees is experienced, knowledgeable, and capable of determining if a person has the skills and experience necessary to immediately assume the Electrician C responsibilities, determined that none of the applicants could take over the job without training. Wright does not believe that Wagers, who participated in the decision making process, discriminated against him.
Before the second Electrician C position was posted, negotiations were conducted with regard to Wright's grievance over not being awarded the Equipment Operator position in 2002. Initially an agreement was reached between an IBEW officer, Wright, and RPL that Wright would be placed in the open Electrician C position to resolve the grievance, which had yet to be heard by the arbitrator. However, this deal was abandoned when the union learned that others were interested in the Electrician C position. Because other union members were interested in bidding on the position, the IBEW decided it could not agree to refuse grievances that might be filed by other candidates if Wright were simply handed the job regardless of others' seniority and qualifications.
Consequently, after the job was posted and bids received, a test was given to the three applicants to measure basic knowledge of electricity and substation equipment to see if any of the three might be deemed knowledgeable enough to step into the Electrician C position immediately. Although RPL hoped that Wright would do well enough to qualify, and would be sufficiently appeased to drop the pending grievance, his was the worst of the three scores on the test. None of the three were deemed qualified. According to RPL and the CBA, the result that a caucasian with more seniority was chosen to be trained for the position.
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is granted if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). To determine whether any genuine fact exists, the court examines the pleadings and the proof as presented in depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions, and affidavits made a part of the record. First Bank Trust v. Firstar Information Services, Corp., 276 F.3d 317, 321 (7th Cir. 2001). It also draws all reasonable inferences from undisputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party and views the disputed evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). However, the non-moving party may not rest upon mere allegations in the pleadings or upon conclusory statements in affidavits; rather he must go beyond the pleadings and support his contentions with properly admissible evidence. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). Only competing evidence regarding facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 247-48. And, if the non-moving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to his case, one on which he would bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is properly granted to the moving party. Ortiz v. John O. Butler Co., 94 F.3d 1121, 1124 (7th Cir. 1996).Discussion
I. Failure to Promote
Wright has not offered any direct evidence of race discrimination in the promotion decisions at issue. He relies instead on the familiar indirect method of proof. To establish a prima facie case of race discrimination in a promotion decision, Wright must come forward with evidence tending to show: (1) he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified for the position sought; (3) he was rejected for the position; and (4) the employee promoted was not a member of the protected group and was not better qualified than Wright. Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc., 260 F.3d 727, 732 (7th Cir. 2001). Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a nondiscriminatory reason for the promotion decision. Traylor v. Brown, 295 F.3d 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2002). The plaintiff must then present sufficient evidence to enable a reasonable trier of fact to find that the employer's explanation is a false pretext, which would permit an inference of unlawful discrimination. Id. To demonstrate pretext, a plaintiff must do more than show that the decision made was wrong or that his qualifications might have been slightly better than those of the person who received the promotion. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1179-1180 (7th Cir. 2002). If relying on comparative qualifications to establish pretext, plaintiff's qualifications must be so superior that no reasonable person in the exercise of impartial judgment could have selected another individual. Id.
With respect to the posting for Equipment Operator, Wright has failed to establish the fourth requirement. The undisputed facts show that Field was clearly more qualified for the position. He had operated the equipment at issue and had enough experience to pre-qualify for the raise given to those with six months experience on the job. Wright admits to having little or no experience operating any of the equipment. While Wright argued unsuccessfully during the arbitration hearing that with job postings there had always been a great deal of deference given to those with more seniority and that he was entitled to a 60-day trial period, that is of no moment in this case. Field's superior qualifications are undisputed and readily apparent, and Wright has offered no evidence of any non-African American being given the trial period he proposes.
As to the two postings for Electrician C, the court concludes that Plaintiff has made his prima facie case but has failed to overcome the non-discriminatory reason advanced by RPL for the choice of the other two employees to fill the positions — seniority under the CBA. While RPL argues that Wright has failed to establish that he was qualified for the Electrician C position, the court is not persuaded on that point. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Wright, RPL deemed none of the applicants capable of stepping into the position. Both individuals who were awarded the position required training. While Wright scored lowest on the basic electricity test the second time around, the undisputed facts show that the decisive fact in both decisions was seniority, as required by the CBA. By complying with the CBA, RPL did not engage in race discrimination. Wright has offered no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that RPL's reliance on the seniority provisions of the CBA was a false pretext for race discrimination.
II. Emotional Distress
In Count III of his complaint, Wright alleges that he was "embarrassed, humiliated and suffered emotional distress because of Defendant's wrongful conduct" and then concludes this sentence and the count with the following nonsensical phrasing, "back pay and additional promotional positions and opportunities positions which Plaintiff would know occupy, but for discrimination; and damages should be assessed against Defendant." The court does not understand how this count serves any purpose, as it appears to be more of a prayer for damages than a separate count. However, in an abundance of caution and leniency in the interpretation of pleadings, the court assumes that Wright seeks to assert a state law tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Even giving Wright the benefit of the doubt in interpreting Count III as a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, that claim fails as a matter of law. Under Indiana law, no such claim may be successfully prosecuted unless there is evidence that the action taken by the defendant was taken with intent to harm and was so outrageous as to be beyond the bounds of decency. Powdertech, Inc. v. Joganic, 776 N.E.2d 1251, 1264 (Ind.App. 2002). The evidence of record is entirely devoid of support for such a claim. No jury could reasonably find in Wright's favor on the same. Because it is so clear that the claim has no merit, the court exercises its supplemental jurisdiction to resolve it without further litigation in the state courts. See, e.g., Wright v. Associated Insurance Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 1994); Korzen v. Local Union 705, International B'hood of Teamsters, 75 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal of meritless state law claim).
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed in this entry, defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted. Final judgment shall issue in favor of defendant.
So ordered.