We concluded that "when the employer refuses to pay medical benefits and that refusal is later deemed unfounded, the employer cannot rely on the claimant's failure to comply with the [provisions of OCGA §§ 34-9-200 and 34-9-201 requiring Board approval for a change in physician by referral] to deny liability for claimant's medical expenses." Id. at 216-217; compare Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822, 823 ( 449 S.E.2d 167) (1994) (where claimant changes physicians at a time when the employer is providing medical benefits, the provisions of OCGA §§ 34-9-200 and 34-9-201 requiring Board approval do apply). Since the City had accepted the compensability of the claim and was providing medical benefits at the time the medical treatments at issue were provided, the Superior Court correctly determined Capital Atlanta, supra, did not apply under the present facts.

"It is arguable that [ Board Rule 201 (c) ] is invalid because it enlarges the substantive rights of claimants[.]" Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822, 824 (2), 449 S.E.2d 167 (1994). However, pretermitting whether Board Rule 201 (c) is invalid, the superior court erred in concluding that Hawkins was entitled to a change in physician.

The ALJ was authorized to find Pritchett justified in seeking treatment with doctors other than the authorized physician if she found Pritchett "`had been dismissed from treatment as cured even though still in need of treatment. . . .' [Cit]" Bel Arbor Nursing Home v. Johnson, 192 Ga. App. 454 ( 385 S.E.2d 315) (1989). See also Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822, 823 (1) ( 449 S.E.2d 167) (1994). She found, in fact, that Dr. Burkus "is of the opinion that there is nothing further to offer the employee in the way of medical treatment."

Following our grant of a discretionary appeal, The Arrow Company appealed the superior court's judgment requiring The Arrow Company to pay certain medical and prescription drug expenses following an unauthorized referral to a specialist by Smith's authorized physician. We reversed because we found that Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822 ( 449 S.E.2d 167) controlled disposition of the appeal, and because we found that the amendments to OCGA § 34-9-201 and the State Board of Worker's Compensation Rules were inapplicable because Smith's injury occurred before the effective dates of the amendments. The case is now before this court again because, after granting certiorari, our Supreme Court remanded the case for reconsideration in light of this court's subsequent decisions in Porter v. Ingles Market, 219 Ga. App. 145 ( 464 S.E.2d 212) and Barnes v. City of Atlanta Police Dept., 219 Ga. App. 139 ( 464 S.E.2d 609), which held the amendment to OCGA § 34-9-201 should be applied retroactively.

On June 21, 1994, the board issued its order reversing this portion of the ALJ's decision, determining that, since Ingles did not have a posted panel of physicians, Lee Fabricators v. Cook, 203 Ga. App. 450 ( 417 S.E.2d 35) (1992), did not apply and Ingles was responsible for these bills. In Case No. A95A1518, Ingles appeals from the superior court's affirmance by operation of law of this portion of the board's decision, contending the matter is controlled by Wright v. Overnite Transp. Co., 214 Ga. App. 822 ( 449 S.E.2d 167) (1994). (a) "[W]here the claimant changes doctors at a time the employer is providing medical care, the employer's subsequent termination of medical care and controversion of the claim does not excuse the claimant's failure to petition for a change `at the time other medical services were sought.' K-Mart Corp. v. Anderson, 166 Ga. App. 421, 423 ( 304 S.E.2d 526) (1983).