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Wright v. Northrop Grumman Corp.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Jul 23, 2008
No. B196840 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)

Opinion

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. SC087076, Jacqueline Connor, Judge.

Law Offices of Daniel D. Dydzak and Daniel D. Dydzak for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP, Tracey A. Kennedy and Lauren Thibodeaux for Defendant and Respondent.


KRIEGLER, J.

Plaintiff and appellant William Wright III appeals from a judgment following an order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Northrop Grumman Corporation in this action arising out of the termination of Wright’s employment. Wright contends triable issues of fact exist as to whether he had an oral agreement providing that Northrop would not terminate his employment without cause. We conclude that Wright was an at-will employee and therefore affirm the judgment.

FACTS

Northrop manager Fred Leake hired Wright in June 1985 to work as a senior quality assurance engineer. Wright signed a “requisition and agreement” form that stated in pertinent part, “No promise of a specified term of employment . . . has been made by the employment interviewer.” He also signed an acknowledgement of receipt of the employee handbook, which states, “Nothing in this handbook alters the basic at-will relationship between you and Northrop Grumman. Either you or the Company may terminate your employment with Northrop Grumman for any reason, with or without cause.”

Leake told Wright that after his 90-day probationary period ended, he would be a permanent employee. Leake also told him that Northrop employees could expect long-term careers with the company. In 1986, Wright was promoted to quality engineering specialist. He received good performance reviews and periodic increases in salary and benefits. Wright observed that Northrop had a history, policy and practice of keeping long-term employees in its engineering department because several employees had worked for the company into their seventies.

In March 2003, Wright’s son was in a serious car accident. Northrop employee Wendy Butterfield took over Wright’s job duties during an absence. Butterfield discovered errors in Wright’s work, including reports that he prepared in 2002 and early 2003 in which Wright certified material had met specifications when his test results showed the material had failed. Wright admitted that he had made careless mistakes. In May 2003, Wright’s supervisor and a human resources employee provided Wright with a final warning notice and corrective action plan. As part of the plan, Wright’s work would be reviewed for accuracy for a minimum of six months.

Wright had received training on the proper disposal of hazardous material. On September 17, 2003, Wright poured nitric acid in a corrosive waste container with unknown substances. He was aware that a reaction was possible, but there was no immediate reaction. Ultimately, fumes from the container caused evacuation of hundreds of employees, several of whom received medical attention and the laboratory was closed for two or three weeks. Northrop concluded that Wright was responsible for improperly disposing of hazardous waste. Northrop informed Wright on September 27, 2003, that he was being terminated for violating Northrop’s conduct standards as set forth in the employee handbook; namely, gross negligence in performance of his duties and violation of safety, environmental, or plant protection regulations.

Wright was 57 years old at the time of his termination. He had been receiving medical care for clinical depression and attention deficit disorder for several months, although there is no evidence that Wright’s coworkers, supervisor, or Northrop’s human resources personnel were aware of his condition. Wright’s son passed away from his injuries in December 2003.

The unemployment insurance department determined that Wright was not entitled to benefits. Wright appealed this determination to the California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board. On January 27, 2005, an administrative law judge issued a decision finding that Wright had not committed misconduct, as he had followed Northrop’s procedure for handling corrosive waste and did not willfully disregard his duty to his employer, and therefore, the denial of unemployment benefits was reversed.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On September 27, 2005, Wright filed a complaint against Northrop for breach of an oral employment contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Wright alleged that he had an oral employment agreement with Northrop. Northrop’s actions constituted harassment and discrimination, and subjected him to a hostile work environment. Northrop breached the employment agreement by terminating him without good cause and in violation of public policy, based on his advanced age and absences he had taken as a result of stress. Northrop also breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by terminating him without good cause and against public policy.

On September 22, 2006, Northrop filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that Wright was an at-will employee, and moreover, Northrop had good cause to terminate his employment. Wright opposed the motion. The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment and entered judgment in favor of Northrop. Wright filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

“We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposing papers except that to which objections were made and sustained. We liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party. (Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1028, 1037.)” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 388-389 (Dore).)

Express Written Agreement

Wright contends that there are triable issues of fact as to whether he had an oral agreement providing that Northrop would not terminate his employment without cause. We disagree.

Labor Code section 2922 provides as follows: “An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other.” “[A]n at-will provision in an express written agreement, signed by the employee, cannot be overcome by proof of an implied contrary understanding.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 340, fn. 10 (Guz); Dore, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 389.) The “mere passage of time in the employer’s service, even where marked with tangible indicia that the employer approves the employee’s work, cannot alone form an implied-in-fact contract that the employee is no longer at will.” (Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at pp. 341-342.) For example, in Guz, the employee was terminated after 23 years of employment, but the employment remained at-will for purposes of summary judgment, although the employee received steady raises and promotions and performance reviews were generally favorable. (See id. at p. 327-328, 342-343.)

The undisputed evidence showed that Wright signed a document stating that he had an at-will employment relationship. Moreover, the acknowledgement expressly provided, “Either you or the Company may terminate your employment with Northrop Grumman for any reason, with or without cause.” The fact that Wright performed well, received one promotion and regular salary increases, and was employed by the company for several years, or that other employees had lengthy careers at Northrop, did not alter Wright’s at-will employment relationship.

Nor was the acknowledgment of at-will employment a contract of adhesion. “As [Civil Code] section 1670.5, subdivision (a) states: ‘If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.’” (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) However, the acknowledgment merely restated the at-will provision of Labor Code section 2922. The validity of Labor Code section 2922 cannot seriously be questioned, in light of our Supreme Court’s express reliance on the statute in Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at page 350 and Dore, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pages 391-392. The trial court properly granted the motion for summary judgment.

Because summary judgment was properly granted on the basis that Wright was an at-will employee subject to termination at any time, we need not address whether there was good cause for his termination.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendant and respondent Northrop Grumman Corporation is awarded its costs on appeal.

We concur: TURNER, P. J., ARMSTRONG, J.


Summaries of

Wright v. Northrop Grumman Corp.

California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division
Jul 23, 2008
No. B196840 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)
Case details for

Wright v. Northrop Grumman Corp.

Case Details

Full title:WILLIAM WRIGHT III, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. NORTHROP GRUMMAN…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Second District, Fifth Division

Date published: Jul 23, 2008

Citations

No. B196840 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2008)