Opinion
J-A14033-15 No. 1430 MDA 2014
07-17-2015
MARILOU WRIGHT, Appellant v. KEVIN MULLEN, Appellee
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 2, 2014, in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County, Civil Division at No(s): 2013-4059 BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS and STRASSBURGER, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Marilou Wright (Wright) appeals from the judgment entered on October 2, 2014, against her and in favor of Kevin Mullen (Mullen). We affirm.
We note that Wright purported to appeal from the order denying her post-trial motion, which does not constitute an appealable order. Fanning v. Davne , 795 A.2d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 2002) (providing appeal to Superior Court can only lie from judgments entered subsequent to trial court's disposition of any post-verdict motions, not from the order denying post-trial motions). Accordingly, at the direction of this Court, the prothonotary entered judgment in this matter on October 2, 2014. We have corrected the caption accordingly.
In May of 2010, Wright entered into a residential lease with Mullen. The tenancy was uneventful until June 25, 2013, when Mullen discovered that Wright's pets had caused substantial damage to the floors of the rental property. Subsequent to this discovery, and despite multiple attempts to remedy the damage, the relationship between the parties deteriorated. Ultimately, Wright moved out of the rental property on August 31, 2013, nine months prior to the expiration of the lease. Mullen was able to repair and re-lease the property on January 1, 2014, but demanded compensation from Wright, as well as payment of rent, under the terms of the lease, through May 31, 2014.
On October 17, 2013, Wright filed a declaratory judgment action asking the court to declare, inter alia, "the respective rights and responsibilities of the parties" under the lease. Action for Declaratory Judgment, 10/17/2013, at 8. Mullen filed an answer and new matter with counterclaim on February 4, 2014.
On May 29, 2014, after a three day bench trial, the trial court decided in favor of Mullen and awarded a net of $11,974.11 in damages. The trial court denied Wright's post-trial motion. This appeal followed. Both Wright and the trial court complied with the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Wright raises the following four issues for our review.
A. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in entering judgment in favor of [Mullen] and against [Wright] for rent, late fees and utilities by ignoring substantial evidence presented by [Wright]: (1) that [Mullen] breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment owed to [Wright]; (2) that [Wright] surrendered the premises on August 31, 2013 and [Mullen] accepted said surrender by removing the keys from the premises that day, canceling the fuel oil to the premises, and listing the property for lease on Craig's List, or alternatively that [Mullen] repudiated the lease; and (3) that [Mullen] breached the lease and violated The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951 by charging [Wright] an illegal security deposit under duress?Wright's Brief at 3-4 (answers omitted).
B. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in entering judgment in favor of [Mullen] and against [Wright] for damages to the leased premises by ignoring substantial evidence establishing that the lease which was drafted by [Mullen] did not include a default/remedies provision authorizing [Mullen] to claim the damages which said court awarded to [Mullen] in its verdict?
C. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err in entering as part of its gross damage award against [Wright] (before credits) the sum of $12,446.83, representing one-half of the Mammoth Restoration estimate given substantial evidence which established that: (1) [Mullen] has never paid Mammoth any money for any restoration work; (2) the Mammoth estimate was approximately three times as high as the Home Depot estimate that [Mullen] had originally asked [Wright] to pay; and (3) [Mullen] performed flooring repairs prior to re-leasing the premises on January 15, 2014 which were similar to the flooring repairs commissioned by [Wright] in August of 2013 for which [Wright] only paid Celestino Remodeling the sum of $905.00?
D. Did the [t]rial [c]ourt err by failing to award [Wright] any damages other than a credit for the two security deposits in light of substantial evidence presented by [Wright] establishing that: (1) [Mullen] charged [Wright] an illegal security deposit of $1,500.00, (2) [Mullen] did not appropriately sequester the original security deposit as required by The Landlord and Tenant Act of 1951, and (3) [Mullen] did not properly account for either security deposit or related interest within thirty days of surrender and acceptance as required by said Act?
Our standard of review in a non-jury trial is well established:
We must determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial judge committed error in the application of law. Additionally, findings of the trial judge in a non-jury case must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as a verdict of a jury and will not be disturbed absent error of law or abuse of discretion.Davis ex rel. Davis v. Government Employees Insurance Company , 775 A.2d 871, 873 (Pa. Super. 2001) (quotations omitted).
Additionally, we are mindful that "leases are in the nature of contracts and are thus controlled by principles of contract law, including the well settled rules of interpretation and construction." Cusamano v. Anthony M. DiLucia , Inc., 421 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Pa. Super. 1980). "Interpretation of a contract, in this case a lease, poses a question of law." Charles D. Stein Revocable Trust v. General Felt Industries , Inc., 749 A.2d 978, 980 (Pa. Super. 2000). "Our standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as this court may review the entire record in making its decision." Kripp v. Kripp , 849 A.2d 1159, 1164 n. 5 (Pa. 2004).
Following our review of the certified record, the parties' briefs, and the relevant law, we conclude that the opinion of the Honorable Bradley P. Lunsford states findings of fact that are supported by the record, evidences no abuse of discretion, and thoroughly and correctly addresses and disposes of Wright's issues and supporting arguments. Accordingly, we adopt the trial court's opinion, filed on October 31, 2014, as our own, and affirm the disposition of Wright's issues on the basis of that opinion. The parties shall attach a copy of the trial court's October 31, 2014 opinion in the event of further proceedings.
Judgment affirmed. Judgment Entered. /s/_________
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/17/2015
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