Opinion
No. 3:01cv0802 AS
May 16, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On November 13, 2001, pro se petitioner, James Wright, an inmate at the Maximum Control Complex (MCC) in Westville, Indiana, filed a petition seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Response filed on behalf of the respondent by the Attorney General of Indiana on March 22, 2002, demonstrates the necessary compliance with Lewis v. Faulkner, 689 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1982). The petitioner filed a Traverse on May 14, 2002, which this Court has carefully examined. The Attorney General of Indiana has placed before this Court extensive documentation beginning with Exhibits A1 to A12, so this Court has a more than adequate record to determine whether there is an entitlement here to any relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The petitioner is a convicted felon serving a sentence for possession of cocaine. The sentence was imposed in Marion County, Indiana in 1999. The disciplinary setting for this case is somewhat unique. The actual conduct involved in this case occurred in Otter Creek Correctional Center, a correctional facility owned and operated by the Corrections Corporation of America, located in Wheelwright, Kentucky. That institution apparently houses inmates under contract with the Indiana Department of Corrections, and this petitioner was there under that contract. Apparently, the conduct that constituted the battery for which the petitioner was charged in a disciplinary proceeding occurred at the institution in Wheelwright, Kentucky. The CAB proceeding occurred in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. Thus, the only connection this petitioner and case have with this Court is the fact that he is now incarcerated in a state facility located in this district. So this Court is required to plow through these proceedings in both Sullivan County, Indiana and Wheelwright, Kentucky.
As a result of the proceedings at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility, this petitioner was sanctioned with a written reprimand, loss of telephone privileges for four months, and one year of disciplinary segregation, which has almost been served. None of these sanctions thus far would implicate Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), but would be within the ambit of Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995). However, that is not the end of the story. Additionally, there was a deprivation of 365 days of earned time credit and demotion from credit class I to credit class III. Thus, Wolff is implicated. The procedural demands of Wolff have been followed, and confidential information has been relied on and provided to this Court and examined here.
This event which took place apparently involved a mini-palace revolt by inmates in which this petitioner was heavily involved. He hit the warden on the back of the head with a closed fist. There apparently was massive evidence heard and considered which implicated this petitioner in assaulting the warden. A conduct report was written on July 12, 2001, and the process proceeded in a fairly extensive way. Final administrative review has been had. Certainly, the evidence here is more than sufficient under Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Institution at Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985), and the "some evidence" test in this circuit under Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 2000 WL 1512783 (U.S.), McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999), and Meeks v. McBride, 81 F.3d 717 (7th Cir. 1996).
The issue involving the so-called violation of the ADP is largely a state law issue under Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991). However, there is an issue regarding the reliability of informants and whether the CAB panel was impartial. This petitioner has failed to make a case with regard to the impartiality of the CAB under Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1025 (1984) and its progeny in this circuit. The confidential statements were clearly inculpatory. The question is whether this petitioner had a right to confront and cross-examine their authors, and generally that is not the case in these proceedings. The full-blown application of the Sixth Amendment has not been applied to CAB proceedings. There has been a compliance with the procedural mandates of Wolff, leading this Court to the conclusion that there is no violation of the Constitution, statutes and treaties of the United States. See Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1088 (1989). Thus, the petition for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is now DENIED. IT IS SO ORDERED.